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Abstract
The thesis consists on three chapters aiming to contribute to a growing literature on adap-
tive learning, a form of bounded rationality that has been attracting increasing interest
both in the theoretical and practical elds, as an alternative to the commonly used rational
expectations hypothesis on how expectations are formed among economic agents.
The rst chapter investigates whether it is possible to improve the ability of the stan-
dard real business cycle model to t the main stylised facts of emerging economies, taking
the case of Mexico as an illustration, by assuming that agents are not fully rational and
instead form expectations according to an adaptive learning rule. Two well-known rules -
recursive least squares and its constant gain variant - are considered for this purpose. The
degree of di¢ culty of the learning process is characterised by di¤erent starting values of
the algorithms as well as di¤erent constant gains.
The simulations show that the model under learning generally outperforms its rational
expectations counterpart. Therefore, policymakers should take into account the fact that
the expected welfare gains/losses of a particular policy reform, conceived assuming a fully-
rational environment, might be signicantly di¤erent if, in practice, agents behave as
learners.
Using a heterogeneous-agent model with three types of agents, namely capitalists,
skilled workers and unskilled workers - assuming constant population shares suggesting
low social mobility -, and allowing for di¤erent degrees of complementarity among these
within the productive structure, the second chapter welfare-evaluates tax reforms con-
sistent with a lower long run debt-to-output ratio for the United Kingdom, both under
rational expectations and heterogenous learning.
It shows that, relative to the other tax reforms, capital tax cuts lead to the highest
aggregate welfare but are skill-biased and can thus increase inequality in the long-run.
That is, depending on the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour,
falls in the capital tax can result in higher levels of welfare inequality, even in the absence
of other frictions and increases in other forms of taxation. On the other hand, reductions
in labour taxes can hurt the capitalists.
This chapter shows too that including the transition period in the welfare evaluation
lowers the inequality e¤ects of capital tax reductions since the complementarity between
capital and all labour inputs is higher in the short- than in the long-run. Finally, while
heterogeneous learning in the shape of di¤ering initial beliefs after the reform can lead to
a form of "irrational exuberance" after a tax cut, it can also exacerbate welfare inequality.
Finally, the third chapter presents an heterogeneous-agent model with two types of
agents, capitalists and workers - with constant population shares given the strong evi-
dence on low social mobility -, calibrated to Bolivias data in order to examine the short
and long-run e¤ectiveness and distributional e¤ects of various scal rules designed to im-
pose restrictions on the evolution of public debt as a share of output, in response to two
di¤erent sources of exogenous volatility (i.e. productivity and commodity shocks) and un-
der di¤erent ways of forming expectations, namely rational expectations and heterogenous
learning.
The results show that under full rationality the scal rules generate a trade-o¤between
debt-stabilisation and higher income inequality while, under some conditions, heterogenous
learning can help to break such trade-o¤ so that some of the rules can perform well in both
elds. However, given the signicantly high levels of income inequality and dependence on
commodity revenues experienced by Bolivia, nding the best performing rule in response
to all the relevant exogenous shocks this economy might face, appears to be a challenging
task.
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Preface
While the concept of rational expectations is the standard tool of modelling expecta-
tions in macroeconomic models, it has been criticised for its high information requirements.
In particular, the rational expectations hypothesis is an equilibrium concept which does
not focus on how this equilibrium can be reached in case of a large deviation due, for
example, to a policy change or any structural shift in general. Hence, in a context where
the transition dynamics after such changes are of interest, the rational expectations hy-
pothesis does not take into account the possibility that in practice agents might have no
or very little information on the e¤ects of these changes.
As a consequence, there has been an increasing interest in bounded rationality in the
recent years. One increasingly popular form of bounded rationality is the adaptive learn-
ing hypothesis. While rational expectations assumes that agents know the structure of the
economy, the history of all the endogenous and exogenous variables and all the deep pa-
rameter values, the adaptive learning hypothesis reduces these information requirements.
In e¤ect, adaptive learning assumes that agents do not know the structure of the
economy and the deep parameter values. However, they are endowed with a model of the
economy which they take to estimate the latter with the data they observe using some
learning algorithm. Under certain conditions, a plausible learning process will ensure
convergence towards rational expectations. Thus, although adaptive learning represents
a small deviation from rational expectations, the transition dynamics predicted by both
approaches can di¤er substantially, a result that deserves attention.
In light of the above, this thesis aims to contribute to the growing literature on adaptive
learning, looking to pay attention to both theoretical and applied aspects of relevance. It
focuses mainly on scal policy matters, as these have received relatively less attention in
the literature. For this purpose, the thesis has been divided in three main chapters, each
of them with di¤erent theoretical or policy-oriented motivations, but all sharing the same
interest in better understanding the consequences of assuming that agents might no be
fully rational and behave as learners instead.
The rst chapter investigates if it is possible to improve the ability of the standard real
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business cycle model to t the data in the case of emerging economies - taking the case of
Mexico as an illustration - by assuming that, instead of being fully rational, agents form
expectations according to an adaptive learning rule.
The motivation of this investigation relies in the fact that while it is well-documented
that the simple RBC model and its main extensions have been successful in replicating
most of the key macroeconomic stylized facts of the US and other developed economies,
their performance has been rather poor in the case of emerging economies
The results of this analysis are quite relevant for policy-design purposes in the sense
that the expected welfare gains/losses of a particular policy reform conceived assuming a
fully rational environment might be signicantly di¤erent if, in practice, agents behave as
learners. This point is also illustrated in this chapter by comparing the e¤ects of two tax
reforms.
The second chapter seeks to examine the distributional consequences of a variety of
tax reforms in a context of structural and learning heterogeneity among agents, and a
productive sector characterised by exhibiting di¤erent degrees of complementarity between
capital, skilled and unskilled labour. To isolate the e¤ects of changes in each tax rate on
all agents, this work considers changes in tax rates that are not revenue neutral. Instead,
given its current policy relevance, tax reforms consistent with a lower steady-state debt-
to-output ratio are taken into consideration.
For illustrative purposes, the proposed model is calibrated to the UK economy, with
the aim of obtaining a realistic assessment of the likely costs and benets of tax reforms
for the di¤erent agents.
As said earlier, two types of heterogeneity are considered in this chapter. First, the
models structural heterogeneity in terms of income and savings is generated by means of
nancial transaction costs which di¤er substantially between three types of agents - cap-
italists, skilled workers and unskilled workers. According to relevant evidence suggesting
low social mobility in the UK, the model assumes constant population shares with respect
to the three types of agents considered.
Second, learning heterogeneity takes the form of di¤ering initial beliefs among those
di¤erent agents who form expectations and need to learn their equilibrium laws of motion.
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This corresponds to an unequal distribution of information right after the tax reform in
the economy, an element which has not yet been considered in the tax reform literature.
The results of this study have important implications for scal policy design as these
help to conclude that tax reforms should be accompanied by a careful evaluation of the
production structure in the economy and should also consider the robustness of the re-
sults to di¤erent plausible ways of forming expectations among agents, in order to clearly
identify the groups that are mostly likely to see their returns reduced due to the reform
so that appropriate redistributive policies can also be considered.
Finally, the third chapter examines the short and long-run e¤ectiveness and distribu-
tional e¤ects of applying various scal rules designed to impose restrictions on the evolution
of public debt, in response to di¤erent sources of exogenous volatility (i.e. productivity
and commodity shocks) and under di¤erent ways of forming expectations among agents,
namely rational expectations and heterogenous learning.
For illustrative purposes, the chapter considers the particular case of Bolivia, an econ-
omy that has su¤ered a long history of severe debt-crisis episodes, triggered both by scal
and monetary mismanagement, and that currently experiences signicantly high levels of
income inequality and economic dependence on commodity (natural gas) exports.
For this purpose, a closed-economy stochastic general equilibrium model with struc-
tural and learning heterogeneity is considered. As before, to capture key features of wealth
and income inequality in the economy, nancial intermediation costs which di¤er substan-
tially between two types of agents, capitalists and workers, are included in a way such that
the latter represent a signicantly large proportion of the population but have very limited
access to the nancial markets. As in the previous chapter, strong evidence suggesting
very low social mobility in Bolivia and Latin America in general, leads to assume constant
population shares in term of the two types of agents considered.
Meanwhile, learning heterogeneity takes the form of di¤ering initial beliefs between
agent types whereby agents with limited access to the nancial markets tend to exhibit
o¤-equilibrium initial expectations which, in turn, a¤ect their learning process and thus
can have important consequences on the performance of the scal rules in terms of their
debt-stabilisation properties and their e¤ects on income distribution.
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The intended contribution of this chapter in terms of scal policy design is thus twofold.
First, it investigates the impact of debt-stabilising scal rules on income distribution to
identify possible trade-o¤s between e¢ cient debt-stabilisation and a higher income inequal-
ity. Moreover, it explores the role learning might have with respect to the aforementioned
trade-o¤(i.e. if it helps to break the trade-o¤or if, conversely, it strengthens it), something
that has received little attention in the literature on scal policy. Second, with the elements
discussed above, the chapter explores the possibilities that might be e¤ectively available to
an economy such as Bolivia in its quest for an e¢ cient debt-stabilisation mechanism which
does not compromise (or even improves) income distribution, within a context of extreme
income and wealth inequality as well as of high dependence on commodity revenues.
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Chapter 1
Business cycles and learning: the case of emerging
economies
1.1 Introduction
Real business cycle (RBC) modelling and its various extensions under the dynamic general
equilibrium (DGE) modelling literature are currently the workhorse of modern macroeco-
nomic analysis and its main applications.1 As many authors point out (see e.g. Mc-
Grattan, 1994 and 2006, and Kremer et al., 2006), the current relevance of this approach
has much to to thank to the earlier success of simple RBC setups in replicating some of
the key macroeconomic stylized facts of the US and other developed economies, while a
large number of extensions have helped to further improve these earlier results in several
important dimensions, a process that ultimately has promoted the intensive use of DGE
modelling in the design and evaluation of scal and monetary policy by their relevant
economic authorities.
On the other hand, it is widely known that RBC modelling has been much less suc-
cessful in replicating key stylized facts in emerging economies, as illustrated by Bergoeing
and Soto (2002) for Chile, Ellery et al. (2002) for Brazil and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2006) for
Argentina. In particular, RBC models have not been able to replicate key features that
are common across these type of economies, such as: a) consumption is more volatile than
output; b) investment is signicantly (i.e. above four times) more volatile than output;
1I would like to thank Charles Nolan for helpful comments to an earlier version of this Chapter.
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c) hours worked are more volatile than wages, and d) hours worked and real wages show
little contemporaneous correlation. Remarkably, despite their well-documented poor t
to the data, a number of well-known extensions of the RBC model are being adopted by
policy-makers in an increasing number of emerging countries (see e.g. Tovar, 2009, and
Florian and Montoro, 2009).
In response to this concern, some extensions to the standard RBC model have been
proposed over the last decade to improve its overall performance when applied to emerging
economies. Most of this research has focused on some particularities often observed in
these economies that tend to a¤ect the behavior of their main economic aggregates. For
example, Ellis and Fender (2003) suggest that taking account of the costs of corruption
in the public sector helps to better explain the transition experiences of several Eastern
European economies; Arias and Ardila (2003) show that including military expenditure
and the costs of an internal conict in the model leads to a better description of the
economic behavior of Colombia; while Castillo et al. (2006) demonstrate that the ability
of a DGE model to t the data for Peru is greatly improved by acknowledging the high
levels of dollarization observed in this country.
Looking for more general results on this area, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) concentrate
their attention on the frequent policy regime switches observed in emerging markets and
then show that introducing trend shocks along with the typical cycle shocks to total
factor productivity (TFP) can account for key features of economic uctuations in these
economies such as the high volatility of consumption and the occurrence of sharp current-
account reversals or sudden stops. However, Garcia-Cicco, et al. (2006) note that for these
results to hold a high variability of trend shocks relative to transitory shocks is necessary,
a feature that has no robust empirical support when long time series are employed, as
demonstrated by them taking the example of Argentina.
More recently, Mendoza (2008) developed a DGE model including frictions in the
nancial (credit) market in the shape of an endogenous collateral constraint which greatly
improved the performance of the model calibrated for Mexico and also helped to generate
dynamics consistent with key features of the sudden stop episode that hit this country
in 1995. Finally, following yet another line of work, Angelopoulos et al. (2012) show -
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with Mexico as the chosen case study too - that introducing weak property rights derived
from major changes in the quality of institutions (e.g. privatization, regulation of the
banking system and bankruptcy laws) as an additional source of uncertainty can improve
the performance of the standard RBC model.
A common denominator of the literature cited above is the use of the rational ex-
pectations (RE) hypothesis which states that, on average, economic agents do not make
systemic mistakes in forecasting the future and thus deviations from perfect foresight are
only random. This, in turn, implies that agents should fully know the structure of the
economy, the values of the structural parameters as well as the distribution of any ex-
ogenous shocks. As many authors have been increasingly suggesting over the last decade
(see e.g. Turnovsky, 2000), such assumption appears to be rather strong, as it ignores the
fact that in many cases agents behave in a less rational fashion mostly due to information
restrictions of diverse nature that tend to persist for a number of periods and thus might
generate temporary deviations from the equilibrium consistent with full rationality.
In light of the above, the aim of this document is to examine whether the overall per-
formance of the standard RBC model can be improved in the case of emerging economics
by assuming that, instead of being fully rational, agents in fact behave according to the
postulates of the so-called adaptive learning paradigm (see e.g. Marcet and Sargent, 1989,
and Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). Adaptive learning (AL) is a form of bounded rationality
(see Sargent, 1993) which hypotheses that economic agents do not fully know the economic
environment in which they interact and that, to overcome this lack of knowledge, they
estimate or learn a reduced form of this environment in an adaptive and recursive fash-
ion. More specically, they act as econometricians by recursively running regressions on
realized past data to estimate a set of structural parameters required to form expectations
about a set of relevant variables.2
2Note that adaptive learning is only one among several alternative approaches considered in the litera-
ture in order to better model expectations. Blume and Easley (2000) postulate an approach called rational
learning, which suggests that the learning behavior derives from preferences in the sense that if a market
participant is an expected utility maximiser, then her beliefs must be revised in light of new information
according to Bayes rule. Evans (2001) then proposed a so-called eductive learning approach by which
learning takes place in mental, not real, time and thus implies more strict conditions for convergence to
the fully rational equilibirum than under adaptive learning.
More recently, Adam and Marcet (2011), combining key elements of rational and adaptive learning,
proposed a more general approach which assumes agents are internally rational - i.e. they maximize
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Even though AL represents a small deviation from RE, as pointed out by Marcet and
Nicolini (2003) and also as shown below, the short and medium run dynamics predicted
by the model under this assumption can be quite di¤erent from their RE counterparts,
with the former often showing higher levels of volatility in some key variables such as
consumption and labour supply whenever the agents face more severe restrictions in their
learning processes and thus remain far away from the RE solution for longer periods of
time. An appropriate setup of these especial features might then help the RBC model
to improve its performance in terms of better replicating the aforementioned key stylized
facts observed in emerging economies.
The version of the RBC model considered in this work is similar to the one proposed by
Ireland (2004), with indivisible labour but including a government that has expenditures
that are nanced by levying taxes on capital and labour income and runs a balanced
budget in every period, as in Giannitsarou (2006).
For illustrative purposes, the model is calibrated to Mexican annual data for the period
between 1993 and 2005. This choice rests in three key criteria, First, it allows to remain
close to most of the relevant literature on this topic (see e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007;
Mendoza, 2008, Boz et al., 2008, and Angelopoulos et al, 2012, all of them considering the
Mexican case). Second, as a member of the OECD, macroeconomic data for Mexico are
available for a reasonably long period of time, something that is not common among most
of emerging economies. Third, Mexicos recent economic history, where the debt crisis
of the mid-eighties and the so-called "tequila" crisis of 1994 stand out as key episodes
in which economic agents probably were not able to behave in a fully-rational fashion,
provides an interesting opportunity to consider alternative ways of forming expectations,
such as AL, and see how these might a¤ect the performance of the model in terms of
tting the data.
Precisely, in terms of the AL setup, two very well-known algorithms in the AL literature
discounted expected utility under uncertainty given dynamically consistent subjective beliefs about the
future -, but might not be externally rational - i.e. they may not know the true stochastic process of
relevant variables beyond their control -, which amounts to relaxing the prior beliefs that agents are
assumed to hold under full-rationality. Besides providing the adaptive learning literature with more
adequate microeconomic foundations, the authors also show that some of the modeling choices in it - e.g.
the chosen reduced-form of the model, the assumptions about the learning rules - are less ad-hoc than
might initially appear.
16
are considered: recursive least squares (RLS) and its corresponding constant gain variant
(RLS-CG).3 Moreover, especial emphasis in this document is given to the two key features
in any learning setup which ultimately determine how di¤erent the predictions of the
model under AL are compared to the case when RE is assumed. These are a) the initial or
starting values of the learning algorithm and b) the level of the constant gain, or relative
weight given to the latest forecast error taken into account in the learning algorithm to
update the latest estimates of the structural parameters of interest.
The rst of these elements is relevant for both learning algorithms and essentially
tries to describe how much preliminary information is held by the agents just before
they start the actual learning process. The second feature is only relevant when RLS-
CG is considered and basically describes the sensitivity of the learning process to the
latest forecast error associated with the previous period parameter estimates generated by
the algorithm. Hence, if the constant gain is relatively high, the learning algorithm will
produce sharp changes in the new parameter estimates even if these had almost converged
to their RE values.
Given the particular economic history of Mexico during the period under analysis, the
goodness of t of the RBCmodel at hand - by means of standard second-moment matching
exercises - will be evaluated under two di¤erent scenarios that can have a serious impact in
the way agents learn about the state of the economy and, as a result, in their consumption
and labour supply decisions over time. In the rst and most commonly used scenario,
the economy is assumed to oscillate around its steady state due to random shocks to
technology. In the second, the economy is assumed to face a major recession but the
government does not intervene so that the economy must naturally return to its steady
state level.
It is important to note that this document follows a similar line of research as Carceles-
Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007), Eusepi and Preston (2011) and Huang et al. (2009), with
the key di¤erence that these authors evaluate the goodness of t of the RBC under AL
for the case of the US only. It is also related to the work of Boz et al. (2008), who show
3See e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) for a detailed
discussion of these algorithms.
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that the performance of the RBC model can be improved for emerging economies if it
is assumed that agents know the structure of the economy and the associated structural
parameters but they need to learn about the nature of a shock on total factor productivity
(TFP). By contrast, in this work it is assumed that agents are interested in learning about
the entire structure of the economy but also about the actual impact of the TFP shocks
on the economy, given the latter.4
The ndings of this chapter show that the RBC model under AL generally outperforms
its RE counterpart in terms of matching the data for Mexico. Therefore, economic policy
design must take into account the fact that the expected welfare gains/losses of a particular
policy reform conceived within a RE environment might be signicantly di¤erent if agents
behave as learners in practice. This point is illustrated by examining the e¤ects of two
unexpected tax reforms for Mexico both under RE and AL.
1.2 The RBC model
The basic closed-economy RBC model considered in this work is similar to that used by
Ireland (2004), but including a simple public sector as in Giannitsarou (2006) so that the
impact on welfare of tax reforms can be examined.5 The main elements of the model are
described next.
4In this sense, the approach considered here "nests" the one followed by Boz et .al. (2011). Another
di¤erence from Boz et.al. (2011) is that they assume learning takes place by means of a more general
Kalman lter.
5This model setup remains quite close to most of the literature discussing the goodness of t properties
of the basic RBC model and its extensions both under rational expectations and adaptive learning. In
these, a closed economy is assumed given that the key domestic features of the economies examined are
of particular interest while, in the long run, the external sector is assumed to be in equilbrium. See,
inter alia, King and Rebelo (1999), Ireland (2004), McGrattan (2006) and Angelpoulos et al. (2011) for
research in this eld assuming rational expectations. Also, see Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007)
and Huang et al. (2009) for a similar discussion under adaptive learning.
In the particular case of Mexico, due to its signicant oil production and exports, trade - dened as
exports plus imports as a share of GDP - has behaved in a fairly steady fashion between 1990 to 2005,
remaining consistently close to its average for the period, of 58% of GDP, even in the years of economic
downturn. Similarly, this countrys trade balance decit during the same period has remained virtually
constant at 1% of GDP (source: World Bank Database).
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1.2.1 Households
It is rst assumed that the single-good economy is composed of a time-invariant number
N of identical and innitely-lived individuals who obtain utility out of consumption and
leisure. Hence, every individual j will maximize the following expected utility function:
U j = E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCjt   Hjt

; (1.1)
where Cjt and H
j
t are agent j
0
s consumption and hours worked, respectively. The para-
meter  is the subjective discount factor. The parameter for labour satises  > 0 and
is consistent with the notion of labour indivisibility proposed by Hansen (1985). That
is,  =   [ln(1 H0)] =H0 where H0 is the amount of indivisible labour that an agent
contracts to provide if she is one of the agents randomly chosen to provide labour. Hence,
the ratio Hjt =H0 is the probability that a given agent will be providing labour in period t.
Also, according to the agreed contract, every agent will always get paid the competitive
wage even if she does not work in a given period, an assumption that resembles a type of
unemployment insurance which is required here to preserve the desired properties of the
utility function (i.e. continuous and di¤erentiable).
Each agent j faces two constraints in every period. The rst is the capital accumulation
rule:
Kjt = (1  )Kjt 1 + Ijt ; (1.2)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate, and the second one is the budget constraint
given by:
WtH
j
t +RtK
j
t 1 +
j
t    k (Rt   )Kjt 1   hWtHjt = Cjt + Ijt ; (1.3)
whereWt and Rt are the factor rentals determined in their respective competitive markets
and thus are taken as given by each individual and jt represents prots. The tax rate
on capital gains is  k and the tax rate on labour income is h. This constraint states
that each agents total expenditure can not exceed her income, which is given by the net
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of taxes remuneration to the inputs she provides plus the prots made by the rms she
owns. However, as shown below, it is assumed that rms operate in a perfectly competitive
environment and thus no economic prots are made, jt = 0.
1.2.2 Firms
To facilitate further manipulations in the following sections, it will be assumed that every
rms output, Y jt , depends on the capital stock accumulated until the previous periodK
j
t 1,
the amount of labour Hjt and a technology shock Zt, according to a constant-returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas function:
Y jt = ZtK
j
t 1
 
tHjt
1 
; (1.4)
where  > 1 is the gross rate of labour-augmenting technological progress and 0 <  < 1
is the capitals share of income.6 The technology shock is available to all rms and follows
a rst-order autoregressive process of the form:
lnZt = (1  ) lnZ +  lnZt 1 + "t; (1.5)
where Z is a positive constant, 0 <  < 1 is the autocorrelation coe¢ cient and the random
shocks "t are normally distributed.
The factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive so that both the wage and
the capital rental are determined by their respective markets and thus must be taken as
given by each individual rm. This means that the prot-maximization behavior of any
rm will be given by maximising:
jt = ZtK
j
t 1
 
tHjt
1   WtHjt  RtKjt 1; (1.6)
6Most studies dene the production in the form Yt = f(Zt;Kt;Ht) where Kt represents the capital
stock at the the beggining of period t and therefore is taken as given. Here, the function used is of the
form Yt = f(Zt;Kt 1;Ht) where Kt 1 represents the capital stock at the the end of period t  1 so that
both specications are equivalent.
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with respect to capital and labour, a procedure that yields the rst-order conditions:
Rt = ZtK
j 1
t 1
 
tHjt
1 
; (1.7)
and
Wt = (1  )ZtKjt 1(1 )tHj
 
t ; (1.8)
which simply state that the optimal amounts of capital and labour to be hired by each rm
are such that the marginal products of these inputs equal their respective factor rentals
Rt and Wt. Note that, according to (1:4), these two conditions can also be written as:
Rt = 
Y jt
Kjt 1
and Wt = (1  ) Y
j
t
Hjt
:
1.2.3 Government
To remain close to the standard RBC model, following e.g. Giannitsarou (2006), it is
assumed that the government expenditure takes the form of transfers to private agents,
Gt, dened endogenously as they are nanced through taxes on labour income and capital
gains. That is, Gt is dened according to a balanced-budget rule of the form:
Gt =  k (Rt   )Kt 1 + hWtHt (1.9)
where Kt 1 is aggregate capital stock (i.e. Kt 1 =
PN
j=1K
j
t 1) and Ht is aggregate labour
(i.e. Ht =
PN
j=1H
j
t ). Policy parameters  k and h are the tax rates on capital and labour
income, respectively, which are assumed to be constant and thus will be set at their average
values for the period between 1980 and 2005 in the calibration procedure below.
It is also worth noting that under the model setup considered in this chapter, where Gt
is not included in the utility function (see equation (1.1)), this variable is often interpreted
as representing public goods or transfers which have not direct impact on the agents
utility but are still necessary for the whole economy to fully operate (see e.g. Marattin
and Palestini, 2012).7
7This model setup regarding on the so-called wastefulness of government spending has been criticised
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1.2.4 Characterization of the equilibrium allocations
Given the model setup above, the general problem for an agent j at time 0 can be expressed
as:
max
fCjt ;Kjt ;Hjtg
E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCjt   Hjt

: (1.10)
subject to the budget constraint - combining (1:2) and (1:3) -:
(1  h)WtHjt + (1   k)(Rt   )Kjt 1 = Cjt +Kjt  Kjt 1; (1.11)
plus the stochastic process for technology:
lnZt = (1  ) lnZ +  lnZt 1 + "t; (1.12)
with the aggregate outcomes Wt and Rt and the initial value of capital taken as given.
The Lagrangian representation of this maximization problem is:
 = E0
1X
t=0
ft[lnCjt   Hjt + jt((1  h)WtHjt +
+(1   k)(Rt   )Kjt 1   Cjt  Kjt +Kjt 1)]g; (1.13)
and the optimal conditions with respect to Cjt , K
j
t and H
j
t are:
jt =
1
Cjt
; (1.14)
jt = 
j
t+1 [(1   k)(Rt+1   ) + 1] ; (1.15)
and
 = jt(1  h)Wt; (1.16)
for not being able to replicate the values of the scal policy multipliers seen in practice (see e.g. Marattin
and Marzo, 2010). However, Marattin and Palestini (2012) show that including the government spending
into the utility function does not unambiguously solve this issue and thus a much more complex analysis
is needed, which is beyond the scope of this work.
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respectively. Now, substituting jt from (1:14) into (1:15) yields the Euler condition:
1 = Et
24 Cjt+1
Cjt
! 1
[(1   k)(Rt+1   ) + 1]
35 ; (1.17)
which equates the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between period t and t+1
and the corresponding marginal rate of transformation given by the available technology.
Likewise, substituting jt from (1:14) into (1:16) gives:
Cjt = (1  h)Wt; (1.18)
which states that the utility loss derived from providing a unit of labour must equal the
utility gains of an additional unit of consumption purchased with the income earned from
providing that extra unit of labour.
1.2.5 Aggregated version of the model
Next, since all the agents are assumed to be identical, it is possible to sum their behavior
up and nd the aggregate variables of this economy. The aggregate value of any individ-
ual variable Xj (with X=fC;H; Y;K; Ig) in any given period will be PNj=1Xj, which is
assumed to be exogenous and constant. Since all the identical agents will consume exactly
the same in each period, it follows that
PN
j=1X
j
t = NX
j
t = Xt. Moreover, since N can
be thought as a population index that goes from 0 to 1, then the average value of any
variable - i.e. Xt=N - will be simply equal to Xt. Therefore, the aggregate version and the
representative-agent version of the model will be equivalent.
Imposing the described aggregation rules into the rst-order condition given by (1:17)
and using the fact that Rt+1 = 
Yt+1
Kt
according to the rmsprot maximization problem,
gives:
1 = Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
 1

Yt+1
Kt
  

(1   k) + 1
#
: (1.19)
Similarly, applying the aggregation rule into the second rst-order condition (1:18) and
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recalling that Wt = (1  ) YtHt , yields:
Ct = (1  h)(1  )Yt
Ht
: (1.20)
The aggregate version of the individual budget constraint (1:11) is:
(1   k) (Rt   )Kt 1 + (1  h)WtHt = Ct +Kt  Kt 1;
but given that the aggregate production function is homogeneous of degree one so that Yt =
RtKt 1 +WtHt and considering the aggregate version of the law of capital accumulation
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It, this constraint can be written as:
Yt = Ct + It +  k (Rt   )Kt 1 + hWtHt: (1.21)
where the last two terms in the r.h.s. are equal to Gt according the governments budget
constraint, (1:9).
1.2.6 Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium (CE) is summarised by the following system of ve equations:
Yt = ZtK

t 1
 
tHt
1 
; (1.22)
Yt = Ct + It +  k (Rt   )Kt 1 + hWtHt; (1.23)
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It; (1.24)
1 = Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
 1

Yt+1
Kt
  

(1   k) + 1
#
; (1.25)
and
Ct = (1  h)(1  )Yt
Ht
: (1.26)
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in the paths of the ve variables Ct; Ht ; Kt; Yt; and It, given the initial values of capital
and TFP, and given the exogenously set stationary AR process for the latter:
lnZt = (1  ) lnZ +  lnZt 1 + "t; (1.27)
1.2.7 Suitable transformations of the CE
The stationary system
The presence of t in the system above implies the existence of a trend in the behavior of
the variables, and thus their steady-state values cannot be found. To overcome this, the
following stationary variables are dened: ct = Ct=t, ht = Ht, kt = Kt=t, yt = Yt=t,
it = It=
t, wt = Wt=t, rt = Rt, gt = Gt=t and zt = Zt. Applying these denitions gives
the following stationary system:8
yt = zt
 kt 1h
1 
t ; (1.28)
ln zt = (1  ) lnZ +  ln zt 1 + "t; (1.29)
yt = ct + it +  k (rt   )  1kt 1 + hwtht (1.30)
kt = (1  ) 1kt 1 + it; (1.31)
1 = Et

ct
ct+1


yt+1
kt
  

(1   k) + 1

; (1.32)
and
ctht = (1  h)(1  )yt: (1.33)
The analytical steady-state solution
In the absence of shocks, this economy converges to a steady state where xt = x for
any x = fy; c; i; k; z; h; r; w; gg and for all t. Dening  = 

  1 + (1    k) and  =
8A detailed derivation of this system is provided in Appendix A.
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( 1+ )(1   k) for convenience, the steady state solutions of the variables of the model
are:9
k =

(1 k)


y; (1.34)
i =




y (1.35)
c =
h
1 




   k (r   )

(1 k)


  h(1  )
i
y; (1.36)
h = (1 h)(1 )


1 




 k(r )

(1 k)


 h(1 )
 ; (1.37)
and
y = Z
1
1 

(1 k)

 
1  (1 h)(1 )
h
1 




   k (r   )

(1 k)


  h(1  )
i (1.38)
while from (1:29) it follows that the steady state value of z will be equal to the constant
parameter Z.
Additionally, the steady-state values of the factor prices are:
r =

(1   k) ; (1.39)
and
w = (1  )Z 11 

(1 k)

 
1 
; (1.40)
while, nally, the steady state value of government expenditure is given by:
g =  k (r   )  1k + hwh: (1.41)
The log-linear version of the system
To solve the model, rst the rst-order Taylor series expansion of the DCE around their
steady state values are taken. For any variable x^ = fy^; c^; h^; {^; k^; z^g the log-linear values
9Detailed derivations of these solutions are provided in Appendix A.
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are dened as x^t = ln xt=x, and the log-linearised system is:10
y^t = z^t + k^t 1 + (1  ) h^t; (1.42)
z^t = z^t 1 + "t; (1.43)
y^t =
c
y
c^t +
i
y
{^t  

 k
 1 k
y


k^t 1; (1.44)
k^t = (1  )k^t 1 + '{^t; (1.45)


Etc^t+1    c^t = (1   k)rEty^t+1   (1   k)rk^t; (1.46)
and
h^t + c^t = y^t: (1.47)
where  =

1  k 1kr+hwh
y
 1
and ' =    1 + .
1.3 Calibration and steady-state values
1.3.1 Calibration
Table 1:1 summarizes the calibration exercise of the model consistent with annual data
for Mexico for the period between 1980 and 2005. It is important to highlight that the
main interest of this section is to dene parameter values which are in line with typical
calibration exercises in the RBC literature, so that the e¤ects of the adaptive learning
assumption can be properly isolated.
The subjective discount factor  is assumed to be equal to 0:885, consistent with an
annual discount rate of 12  13%, which is in line with the average interest rates observed
in the Mexican credit market during the period of analysis.11 It is reasonable to nd such
high interest rates in emerging economies, since they are often characterised by higher
volatility in the economic activity, lower investment and shorter time horizons compared
to developed economies.
10A detailed derivation of this system is presented in Appendix A.
11See http://www.banxico.org.mx/portal_disf/wwwProyectoInternetTasas.jsp
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Table 1.1: Parameter values
parameter value description
0 <  < 1 0.885 discount factor
 > 0 0.06 depreciation rate
 > 1 1.025 labour augmenting growth rate
 > 0 2.06 indivisible labour coe¢ cient
0 <  < 1 0.40 capitals share of income
h  0 0.13 labour income tax
 k  0 0.09 capital income tax
Z > 0 2.00 productivity constant
0 <  < 1 0.914 AR(1) coe¢ cient productivity
" > 0 0.025 std. deviation productivity shock
Following Angelopoulos et al. (2012), the growth rate of labour augmenting technology
is set equal to 1:025, the gross annual rate of growth of output for the US, for the afore-
mentioned period. This seems a reasonable choice since the US is Mexicos most important
trade and nancial partner and, accordingly, there is solid empirical evidence suggesting
these two countries share a common trend (see e.g. Herrera, 2004). The depreciation rate
is set at 6% as in Kehoe and Rhul (2009), while the capitals share in income is set to 40%
as computed by Garcia-Verdu (2005) and also in the same line as Kydland and Zarazaga
(2002), Bergoeing and Soto (2002) and Lubker (2007).
The e¤ective labour and capital income taxes are taken from the calculations of Anton
(2005) following the methodology proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994) and thus are set
to their 1993 to 2001 averages of 13% and 9%, respectively. Finally,  has been chosen
so that the model can replicate the rather intuitive notion that agents spend one third
of their available time working,12 while the scale parameter Z has been set at a value
providing easy-to-read steady-state values. Given the model setup, however, these two
last parameters have no e¤ect over the predicted dynamics of the model.
To conclude the calibration procedure, it is worth to note that most of the economic
12Angelopoulos et al..(2012) compute an average of 0:467 hours worked for the period between 1991
and 2005 for Mexico, while Kanczuk (2004) obtains an average of 0:33 for Brazil between 1980 and 2001,
and Bergoeing and Soto (2002) an average of 0:43 for Chile between 1986 and 2001. Given these di¤erent
values for di¤erent fairly representative emerging economies and, since in the model setup  has no impact
on the dynamics of the model nor in the behavior of the predicted key ratios, it has been chosen such that
h is set at its rather most intuitve value of 0:33.
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modelling literature for emerging economies agree that TFP in these tends to show lower
persistence but higher volatility in response to random exogenous shocks, whereas in
developed economies TFP shows the opposite features. In line with this notion, the TFP
estimates of Angelopoulos et al. (2012) are taken, so that  is set equal to 0:941 and "
equal to 0:025.
1.3.2 Steady-state
Given the calibration above, the resulting steady-state values of the variables of interest
are exhibited in Table 1.2. The bottom rows of the table show that the chosen parameters
produce reasonable values for the key ratios usually considered to examine the feasibility
of calibration exercises. With the exception of the c=y ratio which is slightly higher than
the 0:7   0:65 historical average, the other three key ratios match almost exactly the
average ratios computed for OECD Mexican data between 1980 and 2005, also reported
by Angelopoulos et al. (2012) and Mendoza (2008).
It is important to note that, comparing these results to similar statistics for developed
economies (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999), two relevant features are correctly captured in
this calibration: the capital - output ratio is general lower in emerging economies while the
consumption - output (investment - output) ratio tends to be lower (higher) in developed
economies. The former result is consistent with the fact that emerging economies are
relatively less capital-intensive, while the latter is in line with historically lower investment
rates in these economies, in many cases mostly supported by Foreign Direct Investment
given that domestic saving rates tend to be remarkably low (see e.g. Edwards, 1996, and
Reinhardt, 2008, for the particular case of Latin-American countries).
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Table 1.2: Steady-state values
variable model
y 1.513
c 1.134
h 0.333
k 2.652
i 0.220
g 0.156
w 2.725
r 0.233
ratios model data
k=y 1.75 1.75
c=y 0.75 0.70
i=y 0.15 0.15
g=y 0.11 0.11
1.4 Model Solution
1.4.1 Reduced form of the model
To solve the log-linearised version of the model, note rst that it is possible to follow a
common approach in the AL literature and substitute all the control variables out from the
Euler condition given in (1:46), so that the entire model can be re-written as a second-order
di¤erence equation system of the form:13
k^t = a1Etk^t+1 + a2k^t 1 + b1z^t; (1.48)
z^t = z^t 1 + "t; (1.49)
which shows that the agentsdecisions over the level of capital they wish to hold at any
given period, k^t, can be expressed as a function of the expected value of this variable for
the next period, Etk^t+1, its past value, k^t 1, and the contemporaneous exogenous variable,
z^t, which in turn evolves according to the second equation of the system. Parameters a1,
a2 and b1 are constant coe¢ cients that depend only on the structural parameters of the
13See, among others using this reduced form, Evans and Hokhaponja (2001), Giannitsarou (2006) and
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007 and 2008).
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model according to:14
a1 =
h
Fi
y'D
i
G 1; (1.50)
a2 =
h
i(1 )+y'+k'k
y'D
i
G 1; (1.51)
b1 =
h
(1 k)r

+ 
D
  F
D
i
G 1; (1.52)
where:
D = c+(1 )y
y
; F = 

+ (1 k)r(1 )

and
G =
F(i(1 )+y'+k 1'k)
y'D
+ i
2
y'D
Therefore, by replacing the parameter values as well as the resulting steady-state values
found in the calibration procedure above (summarised in Tables 1:1 and 1.2) into equations
(1:50) to (1:52), the reduced-form parameters for Mexico are:
a1 = 0:4522; a2 = 0:5061 and b = 0:1022; (1.53)
Next, the dynamics of each the control variables of the model q = fy^; c^; h^; {^; r^; w^g can
be re-written in terms of the state variables only, according to the following reduced form
:
qt = q1 k^t + q2 k^t 1 + q3 z^t + q4Etk^t+1 (1.54)
where, as above, the coe¢ cients qj (for j = 1; 2; 3; 4) are convolutions of the structural
parameters of the model.15
1.4.2 Rational expectations
With the reduced form of the model at hand, it is straightforward to nd its solution
under RE applying the method of undetermined coe¢ cients proposed by Uhlig (1995).16
14The derivation of this reduced form is shown in detail in Appendix A.
15Note that, for this particular framework, q4 = 0 in all cases. The analytical derivation of this reduced
is presented in Appendix A.
16While the methods proposed by Blanchard and Khan (1980) and Klien (2002) are often used to solve
the linearised versions of dynamic macroeconomic models, in this chapter the undetermined coe¢ cients
approach is conveniently chosen instead, as it helps to better visualise the main features of adaptive
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First, it is assumed that agents correctly guess that the equilibrium law of motion of the
state variable has the following linear form:
k^t = !kkk^t 1 + !kz z^t: (1.55)
Substituting (1:49) into the equation above gives:
k^t = kk^t 1 + z z^t 1 + t; (1.56)
where k = !kk, z = !kz and t =
z

"t. The rst two (i.e. k and z) are the
two undetermined coe¢ cients of interest. Evaluating this expression at t + 1 and taking
expectations yields:
Etk^t+1 = kk^t + z z^t (1.57)
because Ett+1 = (z=)Et"t+1 = 0, given the distribution of "t.
If the initial guess given by (1:57) is in fact a solution to the model, it must satisfy
its reduced form too. Therefore, substituting this equation into (1:48) implies that the
system becomes:
k^t = a1(kk^t + z z^t) + a2k^t 1 + bz^t; (1.58)
plus (1:49). Substituting this last equation into (1:58) yields the unique equation:
k^t =
a2
(1  a1k)
k^t 1 +
(a1z + b1) 
(1  a1k)
z^t 1 +
(a1z + b)
(1  a1k)
"t: (1.59)
And since this equation must equal the initial guess (1:55) in order to verify that the latter
yields a solution to the model, it follows that:
k =
a2
(1  a1k)
; (1.60)
learning within the model and its relationship with the solution under rational expectations presented
here.
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and
z =
(a1z + b) 
(1  a1k)
: (1.61)
Solving the quadratic equation (1:60) for k yields two possible results:
k1 =
1+
p
1 4a1a2
2a1
and k2 =
1 p1 4a1a2
2a1
; (1.62)
and replacing these into (1:61) gives their respective associated results for z:
z1 =
b
1 a1(+k1 )
and z2 =
b
1 a1(+k2 )
: (1.63)
Therefore, the RBC model at hand has two solutions under RE which correspond to
the so-called minimum state variable (MSV) solutions in the sense that these have been
determined by the smallest possible number of state variables including their own lags (see
MacCallum, 1983). Furthermore, note that this model is known to be regular, meaning
that only one of the two solutions in (1:62) is stationary (i.e. has an absolute value less
than one) and thus is consistent with an stable equilibrium, while the other solution is
ruled out as it implies an explosive path for the state variable.
This can be shown more clearly by considering Figure 1:1, which presents a two-
dimensional plot of di¤erent values for parameters a1 and a2 yielding di¤erent values for
k according to the two solution in (1:62) and satisfying i) k < 1 and ii) k 2 R.17
When the k2 solution is considered, the possible combinations of a1 and a2 for which
the two conditions are satised are given by area A - excluding the borders so that it is
consistent with condition ja1 + a2j < 1 - and also by the smaller areas B and C. On the
other hand, when the k1 solution is considered, the set of combinations satisfying the two
conditions is only given by the smaller areas B and C. For any other combination of a1
and a2 outside areas A, B and C, both solutions are either non-stationary or non-real.
Therefore, it can be concluded that an RBC-type model will be regular or have a
unique stationary solution given by coe¢ cients k2 and
z2, if and only if ja1 + a2j < 1,
17The numerical simulation included 15:000 realizations of the two solutions of the quadratic equation
for di¤erent values of a1 and a2 which were choosen at random from a range between  2 to 2.
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Figure 1.1: Numerical simulation of the quadratic equation under conditions k < 1 and
k 2 R:
which graphically means combinations of a1 and a2 that always lie inside area A. On this
respect, note that the set of parameters presented in (1:53) coming from the calibration
of the model for Mexico clearly satisfy the condition ja1 + a2j < 1, thus verifying that the
model at hand has a unique stationary solution associated with coe¢ cients k2 and
z2 in
(1:62) and (1:63), respectively.
Given the above considerations, the unique stationary solution of the model is given
by coe¢ cients k2 and
z2 which hereafter will be labelled simply
 =

k; z
0
to keep
the notation simple. Therefore, the RE equilibrium law of motion of the endogenous state
variable is:
k^t = kk^t 1 + z z^t 1 +
z

"t: (1.64)
Considering the calibration above, the model solution is given by coe¢ cients:

mex
k = 0:7839 and 
mex
z = 0:4020; (1.65)
With above results, the analytical policy functions of the control variables of the model
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can be found by substituting (1:64) into (1:54) for k^t and recalling that Et"t+1 = 0, which
yields:
qt =
h
q1
k + q2 + q4

2
k
i
k^t 1 +
+
h
q1
z

+ q3 + q4

z +
k
z

i
z^t: (1.66)
for q = fy^; c^; h^; {^; r^; w^g, and then plugging the coe¢ cients found in (1:65) into the resulting
equations.
1.4.3 Adaptive learning
Motivation
The RE approach to solving the RBC model implies assuming that, on average, agents
do not make systemic mistakes in forecasting the future and thus deviations from perfect
foresight are only random. This in turn implies that they must know the structure of the
economy, the values of the deep parameters and the distribution of the random shock.
By contrast, the AL approach to modelling expectations formation presented in this work
follows a di¤erent and perhaps more plausible view of rationality (see e.g. Marcet and
Nicolini, 2003) by which it is assumed that the agents face limitations on their knowledge
about the economy and, to overcome these, they adopt a learning strategy applying basic
estimation techniques on available data.18
More specically, it will be assumed that agents: a) do not know the exact structure
of the economy but have a correct guess about the specication of the equilibrium policy
functions that solve the model, b) do not know the values of the structural parameters that
determine the values of the coe¢ cients  =

k;
z
0
in the equilibrium policy functions,
but c) they do know the true parameters that characterize the exogenous shock (i.e.  and
"). Hence, agents will behave as econometricians who run regressions to estimate the
coe¢ cients in  and use these estimates to form their expectations about the behavior of
the state variable.
18To give a more complete idea of these approaches, a brief description and an illustration of three
alternative ways of modelling expectations are provided in Appendix A.
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Solution procedure
As discussed above, it will be assumed that since agents are not fully rational they use
estimates of the true RE coe¢ cients  =

k; z
0
found in the previous section, which
they update in every period by employing a basic econometric technique. In order to avoid
a problem of simultaneity in these estimations19 it will be assumed that agents forecast or
form expectations about kt+1 using their estimates from the previous period, t 1. This
means that the agentsexpectations formation process derives from what is usually known
as their perceived law of motion (PLM), of the form:
Etk^t+1 = ~k;t 1k^t + ~z;t 1z^t: (1.67)
where the vector ~t =
h
~k;
~z
i0
denotes the estimate of  =

k;
z
0
for all t. Since the
equation above represents the actual forecast of the agents, it can then be plugged into
the rst equation of reduced-form model given by (1:48) to get:
k^t = a1(~k;t 1k^t + ~z;t 1z^t) + a2k^t 1 + bz^t:
Next, using (1:49) and collecting terms yields:
k^t =
a2
(1  a1~k;t 1)
k^t 1 +

a1~z;t 1 + b


(1  a1~k;t 1)
z^t 1 +

a1~z;t 1 + b

(1  a1~k;t 1)
"t: (1.68)
or, equivalently:
k^t = P1k^t 1 + P2z^t 1 + V "t; (1.69)
where:
P1 =
a2
(1  a1~k;t 1)
; (1.70)
P2 =

a1~z;t 1 + b


(1  a1~k;t 1)
; (1.71)
19That is, kt and t would have to be determined at the same time if agents use t to form the period-t
expectation
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V =
P2

=

a1~z;t 1 + b

(1  a1~k;t 1)
: (1.72)
Equation (1:69) is known as the actual law motion (ALM) of the state variable because
every new value of k^t will be obtained in the model economy but always considering the
agentsforecasts according to the PLM. Moreover, and like in the RE case, the ALM of
the control variables (denoted by q) can be found by substituting (1:69) for k^t and (1:67)
for Etk^t+1 into the reduced form (1:54), to get:
qt = q1

P1k^t 1 + P2z^t 1 + V "t

+ q2k^t 1 + q3z^t +
+q4

~k;t 1k^t + ~z;t 1z^t

;
Next, considering (1:49) means that in the rst term of the r.h.s. of the equation above
V z^t = P2z^t 1 + V "t. Hence:
qt =
h
q1P1 + q2 + q4
~k;t 1P1
i
k^t 1+
+
h
q1V + q3 + q4

~k;t 1V + ~z;t 1
i
z^t:
(1.73)
for q = fc^; y^; {^; h^; r^; w^g.
It is important now to turn the attention on the learning algorithms that agents will
be assumed to use in order to nd the estimates ~t =
h
~k;t;
~z;t
i0
. As mentioned earlier,
two di¤erent algorithms will be considered in the simulations and experiments carried out
in this work: recursive least squares and its constant gain variant.
Recursive least squares
Recursive least squares (RLS) is probably the most widely used learning algorithm in the
AL literature (see e.g. Marcet and Nicolini, 2003, and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou,
2007). It assumes that the agents behave as econometricians to estimate the coe¢ cients
of the model, using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for this purpose (see
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). That is, at the beginning of each period t, the vector
of state variables xt =
h
k^t; z^t
i0
is realized based on the ALM (1:69) and the exogenous
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process of technology. This means that xt is found from:
xt =
0B@ k^t
z^t
1CA =
0B@ P1 P2
0 
1CA
0B@ k^t 1
z^t 1
1CA+
0B@ V
1
1CA "t: (1.74)
Since the realizations of xt coming from the matrix system above are observable to the
agents, they can now run the regression:
k^t = ~
0
xt 1 + t; (1.75)
to get a new estimate ~t, where t is the forecast error. Applying OLS, the estimate ~t
will be the coe¢ cient vector which minimizes
PT
t=1 
2
t and thus is given by:
~t =
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1 tX
i=1
xi 1k^i: (1.76)
The equivalent recursive expression of the estimator above is given by the system of two
equations:20
Rt = Rt 1 + gt

xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

; (1.77)
~t = ~t 1 + gtR
 1
t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

; (1.78)
where ~t denotes the coe¢ cient estimates vector and Rt =
1
t
Pt
i=1 xi 1x
0
i 1is the second
moment matrix of the variables included in x. In addition,

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

is the latest
forecast error which will be used to adjust the current estimates, and the gt = 1=t is known
as the decreasing gain sequence, because it implies that as time goes by, every new forecast
error will have a smaller impact in the latest estimation.
Constant gain RLS
Another type of algorithm gaining popularity more recently (see e.g. Orphanides and
Williams, 2005, and Milani, 2007 and 2008) is known as the constant gain variant of the
20The detailed derivation of the recursive version of the OLS regression is provided in Appendix A.
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RLS algorithm (hereafter RLS-CG). The main feature of it is that the decreasing gain
sequence, gt, included in the learning rule above is replaced by a constant positive but
small number (i.e. less than one), g.
In this case, from equation (1:77), the RLS-CG algorithm is given by:
Rt = Rt 1 + g

xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

; (1.79)
~t = ~t 1 + gR
 1
t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

; (1.80)
The main di¤erence between this and the decreasing gain algorithm is that under
the latter the e¤ect of the latest forecasting error

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

tends to vanish as t
increases, while under the constant gain rule every new forecasting error has the same
weight as past ones. For this reason, as t ! 1 and under certain conditions (discussed
later), a constant gain algorithm ensures convergence to a distribution centered around
the RE solution rather than to the true time-invariant values included in . Because of
these properties, this algorithm can be quite useful whenever it is reasonable to assume
that agents prefer to use more recent information when forming expectations.
Determinacy, Stationarity, E-stability and Convergence
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) demonstrate that two necessary but not su¢ cient conditions
for local convergence of the adaptive learning solution towards the RE one are: a) the RE
solution of the model must be unique (i.e. satises the so-called determinacy condition)
and stationary and b) the RE solution must be expectationally stable or E-stable.
Regarding the rst condition, in a previous section it was shown that, for the calibration
exercise presented the model at hand has a unique solution. Moreover, the solution was
stationary since
mexk  < 1 thus ensuring that the policy function does not predict an
explosive path for the state variable.
On the other hand, E-stability is a condition that determines the stability of the RE
solution under a learning rule, in which the estimates ~k and ~z used in the PLM (1:67)
are adjusted slowly in the direction of the implied ALM parameters shown in (1:69). If this
adjustment process is completed, feeding the latest estimates ~k and ~z in the two ALM
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parameters given by (1:70) and (1:71) should yield exactly the same two estimates again.
In such case, these estimates must be equal to the RE solution parameters k and z,
since it was demonstrated that the model at hand has a unique equilibrium. Intuitively,
this implies that the RE solution  = [k; z] will be E-stable under learning if small
deviations from it are returned to  = [k; z] under the chosen learning rule.
For the RLS algorithm, and recalling that P =

P1 P2
0
, Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) show that a RE solution of the model is E-stable if we the following 2 2 Jacobian
matrix (where I is the identity matrix):21
J =
@P
@

=
  I (1.81)
is stable, i.e. it has eigenvalues with strictly negative real parts. From (1:70) and (1:71)
it follows that the Jacobian evaluated at the RE solution is equal to:
J =
264 a1a2(1 a1k)2   1 0(a1z+b1)a1
1 a1k
a1
1 a1k   1
375 (1.82)
To ensure that the real parts of the two eigenvalues of this matrix - i.e. the elements
in the main diagonal - are negative, the two conditions to be satised are:
a1a2
(1 a1k)2   1 < 0; and
a1
1 a1k   1 < 0: (1.83)
Applying these two conditions to the calibrated model shows that the E-stability condition
is satised since:
0:5491  1 < 0; and 0:6402  1 < 0; (1.84)
which in turn implies that the model at hand solved assuming RLS locally converges to
the RE solution.
In addition, Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) show that for the RLS-CG al-
gorithm the same E-stability condition described above applies plus the condition that
0 < g < 1. Therefore, the model at hand also shows local convergence to a distribution
21Associated with the two coe¢ cients of interest, k and z:
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centered around the RE solution when this learning rule is used.
To conclude this part, it is important to stress the fact that the conditions described
above ensure local but not global convergence of the learning rules towards RE. Hence,
if the starting point of the learning process or, if due to major exogenous shocks in the
economy, the estimates under the learning rules lie too far away from the area of attraction
within the parameter space implied by the E-stability condition, the agentsforecasts might
never converge to the RE equilibrium. Therefore, in order to increase the probabilities
of local convergence, the learning algorithms will be augmented with a projection facility
proposed by Marcet and Sargent (1989), according to which any estimate that is considered
an outlier is ignored and the latest available estimate is repeated instead for forecasting
purposes. That is, the learning rule is now dened as:
Rt = Rt 1 + gp

xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

; (1.85)
~t =
8><>:
~t 1 + g
pR 1t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

~t 1
if ~t < 1
if ~t > 1
; (1.86)
where the gain sequence gp can be set equal to gt or g; depending on the learning variant
chosen.
Initial conditions for learning
An important issue in learning is how to appropriately set the initial values ~0 and R0
for the recursions. While it should be expected that the e¤ects of the initial conditions
will disappear in the limit, note that these initial values might have an important impact
in the short and medium run dynamics of the model. Moreover, as said earlier, if these
initial values are too far away from the RE solution, it might be the case that convergence
of the estimates to the true values will be very slow or not achievable at all.
Hence, it is sensible to consider some initializing methods which help the learning
algorithm start from values that do not compromise convergence. According to type of
experiments carried out in this document, two alternative ways of initializing the recursion
will be considered.
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Initial conditions from randomly generated data (RG) Dene t0 as the time
period for which the initial values of the recursion are set (i.e. a pre-estimation time period)
which can be rationalised as some preliminary data from which agents can start their
recursive estimation procedure. This means that the recursive algorithm itself starts at t0+
1. Hence, the initial values are dened as follows (see Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou,
2007):
Rt0 =
1
t0
t0X
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1; (1.87)
~t0 =
1
t0
R 1t0
t0X
i=1
xi 1k^i; (1.88)
with the initial value x0 given and usually set equal to 0. A rst key element here is to
determine t0. While it is clear that t0 must be at least equal than the number of regressors
(i.e. two), the actual minimum t0 required must be one that ensures the invertibility of
Rt0, implying that t0 could be in fact larger than two. A second key element is to dene
how the values xi for i = f1; :::; tog will be (randomly) generated. The RE solution will
be used as the benchmark specication for generating the random values. That is, given
x0 = 0, a number of randomly generated values xt is obtained from
xt =
0B@ k^t
z^t
1CA =
0B@ k z
0 
1CA
0B@ k^t 1
z^t 1
1CA+
0B@ z=
1
1CA "t: (1.89)
for all t 2 f1; :::; tog so that Rt0 and ~t0 in (1:87) and (1:88), respectively, can be found
and subsequently used as the initial values of the recursion given by (1:77) and (1:78) for
t 2 I1ft0 + 1; t0 + 2; :::; Tg. To sum up, the entire recursive algorithm e¤ectively is:8><>: Rt0 =
1
t0
Pt0
i=1 xi 1()x
0
i 1()
~t0 =
1
t0
R 1t0
Pt0
i=1 xi 1()k^i()
; (1.90)
8><>: Rt = Rt 1 +
1
t
 
xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

~t = ~t 1 +
1
t
R 1t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1
 t 2 I1 = ft0 + 1; t0 + 2; ::; Tg (1.91)
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where x() represents the regressors that have been generated using the RE solution
according to (1:89).
Arbitrary or ad-hoc conditions (AH) Another alternative of initialization at t0 = 0
is to simple choose an arbitrary invertible matrix R0 and some stationary coe¢ cients ~0,
although in many cases these are assumed to be the ones consistent with the RE solution
or, if policy reforms are being considered, the ones associated with the RE solution of the
pre-reform economy thus depicting a situation in which the old state of the economy has
already been learnt by the agents (see e.g. Giannitsarou, 2006 and Evans et al., 2009).
Given the initial observations x0, the matrixR0 is dened simply as x0x
0
0. This implies
that at t = 1 the recursion is give by:
R1 = R0 + x0x
0
0; (1.92)
and:
~1 = ~0 +R
 1
t x0

k^1   x00~0

; (1.93)
while from t = 2 onwards the recursion again follows the system given by (1:77) and (1:78).
Therefore, the entire algorithm is:
8><>: R1 = R0 + x0x
0
0;
~1 = ~0 +R
 1
t x0

k^1   x00~0
 ; (1.94)
8><>: Rt = Rt 1 +
1
t
 
xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

~t = ~t 1 +
1
t
R 1t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1
 for t 2 f2; 3; ::; Tg; (1.95)
with x0, R0 and ~0 given.
43
1.5 Simulations and results
1.5.1 Predicted dynamics
From the theoretical description of the learning algorithms given above, it is clear that
any di¤erence in the predicted dynamics of the model under AL with respect to their RE
counterparts can have its origin in only two main elements in the learning setup. The
rst one is related to how close or, conversely, how far away are the initial values of the
learning algorithm from the time-invariant parameters associated with the RE solution.
As mentioned earlier, of the former are too far away from the latter, then the learning
process might be quite slow and, in some cases, convergence towards the RE equilibrium
might not be achieved at all.
The second element is related to the value of the constant gain sequence of the algorithm
and thus is only relevant when RLS-CG is used. As discussed in the previous section, a
constant gain sequence (as opposed to a decreasing gain sequence as under RLS) implies
that every new forecast error made during the learning process will have the same relative
weight as past ones. Hence, if the gain is assumed to be quite high (i.e. closer to one)
any small increase in the latest forecast error might cause major corrections in the latest
estimation and thus a new temporary departure from the path towards the RE solution
occurs.
A useful way to illustrate these di¤erences in the transition paths predicted by the
model under RE and AL is by examining the impulse response functions (IRFs) of a 1%
shock to technology under these di¤erent learning setups.22 These are presented in Figure
1:2 for output, investment, consumption and hours worked given the relevance of these
variables in terms of the stylized facts of interest and also because the latter two have a
direct impact on welfare.
The rst set graphs in the Figure (rst row) show the case where the departing point of
the learning process is quite far away from the RE solution. This is depicted by taking RLS
as the chosen algorithm and assuming RG as the initialization method but with t0 = 5,
22The IRFs of a  1% (negative) shock to technology are symetrically the opposite to the positive shock
case, and thus these are not discussed in the document.
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which e¤ectively implies that very few pre-estimation periods were used to compute the
initial values ~0 and R0 and thus these are far away from their RE counterparts,  and
R. As a result, while the direction of the predicted responses under AL is the same as
under RE, the reactions seem to be sharper in the rst periods (especially in the case of
consumption) and then after some periods these tend to decrease quite rapidly (especially
in the case of hours worked and investment).
The predicted dynamics seem consistent with some the insights provided by Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) and can be rationalised as follows: if agents in the economy are in
fact learners and for some reason their estimates are quite far away from the true RE
solution, they might misinterpret a temporary positive shock as a permanent one (i.e.
a change in at least one of the structural parameters of the model and implying a new
higher steady state), thus leading them to rapidly increase consumption at the expense of
investment - implying lower capital accumulation - and to reduce the labour supply due
to the wealth e¤ect they optimistically perceive. In the following periods, as new data
become available and the actual impact of the shock to technology vanishes, agents start
recognizing the transient nature of the shock and the responses decrease much faster than
when the agents are fully rational.
The second set of graphs in the Figure show the e¤ects of a high constant gain. The
learning algorithm is now RLS-CG with a very high constant gain equal to 0:6.23 To
isolate the impact of the chosen gain sequence, the initializing method is RG again but
this time with t0 = 20 so that the learning process starts very close to the RE solution. In
this case the transition dynamics are quite similar under both RE and AL but there are
still some di¤erences in consumption and hours worked that might be of some signicance.
Moreover, even though these are not shown in the Figure, some periods of extra volatility
occur around the 80th period, explained only by the e¤ects of the high constant gain which
leads to an overreaction of the adjustment process in the learning algorithm in response
to very small di¤erences between the two paths.
23In the AL literature the constant gain values often used range between 0:01 to 0:15 (see e.g. Milani,
2007; 2008, and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007). The gain values chosen in this section are
signicantly higher but note that this is for illustrative purposes only, and that the condition 0 < cg < 1
has been not been violated.
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The nal set of graphs combines the e¤ects of the starting values and the constant
gain under the same learning process. As in the previous case, the RLS-CG algorithm is
chosen again with a very high constant gain, equal to 0:35. The initialization method is
RG but now with t0 = 5 as in the rst case. In this learning setup, the starting values are
far away from the RE solution but also every new forecast error is adjusted sharply due
to the high constant gain associated with it. As a result, the signicantly di¤erent paths
between RE and AL and the remarkable additional volatility of the one under AL can be
fully appreciated.
An important result coming from these exercises is that both key elements in the
learning setup (i.e. the initial values of the recursion and the constant gain) can be a
source of additional volatility in the paths of the relevant variables of the model with
respect to their RE counterparts, a feature of AL that might be helpful when trying to
improve the ability of the RBC model to match the data in the case of emerging economies.
1.5.2 Second - moment matching results
Given the important insights about the transition dynamics predicted by the model under
di¤erent learning setups discussed above, this section now pretends to evaluate the good-
ness of t properties of the RBC model under AL under di¤erent economic scenarios that
are likely to occur in practice, especially in emerging economies such as Mexico. For this
purpose, the volatility, co-movement and persistence properties of the key variables will
be examined, although especial emphasis will be given to the main stylised facts of the
Mexican economy as discussed previously.24
First, a second-moment matching exercise will be performed assuming (as is standard
in the literature) that the economy is oscillating close to its steady-state due to random
24As a control, a similar exercise for a calibration of the model using US post-war quarterly data was
performed. Following Ireland (2004), the chosen parameter values are  = 0:99,  = 0:025,  = 0:36,
 = 1:0039,  = 0:95 and " = 0:00712. Also, following Mendoza et al. (1994) the tax rates are set to
h = 25% and k = 40%. The solution of the model under RE (which is unique, stationary and E-stable)
is given by coe¢ cients k = 0:9516 and z = 0:1349. The results of the second-moment matching exercise
conrm the ndings of Eusepi and Preston (2008) and Huang et al. (2009), namely, AL - both in the
form of RLS or RLS-CG with cg = 0:02 - helps to improve the ability of the standard RBC model to t
the US post-war data, only the rst scenario of the two described below being necessary (and perhaps
reasonable) to obtain these results.
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shocks to technology in every period. In a second scenario, it will be assumed that the
economy is enduring a major economic depression to which the government does not
respond with any explicit policy reform, so that the economy slowly returns to its steady
state.
All the simulation exercises performed to compute the relevant statistics presented in
this section consider a time horizon of 25 periods (years) in order to match the range of
the available data. To get the relevant statistics, logarithms are taken to the simulated
data in levels, and then the Hodrick-Prescott lter with a smoothing parameter of 100
is applied. Each experiment is replicated 1000 times and thus the average statistics are
reported.25
In all cases, the experiments under AL will focus on three key setups: RLS, RLS-CG
with cg = 0:03 (i.e. a low constant gain) and RLS-CG with cg = 0:1 (i.e. a high constant
gain). The two constant gains considered are very close, respectively, to the lowest and
highest values typically used in the literature (see e.g. Milani, 2007 and 2008).
First scenario: the economy oscillates around the steady-state
In this rst experiment, the usual assumption that the economy is fairly close to its
steady state and any deviation from this state is due to exogenous shocks to technology
is considered. From a learning perspective, one reasonable approach is to assume that in
such case the true values of the structural parameter have been already learned by the
agents and thus the initial values of the algorithm are equal to their RE counterparts,
so that ~0 =  and R0 = R. In the learning algorithm, this means making use of
the AH initialising method and taking the RE solution as the reference. Even in this
setup, learning will matter because in each of the following periods, every time there is an
exogenous shock to technology, the new parameter estimates ~t and Rt for all t = 1; 2; ::
will exhibit deviations from the RE values which will dissipate as long as these deviations
do not go beyond the area of attraction implied by the E-stability condition. Moreover,
25The projection facility was activitated only for the case where the RG initialising method is applied
with very few pre-estimation periods (e.g. the minimum possible to ensure the invertibility of R0). In
these cases, on average, the facility was activated in a range of one to two periods out of twenty ve,
representing less than 4% of the entire simulation horizon.
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if a constant gain is assumed instead of a decreasing gain, the response of the estimates
to the exogenous shocks will tend to increase with the size of the constant gain. The
rst three rows of Table 1.3 below show a set of key second moments generated by the
model calibrated for Mexico under the di¤erent AL setups and assuming that ~0 =  and
R0 = R.
A second approach that could be fairly reasonable for Mexico and other emerging
economies - where the time range of available data is relatively short - is to assume that
the agents have not fully learned the truestructural parameter values  and R and thus
further deviations from the RE solution should be expected in the short-run. This lack of
knowledge at the start of the learning process can be fairly depicted by applying the RG
initialization method for the learning algorithm and setting very few pre-learning periods,
that is t0 will be set equal to the minimum number of periods required so that R0 is
invertible.26 The following three rows in Table 1.3, show the resulting moments of this
alternative. In addition, the corresponding statistics simulated by the model under RE and
those coming from the data are presented in the last two rows to allow for comparisons.27
The results in Table 1.3 conrm the widely known poor performance of the standard
RBC model under RE in terms of tting the data, particularly in the cases of the rela-
tive volatility of the main variables and virtually all the moments associated with hours
worked.28 In terms of the co-movement and persistence of the variables, the model under
RE does fairly well, as shown by the crossed correlation (CCF) and autocorrelation (ACF)
functions plus their  one standard-deviation intervals in Figure 1.3, but with the excep-
tion of the CCF for hours worked. On that matter, Angelopoulos et al. (2012) show that
acknowledging the fact that property rights in Mexico are not fully protected and can be
considered as another source of uncertainty can greatly improve the statistics related to
the labour supply.
26In all cases, this invertibility criteron meant that t0 was set to 8 to 10 pre-learning periods.
27The data on output, investment and consumption were obtained from the OECD database for the
period 1980  2005. The data on hours worked were obtained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
y Geograa (INEGI). All these data were made available by Angelopoulos et al. (2012). Finally, due to
data limitations on this regard, the two statistics highlighted with (*) are indicative only, according to
the stylised facts highlighted by Bergoeing and Soto (2002).
28The standard deviation of Mexican output of around 0:03 is reasonably replicated by the model under
RE (equal to 0:032) and all the learning setups considered (of around 0:036).
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Table 1.3: Second Moments for Mexico - Scenario 1
(c)
(y)
(i)
(y)
(h)
(y)
(h)
(w)
cc(c; y) cc(i; y) cc(h; y) cc(h;w)
Initialization method: AH ( ~0= , R0= R)
RLS 0.55 3.70 0.55 1.03 0.91 0.96 0.92 0.68
RLS-CG(0:03) 0.54 3.69 0.54 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.70
RLS-CG(0:1) 0.54 3.71 0.53 1.03 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.70
Initialization method: RG ( ~0 = ~t0, R0 = Rt0, t0 = min)
RLS 0.60 3.54 0.53 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.58
RLS-CG(0:03) 0.61 3.55 0.53 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.86 0.56
RLS-CG(0:1) 0.60 3.57 0.53 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.57
RE 0.54 3.68 0.54 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.69
Data 1.34 5.86 0.23 >1* 0.92 0.70 -0.2 <0*
On the other hand, the same model under the three learning setups - particularly
under RLS - where it is assumed that the structural parameter values were known at
the start of the learning process (rows 1 to 3) clearly outperforms its RE counterpart
in terms of bringing the predicted statistics closer to the data. While the improvements
might not seem very large, it is clear that AL in this case helps to obtain higher relative
volatilities for consumption and investment, although still not enough to match the data,
and also produces a (h)=(w) ratio that is higher than one, thus matching the stylised
fact suggested by Bergoeing and Soto (2002). Finally, assuming less initial information
available for learning (rows 4 to 6) helps to produce even a higher relative volatility of
consumption, at the expense of all the other volatility statistics, but it does help to bring
the co-movement statistics closer to the data. The set of graphics in Figure 1.4 show the
CCF and ACF of the model under RLS-CG in the sixth row of the Table, as this setup
shows the best performance in general. The functions show that the improvements in
the relative volatility statistics under learning does not a¤ect negatively the goodness of
t of the model in terms of the predicted persistence or co-movement of the variables of
interest. In some cases, very small improvements with respect to their RE counterparts
were obtained, although these are di¢ cult to visualize graphically.29
Two important elements must be highlighted at this point. First, despite some im-
29The ACFs and CCFs of the other learning alternatives given in the Table 1.3 show similar results so
these are not reported here.
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provements under AL, the relative volatilities of consumption and investment are still
quite far away from the data. Likewise, with the exception of the (h)=(w) ratio dis-
cussed above, the other predicted statistics involving hours worked clearly fail to match
the data. These results thus have motivated a second set of simulation exercises - shown
below - which try to verify if these evasive statistics are perhaps more associated with
frequent scenarios of economic depression, as suggested by the recent economic history of
most emerging economies, precisely such as Mexico.
Second, the model under RLS-CG and cg = 0:03 shows the worst performance in terms
of tting the data in this and the following exercises, thus suggesting that a low constant
gain in such setup might not be a good representation of the learning dynamics for Mexico.
This is potentially a major qualitative di¤erence with respect to developed economies, as
most learning exercises carried out for these agree on very low constant gains, between
0:01 and 0:04 (see e.g. Milani, 2007 and 2008, and Gaspar et al., 2006).
Nevertheless, this nding seems quite reasonable since, in one hand, emerging economies
in general are known to have been subjected to a number of often economic reforms, struc-
tural breaks and other major shocks a¤ecting their institutions (see e.g. Angelopoulos et
al., 2012, for Mexico) over the last few decades. Within such context, governments in
most of these countries have also endured (or are still enduring) long lasting episodes of
very low credibility (see e.g. Calderon et al., 2004). On the other hand, to reect such
particular features of low credibility or expectations of new structural breaks occurring
any time soon, recursive algorithms with high constant gains have been often suggested
in the AL literature (see e.g. Carceles-Poveda and Giannitasrou, 2006 and 2007). This is
because a higher weight can then be assigned to more recent data in the learning algorithm
in order to capture the e¤ects of the reforms and/or structural changes right after these
have taken place and, in turn, the parameter estimates can be updated faster than under
relatively more stable environments.
Second scenario: the economy recovering from a depression
In this section it is now investigated whether by acknowledging the impact of economic
depressions on the agents ability to learn about their economic environment can help to
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improve the above results, particularly in terms of the relative volatility of consumption
and investment and the statistics involving hours worked. Studying such scenario seems
reasonable since between 1980 and 2005 Mexico experienced two main episodes of severe
economic crisis. The rst took place during the Latin-American debt crisis between 1982
and 1986, when real GDP fell by 4% in 1983 and 1986, while the second episode known
as the "tequila" currency crisis occurred between 1994 and 1995, when real GDP fell by
6%. Such was the negative impact of these episodes, that capital stock in the shape of
machinery and equipment actually fell in both periods, the only two occasions where such
a severe impact had to be endured by this country in the last 60 years, despite some
other (milder) periods of economic downturn taking place over the same period (see e.g.
Ho¤man, 2000, and Souza et al., 2005).
Therefore, to illustrate such episodes in the model and particularly their impact on
the learning dynamics, following Giannitsarou (2006), it will be assumed that the initial
value of the only endogenous state variable of the model - capital stock - is placed at a
level such that the simulated output starts around 4% below its steady-state value. In
other words, instead of setting k^0 = 0 which means that there are no deviations from
the steady-state value of capital, now the simulations will depart from k^0 = 1:84, level
37% lower than k and consistent with a recession of around 4% in terms of output, from
which the economy recovers gradually as no government intervention is assumed. This,
in turn, should generate an additional wedge between the RE the AL paths, since the
early observations to be used in the estimation process will not be consistent with the
steady state of the economy and therefore the early estimates will show a much slower
convergence to the RE solution.30
As before, the two di¤erent assumptions regarding the agents initial knowledge are
considered. The rst three rows of Table 1.4 show the case where the structural parameter
values are already known by the agents, while the following three rows show the case when
these parameter values are still not fully known , for the same selected AL setups in both
cases. In the latter case, however, the number of pre-learning periods is set to t0 = 10
30Recall that local convergence to the RE solution is ensured given that the E-stability conditions hold,
as shown earlier, and that the projection facility can be activated whenever necessary.
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Table 1.4: Second Moments for Mexico - Scenario 2
(c)
(y)
(i)
(y)
(h)
(y)
(h)
(w)
cc(c; y) cc(i; y) cc(h; y) cc(h;w)
Initialization method: AH ( ~0= , R0= R)
RLS 1.11 4.56 0.83 0.75 0.69 0.48 0.27 -0.48
RLS-CG(0:03) 1.09 4.55 0.83 0.75 0.68 0.49 0.29 -0.47
RLS-CG(0:1) 1.09 4.56 0.83 0.76 0.68 0.49 0.29 -0.47
Initialization method: RG ( ~0 = ~t0, R0 = Rt0 , t0 = 10)
RLS 1.16 5.11 0.93 0.80 0.63 0.49 0.30 -0.50
RLS-CG(0:03) 1.16 5.10 0.93 0.79 0.63 0.49 0.30 -0.50
RLS-CG(0:1) 1.16 5.13 0.94 0.81 0.63 0.50 0.31 -0.50
RE 0.54 3.68 0.54 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.69
Data 1.34 5.86 0.23 >1* 0.92 0.70 -0.20 <0*
rather than the minimum possible as this assumption yields better results.
The results in this scenario are quite encouraging in terms of the relative volatility of
consumption and investment but also in terms of the negative correlation between wages
and hours worked. In e¤ect, the results of the model under RLS-CG with cg = 0:1 in
the second approach where the RG initialisation method is used, yielding (c)=(y) and
(i)=(y) ratios that are very close to the data, suggest that such learning setup seems
to better depict how expectations are formed among agents in emerging economies, as it
shows the best overall results in terms of the stylised facts discussed earlier, considering
the di¤erent experiments carried out in this section. However, it is also clear that these
results are obtained at the expense of the co-movement and persistence statistics which
are now quite poor when compared to the results of the rst scenario. However, these
tend to improve rather fast as more years are gradually allowed into the simulations.31
These results suggest that highly volatile consumption and investment plus a negative
correlation between hours worked and wages (and as a result also between hours worked
and consumption), three key stylised facts often seen in emerging economies - are more
consistent with an economy populated by learners, in an scenario of transition towards
the steady state after a major deviation - due to a severe economic crisis, for instance -
had taken place. Such deviation a¤ects the agents ability to learn the RE solution faster -
particularly in the early periods -, which ultimately leads them to make their consumption
and investment choices in a context of large forecast errors and important adjustments
31For this reason, these are not reported in the document.
55
of the estimates in every period, as they nd it di¢ cult to recognize whether the current
paths of the main variables towards the steady state respond to a temporary positive
shock to technology or are simply driven by the deterministic recovery process towards
the steady state that follows right after the latest economic depression.
It is worth noting that the above analysis seems consistent with the ndings of Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) and Boz et al. (2008) in the sense that agents in emerging economies
might nd it di¢ cult to recognize between shocks to the trend of the economy - which are
quite frequent in these economies - and the more typical transitory uctuations around a
stable trend.
1.5.3 Welfare implications
The results above show that in general AL helps to improve the ability of the RBC model
to t the data for Mexico, specially in terms of the relative volatility and co-movement.
Therefore, if AL rather than the mechanical sources of volatility and correlation of the
model at hand solved under RE provide a more appropriate representation of this economy,
then the outcome of any economic policy carried out by the government might be di¤erent
from what is expected if it (wrongly) assumes that private agents are fully rational. It
might in fact generate unexpected additional welfare gains/costs from misspecifying pri-
vate expectations formation. A similar point was in fact made by Giannitsarou (2006) for
the US case, showing that after a tax reform which brings the capital tax rate down, an
economy of learners will be less better o¤ than one of fully-rational agents.32
The objective of this nal section is thus to verify whether this concern is also relevant
for an emerging economy and, if so, to what extent. For this purpose, two unanticipated
tax reforms are welfare-evaluated: a) a reduction of the capital tax  k from 9% to 0%,
inspired by most of the literature on capital taxation suggesting that this tax should be
set to zero in the long run (see e.g. Chamley, 1986, and Lucas, 1990); and b) a similar
reduction of the labour tax h from 13% to 0%, to complete the analysis given the tax
menu available in the model setup.33
32See also Milani (2007) for another example about this issue related to monetary policy.
33A reduction of h to 8.6%, so that the ratio G=Y in both reforms is the same and equal to 8%,
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Table 1.5: Tax reforms and steady-states
variable base.  k = 0% h = 0%
y 1.513 1.550 1.575
c 1.134 1.188 1.304
i 0.220 0.242 0.229
h 0.333 0.326 0.347
h 2.652 2.913 2.761
In each case, following Giannitsarou (2006), the other tax rate will remain constant and
G will adjust accordingly in order to satisfy the balanced budget condition.34 Furthermore,
it is worth noting that since in the model setup proposed in this work G is not included
in the utility function, the welfare gains resulting from the tax reforms under analysis
will be higher than in a case where G is also a determinant of the agents utility (see e.g.
Chapter 3). In e¤ect, the decrease in taxes will naturally result in a fall of government
revenues given that no other sources of revenue are assumed. Hence, the positive e¤ects
on total utility coming from a less distorted economy - which are discussed below - will be
lower because of the relatively lower utility obtained from the consumption of less public
goods. Nevertheless, standard model calibration procedures (see e.g. Malley et al., 2009)
acknowledge the fact that the relative weight of public good consumption in the utility
function tends to be quite small, which implies that while some quantitative di¤erences
can be expected between these two setups, the results should still be qualitatively similar.
Table 1:5 reports the post-reform steady-state values consistent with the two tax re-
forms. In the economy with  k = 0%, output is 2:5% higher than in the pre-reform
steady-state, explained mostly by the capital stock which is almost 10% higher as labour
is in fact 2% lower. As a result, consumption and investment are 4:8% and 10% higher,
respectively. The equilibrium laws of motion under RE in this case are still of the form
given by (1:64) with coe¢ cients post;kk = 0:7797 and 
post;k
z = 0:4056.
When h = 0%, output is 4% higher than its pre-reform value, explained by an increase
was considered too. In this case, the diferences between RE and AL are virtually insignicant. For that
reason, the results of a much more dramatic change of this tax are reported.
34Giannitsarou (2006) shows that if it is assumed that to compensate a tax cut the other tax rate must
increase to a level such that the pre-reform ratio G=Y remains unchanged, the results are qualitatively
similar to those presented in the non-revenue-neutral exercise.
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of capital stock and labour of 4%. The latter is in clear contrast to the capital tax cut case,
implying that agents choose to work more hours in order to benet from a much higher
post-tax labour income and increase their consumption accordingly. In e¤ect, consumption
is now 15% higher than in the previous steady-state while investment is only 4% higher.
The resulting equilibrium laws of motion are also in the same form as in (1:64), with
coe¢ cients post;hk = 0:7839 and 
post;h
z = 0:4062. Finally, it is important to note that
the two solutions associated with each tax reform satisfy the conditions of determinacy,
stationarity and E-stability discussed earlier, so that both show local convergence to their
respective RE solutions under the di¤erent AL setups.
In terms of the learning setup, following Evans et al. (2009), it will be assumed that
the agents have already learned the structural parameters associated with the pre-reform
steady-state of the economy, denoted by 
pre
=


pre
k ;

pre
z

and Rpre. However, they do
not know the new parameter values associated with the post-reform steady-state after
either of the two tax reforms, denoted by 
post;m
=
h

post;m
k ;

post;m
z
i
and Rpost;m where
m = h;  k. Technically, this implies that the AH initializing method is applied to set
~0= 
pre
and R0= R
pre in the learning algorithm. Finally, in line with the results in
the previous sections, the two learning algorithms with the best performance in terms of
matching the data - i.e. RLS and RLS-CG with cg = 0:1 - will be considered in these
experiments.
Following Lucas (1990) and Giannitsarou (2006), the welfare measure used for this
analysis is a compensating consumption supplement or the percentage amount  by which
consumption should change in all periods in the pre-reform economy so that the agents
are equally well o¤ as in the post-reform economy, including the transition period. This
will be conditional on the initial random shock to technology the economy is potentially
subjected to, which in practice usually tends to be the main factor motivating the tax
reforms in the rst place (e.g. a tax cut after a recession). The formula of this measure is
thus given by:35
mi =
h
e(1 )(U
post;i
T;m  Upre;RET )   1
i
 100
 "0 = " (1.96)
35The derivation of this formula is presented in Appendix A.
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where total discounted utility UT is computed according to (1:1) with the number of
simulated periods set to T = 1000 and m = h;  k and i = RE, AL. Since it is assumed
that the agents have learned the pre-reform steady state, the pre-reform utility is computed
using the RE solution of the model, implying that Upre;RET (conditional on each exogenous
shock) remains unchanged for both tax reform exercises. Finally, " is a given realization
of a shock to technology taking place simultaneously with the tax reform. Given the
standard deviation " = 0:025 for TFP in Mexico, shocks in the range [ 0:09; 0:09] need
to be considered as these cover close to 99% of the associated probability mass. Hence,
if  > 0 there is a (conditional) welfare gain of moving from the pre- to the post-reform
steady state.
The conditional welfare computations of the two tax reforms are exhibited in Figure
1:5, where it can be seen that, conrming Giannitsarous (2006) ndings, the di¤erences
between AL and RE are more signicant when large negative shocks hit the economy.
These di¤erences then tend to vanish for relatively small but increasing positive shocks
and again become signicant but in the opposite direction once large positive shocks are
taken into account.
However, unlike Giannitsarous (2006) main results on welfare, the upper-left plot in
the Figure shows that a reduction of the capital tax in response to a negative shock to
technology would make learners better o¤ than fully rational agents, while the opposite
is true for the same tax reform if a positive shock just above "0 = 0 hits the economy.
Intuitively, a bad shock coinciding with a tax cut makes learners believe that under the
new regime capital is more inelastic than under the old regime (also note that 
pre
> 
post
)
and thus they decide to accumulate capital more slowly than under RE. As a result, in the
early periods right after the reform and the bad shock the decrease in consumption and
increase in hours worked of the learners (motivated by the bad shock) is smaller than in the
case of fully rational agents. Then, after some periods, rational agents resume their rapid
convergence towards a higher level of consumption and the lower level of hours worked
consistent with the post-reform steady state (see Table 1.5 above), while the learners
convergence is slower.
At this point, the discount factor in the utility function, , enters into play. This
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parameter has been set equal to 0:885 following the relevant literature as a way to depict
features often associated with emerging economies such as shorter investment horizons and
higher levels of impatience among agents. In terms of welfare calculations, this parameter
value implies that every additional future period included in the computation of the present
value lifetime utility at t = 0 is heavily discounted by t for t = 1; ::;1.36 This element,
along with the fact that the capital tax cut has had a relatively small impact in terms of
the nal level of consumption (i.e. it only increases 4% with respect to its pre-reform level),
implies that the early post-reform periods when consumption is higher and labour supply
is lower under learning with respect to RE are the most important in relative terms,
ultimately leading to the results shown in the left-hand plots of the Figure. Likewise,
following the same interpretation as above, if the behavior of learners is in fact better
described by the RLS-CG algorithm with cg = 0:1 (lower-left plot), then the welfare gains
for learners after a large negative shock are even more signicant. At the extreme, if a
large negative shock "0 =  0:09 occurs, then the additional welfare gain under learning is
equivalent to 0:5%.
On the other hand, when a (at least slightly above "0 = 0) positive shock coincides
with the reform, both learners and RE behave virtually in the same way and therefore the
di¤erences in welfare are very small. However, when a very large positive shock is realized
the welfare gains are higher under RE because in the next few periods that follow the
capital stock overshoots in the economy of learners since the positive shock makes them
believe that capital is less inelastic than before. As a result, they optimistically decide to
work and invest more and thus consume less than fully rational agents. Therefore, the
same discussion related to the discount factor is in place once more but now acting in a
symmetrically opposite way.
In turn, the right-hand plots in the Figure show that if eliminating h is the chosen tax
reform in response to a relatively large shock to technology - i.e. a negative shock larger
than "0 =  0:015 or a positive shock larger than "0 = 0:035 - then learners will be less
36In fact, note that if  is modied slightly from 0:885 to 0:89 (ceteris paribus) in this calculations,
then the results are inverted as the welfare gains under RE become higher than those under learning
after a large bad shock while the opposite is true for positive shocks, as suggested by Giannitsarou (2006)
considering a calibration of a similar model for the US, and where the parameter  is often set at a much
higher level.
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better o¤ than rational agents, irrespective of the learning algorithm that better describes
the former. In the rst case, the same elements related to the behavior of learners in the
early periods and the discount factor apply. However, note that in this case the impact
of the tax reform on consumption is much more important than in the  k case important
(i.e. an increase of 15% with respect of the old regime), which implies that, after a few
periods of sluggishness, the faster convergence to the higher steady state by fully rational
agents generates a series of (discounted) welfare gains which e¤ectively outweight those in
favour of learners generated only in the early periods.
For the second case, when a large positive shock is realized, the analysis is analogous
to the same case above. That is, the welfare gains are higher under RE because in the
economy of learners capital overshoots in the early periods as they work and invest more
and consume less than fully rational agents. Finally, if the shock, either positive or neg-
ative, is rather small - i.e. inside the [ 0:015; 0:035] interval cited earlier - there will be
virtually no di¤erences in welfare gains between learners and rational agents.
1.6 Conclusions
While a number of authors have highlighted the relevance of learning to match the behavior
of the key aggregates in developed economies, this document tried to verify such potential
for emerging economies. This is considered an important contribution to the AL literature
since most of the research in this eld - with the exception of Marcet and Nicolini (2005)
and Boz et al. (2008) - has focused exclusively on developed economies.
The simulation exercises under two di¤erent learning algorithms showed that in general
AL helps to improve the second-moment matching properties of the standard RBC model
calibrated for Mexico and perhaps for emerging economies in general as these share a
number of key features which have been taken into account in the calibration exercise.
However, in order to replicate key stylised facts such as consumption being more volatile
than output and labour supply being much more volatile than wages, it has been necessary
to assume that the economy is in fact recovering from an economic depression, something
that is nevertheless supported by the data.
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These results give some indication that AL in the shape of RLS and RLS-CG with
a relatively high constant gain, might be a good representation of how agents form their
expectations in practice. Therefore, the design of economic policy must take into account
the fact that the expected welfare gains/losses of a particular reform conceived assuming a
RE environment as it is commonly done might be signicantly di¤erent if in reality agents
tend to behave more as learners. This point has been illustrated by welfare-evaluating the
e¤ects of two tax reforms for Mexico, the results of which suggest that, if the government
decided to cut taxes in response to a large negative shock to the economy, then a large
capital tax cut might be more advisable than a large cut of the labour tax.
Finally, it is worth noting that AL within the framework presented here was not able to
improve the performance of the standard RBCmodel in a way such that all the key stylised
facts can be captured using a single model setup with a given set of initial conditions. In
e¤ect, some important moments such as the crossed correlation between hours worked and
output were couldnt be replicated by the model.
In light of these caveats, the model under AL could be greatly enriched in two impor-
tant and complementary respects. First, some market frictions which have been proved to
be highly relevant for emerging economies (e.g. credit restrictions as in Mendoza, 2008)
as well as acknowledging the existence of structural heterogeneity among the economic
agents, could help to improve the overall performance of the model, both under RE and
AL. Second, as discussed by Giannitsarou (2003) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2006), a
better insight of the dynamics predicted by the AL hypothesis could be gained by con-
sidering the possibility of expectational heterogeneity, whereby di¤erent segments of the
economys population, which might also di¤er in some of their structural features (and
thus structural heterogeneity is also present) or not, follow di¤erent learning setups and
hence their interaction might bring important dynamic implications to the model. This
approach is in fact pursued with more depth in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 2
Distributional consequences of tax reforms in the UK
under capital-skill complementarity
2.1 Introduction
There now exists a signicant and growing literature on tax reforms in dynamic general
equilibrium (DGE) models, largely focusing on the aggregate welfare benets and the
distributional consequences of permanent reductions in constant capital tax rates.1 Studies
within the representative agent framework suggest that tax reforms which reduce capital
taxation will produce welfare gains for the society, even if the tax burden is concurrently
shifted to labour (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, Cooley and Hansen, 1992, Angelopoulos et al.,
2012).2 The aggregate welfare benets from tax reforms that reduce capital taxation are
also conrmed in models with heterogeneous agents (see e.g. Garcia-Mila et al., 2010).
However, at the same time, heterogeneous agent models make clear that such reforms
can have large redistributive e¤ects that will disadvantage di¤erent groups in the society
(see e.g. Domeij and Heathcote, 2004, Greulich and Marcet, 2008 and Garcia-Mila et al.,
1This chapter is an extended version of the paper "The distributional consequences of supply-side
reforms" with Jim Malley and Konstantinos Angelopoulos (Discussion Paper 2010-16). I would like to
thank Chryssi Giannitsarou, Charles Nolan, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Peter Rosenkranz for helpful
comments and suggestions.
2At the same time, at the aggregate level, there is also an important literature that examines optimal
tax policy. The general message from Ramsey optimal taxation is that the tax rate on capital should be
zero in the long-run (see e.g. Chamley, 1986, Chari et al., 1994 and Chari and Kehoe, 1999). This result,
however, does not necessarily hold in models incorporating market failures (see e.g. Guo and Lansing,
1999), nor in models under time-consistent optimal taxation (see e.g. Klein et. al., 2008).
64
2010).3
The literature using heterogeneous agent models has also considered di¤erent types
of market incompleteness and/or agent heterogeneity to demonstrate the distributional
e¤ects of tax reforms and, in particular, capital tax cuts. An important dimension in
which agents di¤er, which is central to the analysis of capital tax reforms, is inequality
in the distribution of assets or wealth.4 A common approach to modeling this type of
heterogeneity is to assume that some agents do not have access to the capital markets, or
more generally, that some agents depend more on labour relative to capital income (see
e.g. Judd, 1985, Lansing, 1999, Krusell, 2002, and Garcia-Mila et al. 2010).
In such environments, agents whose capital income is signicant can expect to gain
after a capital tax cut. However, the total e¤ects of a capital tax cut are not as clear
for those agents who depend predominantly on labour income, usually termed as the
workers. There are costs to workers from a capital tax cut, if this is accompanied by an
increase in labour taxes. Nevertheless, there can also be benets that take the form of
increased labour productivity delivered by the increase in the capital stock. Therefore, to
evaluate the distributional e¤ects of capital tax cuts, the productive role of capital and its
complementarity with labour need to be explicitly examined.
This complementarity between capital and labour becomes particularly important
when the economic structure suggests a distribution in the skill supply of the labour
force, in addition to the asset distribution, and even more so when these distributions are
positively related. For instance, the PSID data (see e.g. Table 2 in Garcia-Mila et al.,
2010) suggest that high wealth is positively related to higher wages, while evidence from
the UK, discussed further below, suggests that skill acquisition, in the form of University
education, is related to socioeconomic income group.5
3Studies that take into account the redistributive e¤ects of capital taxation in designing optimal taxa-
tion in heterogeneous agent models are fewer. In Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), Ramsey-type optimal
taxation leads to a zero tax on capital in the long-run. However, this result does not necessarily hold
when time-consistent taxation is considered (see e.g. Krusell, 2002, and Angelopoulos, Malley, and Philip-
popoulos., 2011).
4See for example, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data for wealth inequality in the USA
analysed in Garcia-Mila et al. (2010) and the Family Resources Survey data discussed in more detail
below for the UK.
5Note that the literature has allowed for joint inequality in asset holdings and labour skill in evaluating
capital taxes (see e.g. Conesa et al., 2009, and Garcia-Mila et al., 2010). Our main interest here is the
importance of capital-skill complementarity under such joint distributions.
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When the production structure exhibits capital-skill complementarities as suggested
by e.g. Stokey (1996) and Krusell et al. (2000), where skilled labour complements capital
more than unskilled, capital-augmenting policies will be skill-biased and will thus increase
the wage premium and inequality.6 In an environment where the unskilled are also those
agents who do not own capital stock, the benets for the unskilled workers from a capital
tax cut discussed above are likely to be small and thus the inequality e¤ects of capital tax
cuts higher. However, whether a capital tax cut creates benets for the workers in such
an environment depends on the production structure and the joint distribution of asset
and skill heterogeneity.
Additionally, the inclusion of the transition period in the welfare evaluation of the
reforms is crucial. In existing studies, this is because the benets associated with the
capital tax cut, in the form of higher labour productivity, materialise later in the lifetime
of the worker (see e.g. Greulich and Marcet, 2008 and Garcia-Mila et al., 2010). Therefore,
capital tax cuts increase inequality more immediately after the reform, compared to the
long-run. However, when the production structure exhibits capital-skill complementarities,
the timing of the e¤ects on capital tax cuts on unskilled labour will depend on the evolution
of the complementarities of capital with the di¤erent types of labour over time.
Furthermore, another line of research suggests when studying the transition path after
a tax reform, considering alternative expectation generating mechanisms is also useful. For
instance, Giannitsarou (2006), has shown that capital tax cuts, which necessitate learning
on the part of the agents towards the new equilibrium, can reduce the desirability of such
reforms. However, Giannitsarou worked in a representative agent framework and thus did
not consider the case where agents might have heterogeneous initial conditions for learning
after the reform.
With the above background in mind, this chapter aims to welfare-evaluate changes
in income tax rates for di¤erent types of agents, in a model that allows for capital-skill
complementarity and dynamics that can be inuenced by heterogeneity with respect to
initial conditions for learning. To isolate the e¤ects of changes in each tax rate on all
6See e.g. Hornstein et al. (2005) for a review of the literature and empirical evidence on factor- and
sector-specic technologies and inequality.
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agents, we consider changes in tax rates that are not revenue neutral. Instead, given its
current policy relevance, we consider tax reforms consistent with a lower steady-state debt-
to-GDP ratio. Moreover, to focus on the interaction of asset and skill heterogeneity with
a production structure that allows for di¤erent capital-labour complementarities, we also
abstract from other sources of heterogeneity that have already attracted a lot of interest
in the literature (i.e. stochastic or unobservable ability).
We calibrate our model to the UK economy, to assess the likely costs and benets of tax
reforms for the di¤erent agents. The UK is used to illustrate the quantitative analysis, since
the data suggest signicant heterogeneities, in both asset holdings and skill in the labour
supply which are also generally positively correlated. According to the Family Resources
Survey in 2008-2009, 28% of households do not have any savings, 53% have savings up to £
20,000 and 19% have savings above £ 20,000.7 Moreover, the Labour Force Survey of the
O¢ ce for National Statistics8, suggests that in 2003, 28% of the working population was
employed in low-skill, semi-routine and routine occupations, whereas the remaining share
worked in supervisory, technical, professional and managerial occupations. There is also
support for associating skill with income group. For example, data from the Department
for Education and Skills on the participation rates in higher education for di¤erent income
groups show that the participation ratio was about three times higher in the 1990s for the
three highest, relative to the three lowest groups.9 Finally, the tax structure in the UK
stands in stark contrast with other European countries, by having a very high capital to
labour income tax ratio.10
Our modeling permits us to capture key features of heterogeneity. Following the litera-
ture on credit constraints and income inequality (see e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou,
1996 and Aghion and Howitt, 2009), nancial intermediation costs allow our model to gen-
erate heterogeneity in savings, which is consistent with the UK data. In addition, we use
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specication for the production function, fol-
7The survey is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions (see their Table 4.9 for the
information reported here).
8See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7665.xls.
9See www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7308.xls.
10See e.g. Martinez-Mongay (2000), for e¤ective tax rates in European countries. More details on tax
and other data used for the calibration are provided later in section 3.
67
lowing e.g. Stokey (1996) and Krusell et al. (2000), which assumes di¤erent degrees of
complementarity with capital for skilled and unskilled labour. This allows our calibrated
model to produce a wage premium that is in line with empirical studies.
We relax the assumption of rational expectations so that we can also consider an adap-
tive learning environment. This allows us to include an additional source of heterogeneity,
in the form of the initial beliefs of the agents who need to learn the equilibrium laws of
motion. This corresponds to an unequal distribution of information after the reform in the
economy and, as far as we know, has not yet been considered in the tax reform literature.
In this sense, the intended contribution of this Chapter is two-fold. First, while the
literature on the welfare e¤ects of changes in income tax has allowed for joint inequality
in asset holdings and labour productivity in evaluating capital taxation (see e.g. Domeij
and Heathcote, 2004, Conesa et al., 2009, and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010), our main interest
is on the importance of the capital-skill complementarity under such joint distributions.
This allows us to examine the post-reform evolution of wage inequality that is driven by
an endogenous skill premium, and evaluate its contribution in determining the overall in-
equality e¤ects of a given tax reform. Second, as said above, while the tax reform literature
has in general assumed full-rationality of agents (with Giannitsarou, 2006, and Evans et
al., 2009, as relevant exceptions, but both assuming a representative-agent environment),
we look to assess the additional implications of assuming alternative ways of forming ex-
pectations among di¤erent types of agents, a feature that is often known as a form of
structural- and learning-heterogeneity in the adaptive learning literature, but which has
received little attention in the scal policy eld.11
By rst focusing on the long-run, we show that tax cuts have sizeable distributional
e¤ects even when they are not met by a rise in another tax rate. Instead, these distri-
butional e¤ects work through the structure of the production and, more specically, the
complementarity between labour and capital. In particular, capital tax reductions are
skill-biased and thus increase the skill premium and income inequality, consistent with the
11See, e.g., Giannitsarou (2003), Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) and Nunes (2009), for earlier discussions
about the assumption of both structural and learning heterogeneity in general equilibrium models with
applications in the monetary policy eld.
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results in He and Liu, 2008.12 In fact, for elasticities of substitution between capital and
unskilled labour, within the range of empirical estimates, there are income and welfare
losses to unskilled workers in the long-run after the capital tax cut. On the other hand, we
nd that reductions in labour income taxes also disproportionately favour either skilled
or unskilled labour and can reduce the welfare of the capitalists, resulting in reductions in
inequality. These results are consistent with the literature on tax reforms discussed above,
which suggests that capital taxation increases inequality, while labour taxation decreases
it. In our model, the e¤ects of tax policy on inequality are amplied by the skill-premium
channel.
Next, by examining the transition to the post-reform steady-state, we nd that the
skill premium initially falls and then converges to the higher, post- reform levels. This
result is driven by the fact that, in general equilibrium, the macroeconomic e¤ects of
the complementarity between capital and labour inputs is higher in the short-than in the
long-run. In particular, following the tax reform, the relative skill supply increases, as the
agents that hold the capital stock increase the skilled labour supply, to increase labour
income and thus investment in capital, given the higher returns to capital. The increase in
relative skill supply decreases the skill premium, thus providing short-run benets to the
unskilled workers. These benets are reduced over time, as the capital stock is increased
and the relative skill supply decreased.
This dynamic transition of the skill premium implies that the inequality e¤ects of a
capital tax cut are lower initially. Based on the ndings of the tax reform literature to
date, the benets of capital tax cuts are generally expected to be higher in the long-run
for both workers and capitalists. However, allowing capital accumulation to a¤ect the
skill premium implies that, in our analysis, the benets for the workers are lower in the
post-reform steady-state since capital and unskilled labour are substitutes. In contrast,
capitalists and skilled workers benet more from the higher capital stock as this is built
up over time. Thus, including the initial periods helps to close the lifetime welfare gap
between the agents and reduce the inequality e¤ects of capital tax cuts.
12Our analysis for the UK also suggests that the combination of high e¤ective capital tax rates with
the complementarities in production imply that the tax revenue can be increased in the long-run by a
reduction in the capital tax, since this will increase the tax revenue from labour income.
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Finally, we show that heterogeneity in learning matters. Consistent with the results
in Giannitsarou (2006), under homogeneous initial conditions in learning, the convergence
to the new steady-state is slower and this results in welfare costs for the agents after a
capital tax cut. However, heterogeneity in initial conditions implies learning dynamics that
result in paths for the economic variables that exhibit overshooting relative to the rational
expectations solution. In this case, the errors that the learners make in the adjustment
process amplify their reaction to the tax reform, so that there is a form of an "irrational
exuberance", which is benecial to all learners. Similarly, heterogeneous learning implies
welfare gains for the other tax reforms considered.
2.2 Model
In this section we construct a closed-economy DGE model comprised of a representative
capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers who all consume output in
the product market and supply labour in the factor market in return for labour income.
The rst two income groups, subject to intermediation costs, allocate savings to physical
capital and government bonds in return for capital income whereas unskilled workers
do not save. The representative rm is owned by the capitalist who hires (skilled and
unskilled) labour services and leases physical capital from the factor market for which it
pays the competitive wage and interest rate respectively. Finally, the government taxes
economic activity, provides public spending and issues debt to balance its budget.
2.2.1 Population composition
The population size, N , is exogenous and constant. Among N , N c < N are identical
capitalists, N s < N are identical skilled workers, and the rest, Nu = N   N c   N s,
are identical unskilled workers. Capitalists are indexed by the subscript c = 1; 2; :::; N c,
skilled workers by s = 1; 2; :::; N s and unskilled workers by u = 1; 2; :::; Nu. There are
also N f rms, f = 1; 2; :::; N f . We assume that the number of rms equals the number of
capitalists, N c = N f ; and that each capitalist owns one rm. It is useful, for what follows,
to dene N c=N = nc, N s=N = ns, Nu=N = nu = 1  nc   ns and N f=N = nf .
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2.2.2 Firms
Each rm produces a single output, Y ft , using physical capital, K
f
t , and two distinct
types of labour, unskilled, hfu;t, and skilled, h
f
t , where skilled labour is relatively more
complementary to capital than unskilled labour. The production function is given by
a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology assumed to take a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) specication following e.g. Krusell et al. (2000) and He (2012):13
Y ft = A



hfu;t

+ (1  )
h


Kft

+ (1  )

hft
i 1
(2.1)
where A > 0 is constant productivity; 0 < ;  < 1, are the parameters determining the
factor elasticities, i.e. 1= (1  ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled
labour with respect to unskilled labour, whereas 1=(1  ) is the elasticity of substitution
between capital and skilled labor; and 0 < ;  < 1 are the share parameters. The above
CES form allows us to capture the capital-skill complementarity, which is considered to
be a main driver of the skill premium and wage inequality (see e.g. Krusell et al., 2000;
and Hornstein et al., 2005).
Each rm acts competitively, taking prices and policy variables as given, and maximises
prots given by:
ft  Y ft   rktKft   wthft   wu;thfu;t (2.2)
subject to the technology constraint given by (2:1); where wt and wu;t are, respectively,
the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour and rkt is the interest rate on capital.
14 The
di¤erent roles in the production function for skilled and unskilled labour imply that there
will be a skill premium for the former, in the sense that the ratio of wt to wu;t will be
larger than unity. We will calibrate the production function so that the implied factor
input elasticities and the resulting wage premium are in line with empirical studies.
13Note that when  = 1 and  > 1 capital and skilled labour are perfect substitutes and, when  > 0
and  = 1 and  = 1 then unskilled labor and capital are perfect substitutes.
14Note that, in equilibrium, prots, ft , are driven to zero due to perfect competition.
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2.2.3 Budget constraints of capitalists
The representative capitalist owns one rm and receives its prots. He also receives income
from providing skilled labour services, hc;t, to the labour market and income from interests
on his accumulated stock of nancial assets, in the form of capital, Kc;t, and government
bonds, Bc;t. The interest rate on government bonds is given by rbt . All these sources of
income are taxed. In particular, nancial asset and prot income are taxed at the constant
rate  k, while labour income is taxed at the constant rate h.
We assume that those agents holding assets need to pay intermediation or transaction
premia due to imperfections in capital markets. For instance, these premia can represent
the costs of gathering extra information relating to legal issues, asset-specic government
regulations, intermediation fees and so on. We follow Persson and Tabellini (1992); and
Benigno (2009), and assume a quadratic cost function such that the capitalist incurs a
cost of 'kcK
2
c;t for holding physical capital and of '
b
cB
2
c;t for holding government bonds,
where 'bc; '
k
c > 0 measures the size of the transaction costs. The presence of this capital
market imperfection and of the associated transaction costs help the model to capture a
feature of realism. However, their main contribution here is that they will allow us, as we
shall see below, to capture household heterogeneity in asset holdings.
The capitalist uses his income for consumption, Cc;t, investment in capital, Ic;t, and
investment in government bonds, Dc;t. He also receives average (per agent) transfers from
the government, Gt (= Gt=N). Thus, his budget constraint is:
Cc;t + Ic;t +Dc;t =
 
1   k  rktKc;t + rbtBc;t+
+
 
1   kft +  1  hwthc;t +Gt   'bcB2c;t   'kcK2c;t (2.3)
while the evolution of the stock of capital and government bonds, respectively, are given
by:
Kc;t+1 = (1  )Kc;t + Ic;t (2.4)
Bc;t+1 = Bc;t +Dc;t (2.5)
where 0 <  < 1 is a depreciation rate and Kc;0; Bc;0 > 0 are given.
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2.2.4 Budget constraints of skilled workers
The problem of the skilled worker is similar to the capitalists, except that he pays di¤erent
transaction costs, so that the capital market imperfections a¤ect him to a greater extent.
We assume that rm ownership gives an insider advantage in nancial transactions to the
capitalist (due, for instance, to past experience, socioeconomic background, networks, etc.)
and thus the size of the transaction costs is lower for the capitalist. The idea that capital
market imperfections can explain heterogeneity has been extensively examined in the
income inequality literature (see e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996, and Aghion
and Howitt, 2009). Most of these models assume, for simplicity, that the intermediation
cost is either innite for some agents (and thus these agents are e¤ectively excluded from
the nancial market) or zero. In this paper, we examine the case of non-zero, nite
intermediation costs for both capitalists and skilled workers where 'bc < '
b
s, '
k
c < '
k
s . We
di¤erentiate the skilled worker and capitalist even further by assuming that the former
has lower initial holdings of capital and government bonds, i.e. Ks;0 < Kc;0, Bs;0 < Bc;0:
Accordingly, the budget constraints and the evolution equations for capital and gov-
ernment bonds for the sth skilled worker are:
Cs;t + Is;t +Ds;t =
 
1   k  rktKs;t + rbtBs;t+
+
 
1  hwths;t +Gt   'bsB2s;t   'ksK2s;t (2.6)
Is;t = Ks;t+1   (1  )Ks;t (2.7)
Ds;t = Bs;t+1  Bs;t: (2.8)
2.2.5 Budget constraint of unskilled workers
Unskilled workers di¤er from capitalists and skilled workers in two important respects.
First, they start with zero initial holdings of assets and capital market imperfections
result in them being excluded from the nancial markets as in the models of Benabou
(1996) and Aghion and Howitt (2009).15 Second, we assume that exclusion from capital
15See e.g. Aghion et al. (1999) for a microeconomic rationalisation of credit constraints that do not
allow agents to participate in asset markets.
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markets does not allow them to acquire the skills to provide skilled labour services, so
that their labour e¤ort di¤ers, in nature, from the labour e¤ort of the other two types
of agents. Evidence from the UK, introduced later, suggests that skill acquisition, in the
form of University education, is indeed related to socioeconomic income group.
Thus, the budget constraint of the uth unskilled worker is:
Cu;t = (1  u)wu;thu;t +Gt (2.9)
where 0  u < 1 is the tax rate on unskilled labour, hu;t is the labour supply and Cu;t is
the consumption.
2.2.6 Utility function and optimal choices of agents
Each type of household i = c; s; u maximises:
E0
1P
t=0
tu (Ci;t; hi;t) (2.10)
subject to the relevant budget constraints given above; where E0 is the conditional expec-
tations operator.
We use the instantaneous utility function:
ui;t = (Ci;t; hj;t) =

(Ci;t)
 (1  hi;t)1 
1 
1   (2.11)
where 0 <  < 1 is the consumption weight in utility and  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion.
Therefore, to maximise discounted lifetime utility, the representative capitalist chooses
fCc;t; hc;t; Kc;t+1; Bc;t+1g1t=0 subject to (2:3  2:5). Meanwhile, the representative skilled
worker chooses fCs;t; hs;t; Ks;t+1; Bs;t+1g1t=0 subject to (2:6  2:8) ; and nally the repre-
sentative unskilled worker chooses fCu;t; hu;tg1t=0 subject to (2:9).
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2.2.7 Government budget constraint
Following the literature on tax reforms (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, Cooley and Hansen, 1992,
Giannitsarou, 2006, Garcia-Milà et al., 2010, and Angelopoulos, et al., 2012), we do not
model government spending. Instead, government expenditure takes the form of transfers
to the private agents, Gt. To nance these, it taxes income from labour and nancial
assets and issues government bonds, Bt. The budget constraint of the government is thus
given by:
Gt +
 
1 + rbt

Bt = Bt+1 +N
c[ k
 
rktKc;t + r
b
tBc;t

+ hwthc;t]+
+N s[ k
 
rktKs;t + r
b
tBs;t

+ hwths;t] +N
u[uwu;thu;t]. (2.12)
2.2.8 Market-clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for the capital, bond, skilled and unskilled labour and
product markets respectively are:
N fKft = N
cKc;t +N
sKs;t (2.13)
Bt = N
cBc;t +N
sBs;t (2.14)
N fhft = N
chc;t +N
shs;t (2.15)
N fhfu;t = N
uhu;t (2.16)
N fY ft = N
cCc;t +N
sCs;t +N
uCu;t +N
c [Kc;t+1   (1  )Kc;t] + (2.17)
+N s [Ks;t+1   (1  )Ks;t] +N c
 
'bcB
2
c;t + '
k
cK
2
c;t

+
+N s
 
'bsB
2
s;t + '
k
sK
2
s;t

where (2.17) gives the aggregate resource constraint of the economy.
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2.2.9 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) is dened when (i) households and rms
optimise, taking prices and policy as given; (ii) all constraints are satised; and (iii) all
markets clear. After the relevant substitutions, we summarise the DCE in the paths of the
following variables: (Cc;t; Cs;t; Cu;t; hc;t; hs;t; hu;t; wt; wu;t; Kc;t+1; Ks;t+1; Bc;t+1; Bs;t+1; rkt ; r
b
t )
given the exogenously set stationary processes for technology and scal policy instruments
which are discussed below.16 We dene the relevant aggregate, economy-wide quantities
as, Xt, for Xt = fCt; It; Kt; Bt; Ytg.
Given that we wish to analyse the welfare implications of permanent tax regime
changes, all tax rates are treated as exogenous constants, 0   k; h; u < 1. In the
policy reforms that we will examine, the economy will start from the steady-state and will
be subjected to an exogenous, permanent change in one or more tax instruments, holding
the other policy instruments, including G, constant at the pre-reform steady-state values.
We examine economic outcomes and welfare in the new steady and during the transition
period to the new steady-state.
2.3 Calibration and steady-state
In Table 2.2, we next calibrate the structural parameters of the model so that its steady-
state solution, reported in Table 2.1, reects the main empirical characteristics of the
UK economy. The calibration also provides empirical justication for the key modelling
decisions made above.
2.3.1 Population shares
We rst wish to map out agent heterogeneity and thus distinguish the three types of house-
holds by their di¤ering shares in the population, ni. According to the Family Resources
Survey in 2008-2009, 28% of households do not have any savings, 53% have savings up
16To save space we have not reported the DCE system here but it is provided in Appendix B.
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to £ 20,000 and 19% have savings above £ 20,000.17 In light of this, since we assume that
unskilled workers do not have savings, we set nu equal to 30%. At the other end of the
distribution, since we model capitalists as the income group with the highest share of
savings and assets, we set nc to 20% implying that ns is 50%.
Other data providing an additional dimension by which unskilled workers di¤er from
skilled workers and capitalists is that the former group o¤ers a labour input that is lack-
ing in skills. According to the Labour Force Survey of the O¢ ce for National Statistics18,
in 2003, 28% of the working population was employed in semi-routine and routine occu-
pations, whereas the remaining share worked in supervisory, technical, professional and
managerial occupations, which require an increasingly higher skilled labour input. More-
over, according to data from the Department for Education and Skills on the participation
rates in higher education for di¤erent income groups, the participation ratio was about
three times higher in the 1990s for the three highest, relative to the three lowest groups.19
Thus, there appears to be adequate support for associating skill with income group.20
2.3.2 Productivity
We next turn to heterogeneity in productivity and returns to labour, which governs the
choice of the relevant production parameters. Using the estimates in Krusell et al. (2000),
we set  =  0:495 and  = 0:401 implying elasticities of substitution between capital and
skilled labour and between capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled labour of about 0.67
and 1.67 respectively. As discussed in Krusell et al. (2000); and Hornstein et al. (2005),
these estimates cohere well with the microeconometric evidence reported in the literature.
17The survey is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions (see their Table 4.9 for the
information reported here).
18See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7665.xls.
19See www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7308.xls.
20Even though the chosen population shares allow the model to succesfully replicate a number of key
UK data values, the information considered for this calibration has a couple of caveats that must be
acknowledged. First, due to data limitations and availability lags, some of the values considered are quite
recent (i.e. 2009) while some other are less so (i.e. 2003). Second, it is reasonable to expect that not all
households that hold no savings are in fact unskilled or that not all those with savings above £ 20.000 are
in fact capitalists. In this sense, this calibration should be taken as indicative rather than fully precise.
Nevertheless, given the data limitations in this case, the proposed calibration probably yields the best
aproximations available to the share parameters of interest.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
parameter value denition
0 < 1
1 < 1 1.669 capital/skilled labour to unskilled labour elasticity
0 <  < 1 0.645 capital weight in composite input share
0    1 0.060 depreciation rate on private capital
0 < 1
1  < 1 0.669 capital to skilled labour elasticity
0 <  < 1 0.275 unskilled labour weight
'kc ; '
b
c> 0 0.004 transaction costs, capitalists
'ks ; '
b
s> 0 0.020 transaction costs, skilled workers
0 <  < 1 0.976 rate of time preference
0 <  < 1 0.347 consumption weight in utility
 > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
0 < nc< 1 0.200 population share of capitalists
0 < ns< 1 0.500 population share of skilled workers
0 < G=Y < 1 0.313 public spending share of output
0 < h< 1 0.300 labour tax rate, skilled
0 <  k< 1 0.442 capital tax rate
0 < u< 1 0.200 labour tax rate, unskilled
Our calibration of  = 0:645,  = 0:275 and A0 = 1:65 allows us to obtain the labour
share of income, the skill premium and the capital to output ratio consistent with the UK
data.
2.3.3 Savings
Heterogeneity in savings is controlled for, as explained in the previous section, by the
parameters that govern transaction costs in the nancial markets. Following the models
in e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (2009), we set
these costs to innity for the unskilled workers, which implies that these agents do not
have any savings. As said above, about 28% of the UK households do not save. Regarding
the households with positive savings, data from the Family Resources Survey of 2008-2009
suggest that households in the highest saving bracket have ve times higher savings than
the other savers, on average. In terms of our model, this di¤erence is applied to the
representative capitalist and skilled worker by setting the transaction costs for the latter
to be ve times greater than the former. For simplicity, we set this cost in capital asset
markets to be the same in the bond market. We chose the level of the transaction costs
parameter, so that in combination with an annual depreciation rate, , of 6%, the total
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ratio of capital to GDP in the steady-state is about 2 and the transaction costs are about
1% of asset holdings. The latter is broadly consistent with the average di¤erence between
the lending and borrowing rates in the UK (see, e.g. World Development Indicators - WDI
- database) over the past 30 years.
2.3.4 E¤ective tax rates
E¤ective average tax rates for capital and labour income are constructed by following the
approach in Conesa et al. (2007). We use data from the National Accounts and the Public
Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation databases (available from OECD Statistics), to
obtain the series for 1970-2005. The average capital tax rate over the time period is
 k = 0:442, while the average labour income rate is 0:27. Using data from Social Trends
38, O¢ ce for National Statistics, we are able to approximate the progressivity of the UK
income tax system at about 1:6.21
A ratio of h=u = 1:6, together with the requirement that the weighted average of
the two tax rates equal the e¤ective labour income tax rate, would imply that h = 0:304
and u = 0:19. However, the progressivity of income taxation probably overestimates the
progressivity of labour income taxation, which is our interest here. This is because, in
light of the data discussed, we would expect the higher income brackets to have more
capital income compared to lower income brackets. On the other hand, the lower the
progressivity ratio, the higher the implied value of u. We thus use a progressivity ratio of
h=u = 1:5 for the calibration, which guarantees that u is equal to the base income tax
rate. Accordingly, we approximate the lower tax rate, u, at 20%, and the higher labour
income tax rate, h, at 30%.
2.3.5 Parameters common to all agents
We next approximate the rate of time preference, , so that 1= is equal to 1 plus the
ex-post real interest rate, where we use real interest rate data from OECD Main Economic
21This is obtained by calculating the average income tax rate that applies approximately to the lower
30% and the upper 70% of the tax payers. We then add the national insurance contribution rate of 11%
and calculate the ratio of these two e¤ective average tax rates.
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Indicators, from 1970-2005. This gives a value 0:976 for . Following Kydland (1995), we
set , the weight given to consumption relative to leisure in the utility function, equal to
the average value of work versus leisure time, which is obtained using data on hours worked
from the OECD Economic Outlook database, from 1970-2005.22 We also use a common
value from the literature for the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, 1= = 0:5 or
 = 2.
Given that we will evaluate policies that reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio below, we
calibrate the share of government spending in GDP, G=Y to a reasonable value of 31%,
to obtain a B=Y ratio of 70% based on o¢ cial forecasts for 2011-2013 (see e.g. the Pre-
Budget Forecast, June 2010, O¢ ce for Budget Responsibility)23.
2.3.6 Steady-state
The steady-state solution of the model is given in Table 2.2 below in terms of the aggregate
variables. The gures show that the capitalists consume in total 19:4% of total income (or
about 23% of total consumption)24, skilled workers consume in total 44% of total income
(or around 52% of total consumption) and unskilled workers consume in total 22:3% of
total income (or approximately 26% of total consumption). In addition, the capitalists in
total own about 67% of the capital and government bonds in the economy. As said above,
the ratio of savings, Ic=Is, and assets, Kc=Ks and Bc=Bs, of the representative capitalist
to the representative skilled worker, are equal to ve. Note also that the net (i.e. after
depreciation, tax and transaction costs) interest rates on capital and bonds, are given
respectively by:
erk = rk(1   k)     2'kc  ncnc + ns

Kc   2'ks

ns
nc + ns

Ks (2.18)
erb = rb(1   k)  2'bc ncnc + ns

Bc   2'bs

ns
nc + ns

Bs (2.19)
22To obtain this we divide total hours worked by total hours available for work or leisure, following Ho
and Jorgenson (2001). They assume that there are 14 hours available for work or leisure per day with the
remaining 10 hours accounted for by physiological needs. This implies that  is set to 0.35.
23See http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk.
24This is calculated as (N
cCc)=Y
C=Y = (N
c Cc)=C. The same formula is used below for similar quantities.
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Table 2.2: Steady-state (pre-reform)
variable value variable value
NcCc
Y
0.194 w(N
chc+Nshs)+wuN
uhu
Y
0.633
NsCs
Y
0.444 N
cKc
Y
1.275
NuCu
Y
0.223 N
sKs
Y
0.637
C
Y
0.861 K
Y
1.912
NcIc
Y
0.077 N
cBc
Y
0.467
NsIs
Y
0.038 N
sBs
Y
0.233
I
Y
0.115 B
Y
0.700
w 1.375 erk 0.025
wu 1.006 erb 0.025
w
wu
1.366 Uc -63.02
hc 0.166 Us -68.83
hs 0.236 Uu -73.17
hu 0.235 Ua -68.97
and are equal in the steady-state. The Table shows that these returns are 2:5%, which
compares favourably with the 1970-2005 average UK real interest rate, equal to 2.1% in
the WDI database.
It is next worth noting that the ratio of average hours worked by unskilled workers
to the average hours worked by skilled labour in the model is 1:1, which is the same as
in the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) data.25 These work-time allocations imply Frisch
(or -constant) labour supply elasticities of 3:97 for capitalists, 2:18 for skilled and 2:19
for unskilled workers, which are similar to values calibrated in macro models (see e.g.
Browning et al. (1999), Chetty et al. (2011); and Keane and Rogerson (2012); for a
discussion regarding micro and macro elasticities). The value for the capitalists suggests
that, as expected, this group is the relatively least dependent on labour income, and is
consistent with the research in Low (2005); and Domeij and Floden (2006), which suggests
that agents without full access to asset markets prefer increased work hours. Table 2.2
also shows that the labours share of income in the model, w(N
chc+Nshs)+wuN
uhu
Y
= 0:633 is
close to the value (i.e. 0:601) obtained from the OECDs International Sectoral Database
(ISDB) for 1970-2005.
25The ratio is calculated as hu[(Nc=(Nc+Ns))hc+(Ns=(Nc+Ns))hs] .The data refer to average actual weekly
hours of work by industry sector from 1997-2012. Unskilled and skilled hours are obtained respectively
by averaging over industries A-I and J-Q reported in the UK LFS.
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Turning to the skill premium in the UK, Walker and Zhu (2008), estimate a college
premium (dened as the log di¤erence between the wage rate for skilled and unskilled
labour) of about 18% for males and 28% for females, while Machin (1996), computes
the ratio of wages between non-manual and manual jobs in manufacturing that ranges
between 1:3 and 1:5, from 1970 to 1990. For the US, Hornstein et al. (2005), report a
college premium, in terms of wage ratios, that ranges from about 1:47 in 1982 to 1:79 in
2000. The skill premium predicted by our calibration is w=wu = 1:37 or ln(w=wu) = 31%,
which is thus consistent with the empirical evidence cited above.
Finally, note that in the steady-state, capitalists work considerably less than skilled
and unskilled workers, who work more or less the same time (see the h0s in Table 2.2) while
Cc = 0:439; Cs = 0:402 and Cu = 0:331. Thus in terms of welfare, U , higher consumption
and lower work e¤ort make the capitalists better o¤, followed by the skilled and unskilled
workers, respectively. The weighted average measure of aggregate or Benthamite lifetime
utility, Ua, is also reported.26
2.4 Model Solution
To solve the model, we start by taking the rst-order Taylor series expansion of the DCE
and exogenous process for productivity around their respective steady-states. For any
variable Xt, these values are denoted bXt = logXt   logX. We next re-express the model
in matrix form as second-order di¤erence equation system:
xt=M1Etxt+1 +M2xt 1 +M3zt
yt= N1xt +N2xt 1 +N3zt +N4Etxt+1
zt= zt 1 + ut:
(2.20)
where xt =
h
B^c;t+1; K^c;t+1; B^s;t+1; K^s;t+1
i0
contains the endogenous state variables; yt =h
C^c;t; C^s;t; C^u;t; h^c;t; h^s;t; h^u;t; r^
b
t ; r^
k
t ; w^t; w^u;t
i0
the endogenous control variables; and zt =
26The lifetime utility of agent i is given by Ui =
(1 T )
1  ui, for i = c; s; u, where ui is the welfare of i
calculated at the steady-state using (2.11) and T = 1000. Also note that Ua = ncUc + nsUs + nuUu:
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[a^t+1] the exogenous state variables.27 The various M and N matrices contain convo-
lutions of the structural parameters calibrated in Table 2.1. Finally, only for us to be
able to examine the behavior of adaptive learning under an stochastic environment, we
will consider one exogenous state variable, i.e. total factor productivity (TFP). Hence,
 = a is the autoregressive coe¢ cient of the AR(1) process assumed to be followed by
this variable, while ut = "t+1 is a normally distributed exogenous shock term.
In Appendix B we use (2:20) to briey describe how we obtain both the rational
expectations (RE) and adaptive learning (AL) solutions of the log-linearised model.
2.5 Tax reforms
In this section, we examine ve di¤erent tax reforms that meet a debt-to-GDP target of
60% in the steady-state. The latter provides us with a common base for conducting the
policy reforms.28 We start by changing the capital income tax rate,  k, holding all other
rates constant. Next we examine changes in the labour income tax rates, rst on skilled
labour, h, and second on unskilled labour, u; each implying that the progressivity of
labour income taxation has been altered. We then examine the case where the government
changes the e¤ective average labour tax rate, i.e. h and u move proportionately, so that
the progressivity in the labour income taxation remains una¤ected. Lastly, we evaluate
the distributional e¤ects of varying all tax rates proportionately.
For each tax reform considered, we nd the steady-state tax rate(s) required to obtain
the target debt-to-GDP ratio and welfare-evaluate this tax reform in terms of its aggregate
and distributional consequences in the long-run.29 We also study the transition path by
starting the economy at its pre-reform steady-state, implementing the required permanent
27Other papers in the literature using this particular reduced form are e.g. Giannitsarou (2006), and
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007 and 2008).
28Given that we seek to evaluate the distributional e¤ects of tax reforms and not the optimal size of
the government or government debt, we take this debt target as given. Hence, we do not evaluate the
potential welfare benets from reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, in the form of, for instance, lowering the
cost of borrowing for the government and reassuring nancial markets that there is no risk of default.
29Note that a lower level of debt in the steady-state implies that there will also be a reduction in interest
payments on debt and thus in total government spending, assuming, as we do here, that the remaining
components of government spending do not change. Hence, tax reforms consistent with a lower level of
steady-state debt will need to generate a lower level of total tax revenue.
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tax reform and then simulating the response of economy until it reaches the new steady-
state. This allows us to calculate lifetime welfare under both full-rationality and adaptive
learning.
2.5.1 La¤er curves in tax revenue and debt
Prior to undertaking the welfare analysis, it is rst useful to demonstrate the long-run
general equilibrium e¤ects of tax changes on factor returns and quantities by examining
the e¤ect of tax changes on the tax revenue from all tax bases.30 The relationship between
the tax revenue from a particular tax base and the associated tax rate is, in general, given
by a La¤er curve (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997). In our model, changing a tax
rate can lead to either increases or decreases in the tax revenue collected from this tax
base, depending on whether the economy is on the upward or downward slopping part of
the curve, respectively. In the CES production function with capital-skill complementarity
that we employ, a tax rate change will have spillover e¤ects to the tax revenue collected
from the other tax bases. For instance, an increase in the capital tax rate will decrease
the capital supply, but will tend to increase or decrease the supply of unskilled labour,
depending on whether the latter substitutes for or complements capital in production.
Thus, the tax revenue collected from the tax base of unskilled labour income can either
rise or fall after an increase in the capital tax.
As an illustration, we plot the La¤er curves associated with changes in  k in Figure 2.1.
The B=Y curve (lower-right panel) indicates that the target for the debt to GDP ratio can
be obtained by either increasing or decreasing  k to to 65:3% or 40:7%, respectively. The
relationship between tax revenue from assets and the capital tax rate (upper-right panel)
shows that the economy is on the upward slopping part of this La¤er curve. Increasing
 k increases the tax revenue collected from capital, while falls in  k decrease tax revenue
from this source. However, the upper-left and upper-middle panels in the Figure suggest
that decreases in  k crowd-in both skilled and unskilled labour and, accordingly, the tax
revenue from these sources increases.
30Since in this exercise we are concerned about the long-run e¤ects of tax reforms on total tax revenues,
only the RE solution of the model is considered here.
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Table 2.3: Tax reforms and steady-state equilibria (B/Y=0.6)
fall in tax rates rise in tax rates
 k h u  k h u
base (B=Y = 0:7) 0.442 0.300 0.200 0.442 0.300 0.200
 k 0.407 - - 0.653 - -
h - 0.284 - - 0.696 -
u - - 0.161 - - 0.817
u; h - 0.287 0.191 - 0.700 0.467
u; h;  k 0.429 0.292 0.194 0.674 0.456 0.304
The UK economy appears to be near the peak of the total tax revenue and debt La¤er
curves with respect to  k. The results for the tax revenue La¤er curve are very similar
to those reported in Trabandt and Uhlig, 2012, for the UK. In particular, both models
predict for this economy that the gain in tax revenue by increasing the capital tax to the
point where the tax revenue is maximised is only a few percentage points.31
The results for the La¤er curves associated with the remaining tax instruments are,
in general, similar.32 They also imply that, consistent with the analysis in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (1997), for a given level of debt, when a tax rate is the variable that is chosen
to satisfy the government budget constraint, there can be two long-run solutions.33 In
Table 2.3 we summarise the tax changes required to obtain steady-state equilibria that
cohere with the target B=Y ratio of 60%. Given the La¤er curves in tax revenue and debt
discussed above, this target is consistent with both increases and decreases in tax rates.
Table 3 suggests that reductions in each of the taxes individually or jointly are generally
smaller than the respective increases.
31This is despite the use of di¤erent models. Trabandt and Uhlig, 2012, use a representative agent
model, with a Cobb-Douglas production function and allow for monopolistic competition in the product
market.
32These are not presented to save space but are available on request.
33A critical condition for this is that a La¤er curve exists with respect to total tax revenue. Further
note that Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), also discuss the parameter range under which some of these
equilibria can be indeterminate. For our model and the calibrated parameters for the UK, all solutions
obtained below are saddle-path stable.
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Table 2.4: Steady-state welfare gains/losses relative to pre-reform economy
fall in tax rates rise in tax rates
Capitalist Skilled Unskilled Capitalist Skilled Unskilled
 k 0.0237 0.0211 0.0083 -0.2360 -0.1740 -0.0652
h 0.0007 0.0100 0.0032 -0.3041 -0.2997 -0.1070
u -0.0082 -0.0011 0.0243 -0.1084 -0.0878 -0.2905
u; h -0.0011 0.0076 0.0079 -0.3261 -0.3130 -0.2170
u; h;  k 0.0079 0.0127 0.0082 -0.3318 -0.2722 -0.1470
2.5.2 Evaluation of tax reforms in the long-run
We next calculate the welfare for each agent at the steady-state of these equilibria and
present, in Table 2.4, the welfare gains/losses relative to the pre-reform economy.34 To
calculate these welfare changes, we follow Lucas, 1990, and compute the percentage extra
consumption that an individual would require so as to be equally well o¤ between the two
regimes. This is dened as:
i =
 
Uposti;ss
Uprei;ss
! 1
(1 ) 1
(2.21)
for each agent i = c; s; u, where ss denotes welfare calculated in the steady-state.
The rst observation regarding the results in Table 2.4 is that, as expected, welfare
is always reduced for all agents for increases in tax rates. Therefore, we do not consider
these equilibria further in the analysis which follows.
Regarding the fall in tax rates, the results in Table 4 show that there are di¤erent
welfare e¤ects on the agents. In general, tax cuts imply gains (or, at least, no losses) for
all types of agents, with the exception of reductions in u or u, h combined and thus are
not Pareto improving. The biggest welfare gains at the aggregate level are obtained for a
capital tax cut. However, this is also the tax reform with the largest distributional e¤ects,
ranging from sizeable welfare gains for the agents that own capital and supply skilled
labour, to near-zero welfare gains for unskilled workers. This trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency
and equity is central to the analysis of capital tax reforms and is well-documented in the
34Given that in all cases discussed learning converges to the fully-rational post-reform equilibrium, we
only report the results under full rationality in this part.
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related literature (see e.g. Domeij and Heathcote, 2004; and Garcia-Mila et al., 2010).
However, here it is obtained for a capital tax cut that is not followed by a labour tax
increase.
The key to interpreting these results lies in the interaction of the asset and skill in-
equalities with the structure of production. As discussed above when analysing Figure
2.1, a fall in  k increases the capital stock and this raises the productivity of both types
of labour, so that labour supply and labour income are increased. Therefore, workers also
gain by a reduction in the capital tax. This positive productivity spillover e¤ect is an
important driver of the zero long-run optimal capital tax results in models that assume a
relatively high complementarity between the labour input of the worker and capital stock
(e.g., as in models using Cobb-Douglas production functions).
However, consistent with Krusell et al., (2000), a higher capital stock benets skilled
more than unskilled labour, so that the wage premium increases to 32:9% (implying a
wage ratio of 1:39) after the reform. Hence, in this model, capital-skill complementarities
work to amplify the inequality implications of capital tax cuts. In contrast, reductions
in u or u and h result in increases in unskilled labour, which in turn increase skilled
labour but crowd out capital, thus leading to lower capital income.35
The general message from the above analysis is that the complementarity and/or sub-
stitutability between factor inputs is important when assessing the e¤ects of tax reforms.
This nding is consistent with related research which has emphasised the importance of
di¤erent patterns of production and sector- and factor-specic technical changes on in-
equality (see e.g. Hornstein et al., 2005, for a review). Here, the tax reform plays a similar
role to factor-specic technological progress given the way it a¤ects factor returns and
productivity (see also e.g. He and Liu, 2008). By reducing  k or h the government is
e¤ectively introducing a skill-biased change, while reductions in u favour the unskilled.
He and Liu, 2008, also evaluate the e¤ect of capital tax cuts on the skill premium for
a model that is calibrated to US data and conclude that the capital tax cuts will lead to
35Note that by reducing interest payments in the steady state, the tax cuts considered here imply
an additional channel through which they a¤ect the agents di¤erently. Namely, debt in the steady-
state represents assets to skilled workers and capitalists. Hence, its reduction implies, ceteris paribus, a
reduction in an income source for these two agents, but not for unskilled workers. This hurts capitalists
and skilled workers, especially when the tax rate on unskilled labour falls.
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modest increases in the skill premium. In particular, the elimination of the capital tax
and its substitution with labour taxes, results in an increase of the skill premium of about
3:3% in their model.
In our model for the UK, the e¤ects of the capital tax cut on this premium are bigger,
since the skill premium rises by 1:8% for a small reduction in the capital tax, by 7:9%. Our
model di¤ers in two important ways.36 First, we allow for agents that di¤er in both capital
ownership and skill supply, whereas He and Liu, 2008, use a representative agent model.
The higher concentration of capital that we assume, consistent with the British data,
tends to increase the impact of a capital tax cut on the skill premium. In particular, given
that the marginal propensity to save increases with income, the increase in the supply
of capital after the capital tax cut is expected to be higher in a society characterised
by higher concentration of wealth. Second, He and Liu, 2008, allow for endogenous skill
formation, so that, in their model a capital tax cut also leads to a larger rise in the relative
skill supply, which acts to moderate the skill premium. In light of these ndings, our long-
run quantitative results can be interpreted as an upper bound on changes in inequality.
Nevertheless, for shorter horizons, the composition of skill in the population is more likely
to remain unchanged..
2.5.3 Skill premium and inequality during the transition
We next evaluate the aggregate and distributional e¤ects of the above tax reforms over
the lifetime of the agents, including the transition period, paying particular attention to
how agents form expectations after the reform. First, we evaluate the lifetime welfare of
all agents,37 as they converge to the post-reform steady-state starting from the current
economy, assuming rational expectations (RE). In this case, the agents adjust their choices
to the new tax rates immediately when the reform takes place.
Second, we evaluate lifetime welfare assuming an adaptive learning (AL) environment
36Note also that the policy experiments are di¤erent, since He and Liu, 2008, consider a capital tax cut
that is met by a labour tax rise, whereas we isolate the e¤ects of the capital tax cut, by allowing the level
of debt and interest payments on debt to adjust.
37We calculate conditional welfare or discounted lifetime utility using equation (3.6) and a time horizon
of 1000 periods.
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in which the agents have fully learned the pre-reform rational expectations solution but
now must learn the coe¢ cients of their reduced form policy functions associated with the
post-reform economy by using a recursive least squares (RLS) learning algorithm, which
is widely used in the AL literature. The intuition behind this exercise is that, even though
agents might have some preliminary information regarding a policy change to be enacted
soon as it is often announced by the government, they are nevertheless quite likely to
have no or very little information on the e¤ects of such changes on the aggregate and, in
general, on the implications of the new steady-state that can be achieved as a result of
the reform, and will thus require to learn about these.38
Here, we examine two scenarios which determine the initial conditions for learning. In
the rst, which serves to contextualise our results relative to the literature, we follow e.g.
Giannitsarou (2006) and Evans et al. (2009) and assume that the agents start learning
using the reduced form coe¢ cients that correspond to the pre-reform economy. In the
second, we assume that there is heterogeneity in the initial conditions used for learning,
capturing, for instance, unequal information regarding the tax reform, so that a subset
of the population - i.e. the capitalists - can make a better initial guess regarding the
coe¢ cients in its policy function.39
It is worth noting that in the rst scenario of AL with homogeneous initial beliefs,
the welfare e¤ects of all tax reforms for all agents are e¤ectively the same as under the
RE solution, consistent with the results in Giannitsarou (2006).40 Hence, to save space,
we do not discuss results from this solution further and only present results from rational
expectations (re) and AL with heterogeneous initial beliefs (al), henceforth heterogenous
learning.
38See e.g. Giannitsarou (2006) and Evans and Honkapohja (2012), for a similar discussion. For a
situation in which agents are assumed to fully anticipate a scal reform and a part of its expected
macroeconomic e¤ects within a learning environment, see Evans et al. (2009).
39See Appendix B for the model solution under rational expectations and learning and for details on
how the initial conditions for learning are set.
40Note it is only when the tax reform was accompanied by a negative shock to TFP that the rational
expectations and learning transition paths di¤ered more substantially in Giannitsarou (2006). The results
reported below correspond to a non-stochastic case, when there is a zero initial shock to the model at
the time of the reform. An stochastic transition from the old to the new steady state (obtained by
averaging over 2500 simulations) produced transition paths that are very similar to those reported below.
For this purpose, an AR(1) process was assumed for TFP, with an autoregressive parameter equal to 0:92
and a standard deviation of the innovations equal to 0:01, according to 1970-2005 data from the O¢ ce
for National Statistics.
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Table 2.5: Lifetime welfare (lower tax rates)
 k =0.407 h =0.284 u =0.161
i re al  re al  re al 
c 0.0134 0.0139 -0.00049 -0.0011 -0.0011 -5.34e-05 -0.0092 -0.0092 -4.54e-05
s 0.0152 0.0157 -0.00050 0.0090 0.0090 -8.87e-06 -0.0017 -0.0017 -9.65e-06
u 0.0071 0.0073 -0.00022 0.0030 0.0030 -2.22e-05 0.0242 0.0241 -2.15e-05
a 0.0123 0.0127 -0.00041 0.0052 0.0052 -1.73e-06 0.0050 0.0050 -3.30e-06
Table 2.6: Lifetime welfare (combined lower tax rates)
u=0.191, h=0.287 u =0.194; h =0.292;  k =0.429
i re al  re al 
c -0.0028 -0.0028 -5.39e-05 0.0031 0.0033 -0.00019
s 0.0067 0.0067 -9.49e-06 0.0099 0.0101 -0.00009
u 0.0077 0.0077 -2.31e-05 0.0076 0.0077 -9.07e-06
a 0.0053 0.0053 -2.21e-06 0.0080 0.0081 -0.00009
The results for the lifetime welfare gains/losses for each agent under rational expec-
tations and heterogenous learning are shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for each tax reform
considered. To quantify the importance of the latter for welfare, we also calculate the cost
of the heterogeneous learning, in terms of the consumption supplement, compared to the
RE solution. This is dened as  in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
Rational expectations
We rst compare lifetime welfare gains/costs in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 to the corresponding
steady-state values in Table 2.4 under RE. Consistent with the literature, the results
indicate that the larger benets in terms of aggregate welfare are obtained by capital tax
cuts and that these are smaller, compared to the long-run.41 Moreover, the results show
that the inequality e¤ects after the capital tax cuts are also smaller relative to the steady-
state. In particular, capital tax cuts result in smaller welfare gains relative to the long-run
for capitalists and skilled workers, while the welfare gures are roughly the same for the
41Note that the literature on tax reforms (see e.g. Domeij and Heathcote, 2004, and Garcia-Milà et
al., 2010), has emphasised that capital tax cuts will lead to welfare losses for those households whose
resources depend predominantly on labour income, when the elimination of the capital tax cut is met by
a rise in the labour tax to balance the budget. We conrm that this is obtained in this model as well, for
a similar tax reform. Results are available upon request but are not shown here, since, to save on space,
we focus on the productivity gains after a capital tax cut.
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unskilled workers. In other words, the inequality e¤ects are dampened by the inclusion of
the transition period.
To further investigate this result we focus again on the capital tax reduction. To this
end, in Figure 2.2 we plot the pre-reform steady-state in percent deviations from the post-
reform steady-state and the transition paths of capital, labour input and consumption by
agent, the relative supply of skilled labour, dened as N
chc+Nshs
Nuhu
, and the skill premium.
The paths of consumption and hours are important as these will ultimately determine
welfare for each agent.42
Figure 2.2 shows that a tax reform based on reducing the capital tax implies an increase
in the capital stock as the economy gradually converges to the new equilibrium. The
capital tax cut has created incentives for those agents who hold capital, i.e. capitalists
and skilled workers, to increase their accumulation and thus increase investment. For this
to be achieved, capitalists and workers can temporarily decrease consumption, but they
also can increase their income by increasing their labour supply. Therefore, in general
equilibrium, the increase in the return to capital also increases labour supply for those
agents who hold capital. For the capitalists, in particular, the labour supply initially
increases above the new steady-state and then converges to it. As they become wealthier
over time, given the higher capital stock, they tend to supply less labour as the income
e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect.
The overshooting in the relative supply of skilled labour in the short-run, driven by
the higher returns to capital that will materialise in the long-run, leads to a fall in the skill
premium in the short-run, which, in turn, has positive e¤ects for the unskilled workers.
However, over time, the relative supply of skilled labour falls and the quantity of capital in-
creases. Both factors lead to a rising skill premium towards the new steady-state. Overall,
the dynamic analysis indicates that, in general equilibrium, the complementarity between
capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled labour is higher in the short-run, compared with
the long-run.
Therefore, our analysis implies that after the capital tax reform, wage inequality
42To save space we do not present the Figures associated with the remaining tax reforms reported in
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 but these are available on request.
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changes initially favour the agents with less wealth, and this works to partially o¤set
the increase in asset income inequality in the short-run.43 Therefore, in this model of
capital-skill complementarity, the biggest relative gains for the poorest segment of the
population after the capital tax cut materialise immediately after the reform, when the
increase in the capital stock is lower and the relative skill supply overshoots, such that the
wage premium moves favourably for the unskilled workers. Over time, the gains for the
unskilled worker are diminishing faster than those for the skilled and wealthier groups,
since both wage and asset income inequality now move in the same direction, implying
that the welfare gap between the agents rises more in the long-run.
Heterogeneous learning
Next, we evaluate the importance of learning under heterogeneous initial beliefs. In par-
ticular, the skilled workers initiate their learning by using the coe¢ cients that correspond
to RE solution consistent with the old, pre-reform steady state. In contrast, capitalists
are able to guess, immediately after the reform, the coe¢ cients that correspond to the
RE solution consistent with the new steady state.44 However, both agentsexpectations
will be erroneous, because the actual economy, as determined by the interaction of their
choices, is neither in the pre- nor in the post-reform RE equilibrium. In Figure 2.2, it
can be seen that as the agents revise their errors along the transition path, the general
equilibrium response to the tax reform includes an overshooting relative to the rational
expectations case. This is di¤erent from the case of homogeneous learning, where adaptive
learning generally implies a slower convergence to the new equilibrium (see e.g. Giannit-
sarou, 2006). Therefore, contrary to homogeneous learning, which dampens the reaction
to the tax reform, the errors that heterogeneous learners make amplify their reaction.
The intuition for this result is consistent with Giannitsarous (2006), observation that
43In the tax reforms considered in models that do not allow for capital-skill complementarity (e.g.
Domeij and Heathcote, 2004, Greulich and Marcet, 2008; and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010), the productivity
gains and thus the benets to the workers from a capital tax cut are stronger in the long run, as the
capital stock is built up. However, these models do not allow for an evaluation of the wage inequality
following a capital tax cut.
44Note that, all the policy experiments performed under AL yield stationary and locally E-stable solu-
tions. In other words, all these reforms are e¤ectively learnable (see, e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001,
and Honkapohja and Mitra, 2006).
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positive shocks that coincide with the reform generate a "boost in optimism" that acceler-
ates convergence to the new steady state and capital and output can overshoot in the early
periods under learning as compared to RE. In our case, the overshooting is obtained in
the absence of such shocks. Both capitalists and skilled workers are learners but given our
assumptions regarding heterogeneity in initial beliefs, the former already know their own
post-reform RE coe¢ cients. Hence they realise that returns on investment are higher in
the new steady state, so they start immediately investing more and accumulating capital
faster. In contrast, the skilled workers are still using the pre-reform coe¢ cients and have
no information about the e¤ects of the new regime. Hence, the increased activity they
perceive due to the decision of the capitalists appears to them as very high forecast errors,
as they keep discovering that total capital is higher than the their latest forecast. These,
in e¤ect, act as successive positive shocks which lead them to a faster accumulation of
capital than if they were fully rational.
This overshooting from skilled workers implies that capitalists have also made a fore-
cast error, as actual capital is in fact higher than their forecasted capital that would be
consistent with the RE path. Hence, they also correct their behavior accordingly by
investing more, and thus by overshooting themselves. Thus, heterogeneity in initial con-
ditions appears to create forecast errors that e¤ectively act as positive shocks in the early
periods, as the actual capital stock is higher than what was expected. This e¤ect is higher
for the skilled workers, as can be seen in Figure 2.2.
Therefore, heterogeneous learning leads to a form of "irrational exuberance" which
disappears in the long-run as beliefs gradually converge to the RE solution. However, in
the particular case of a capital tax cut, this helps to increase the welfare for all agents
along the transition path, relative to the case of rational expectations (see, e.g. the
relevant  gures in Table 2.5). With the exception of the proportional decrease in all
taxes, which also shows some sizeable results, the di¤erence between rational expectations
and heterogeneous learning is very small (virtually to zero) for the remaining tax reforms,
given that the change in tax rates is also very small. However, we report that for bigger tax
reforms (e.g. if the tax reforms aim for even lower debt-to-GDP ratios), the quantitative
e¤ects of heterogeneous initial beliefs in learning are unambiguously bigger.
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2.5.4 Substitutability between capital and unskilled labour
The above results suggest that the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled
labour is a critical factor in determining the inequality e¤ects of capital tax cuts, irrespec-
tive of how expectations are e¤ectively formed. Thus, we next explore the quantitative
e¤ects of higher elasticities of substitution. As discussed previously, empirical analyses
provide a range of estimates for the critical parameter  in the production function. We
consider a set of values of  which are consistent with this range and re-parameterise the
model to obtain the same factor shares and B=Y ratio as in the pre-reform economy in
Table 2.2.45 In Table 2.7, we present the results for the welfare gains or losses for the
three types of agents post-reform for the steady-state and for all periods according to
these alternative calibrations. In each case, di¤erent capital tax reductions were applied
to reach a debt-to-output ratio of 60% in the new steady-state.
The results in Table 2.7 suggest that over both time horizons considered, the welfare
gains from the reduction in the capital tax to capitalists and skilled workers increase when
the substitutability between capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled labour is increased.
In contrast, the welfare gains to the unskilled workers fall. Therefore, the overall welfare
inequality e¤ects of capital tax cuts rise in the presence of higher capital skill complemen-
tarity, since reductions in the capital tax are skill-biased and thus raise wage inequality.
While these qualitative results are expected, the small quantitative changes obtained for
the empirically relevant range of parameters considered, lend support to the robustness of
the model predictions in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, both under RE and heteregenous learning.
2.6 Conclusions
Using a heterogeneous agent model allowing for di¤erent degrees of complementarity be-
tween capital, skilled and unskilled labour, we have evaluated supply-side reforms consis-
tent with a lower public debt-to-GDP ratio. To implement these reforms, we calibrated
45See e.g. Cantore and Levine, 2012, on "re-parameterisation" with CES production functions.
The re-calibration considered here ensures that the values at the pre-reform steady-state when  =
f0:42; 0:45; 0:50g are the same as those reported in Table 2 (i.e. when  = 0:401) up to the third decimal
place. For this purpose,  took the values f0:281; 0:290; 0:303) while  took the values f0:645; 0:645; 0:635g,
respectively.
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Table 2.7: Walfare gains/losses for di¤erent alphas
Steady-state Lifetime
Capitalist Skilled Unskilled Capitalist Skilled Unskilled
 = 0:40, w
wu
= 1:366;  k = 0:4070
RE 0.0237 0.0211 0.0083 0.0134 0.0152 0.0071
AL - - - 0.0139 0.0157 0.0073
 = 0:42, w
wu
= 1:370;  k = 0:4067
RE 0.0240 0.0213 0.0081 0.0136 0.0154 0.0070
AL - - - 0.0141 0.0160 0.0072
 = 0:45, w
wu
= 1:373;  k = 0:4065
RE 0.0245 0.0217 0.0078 0.0139 0.0157 0.0068
AL - - - 0.0144 0.0162 0.0070
 = 0:50, w
wu
= 1:386;  k = 0:4063
RE 0.0245 0.0218 0.0072 0.0139 0.0158 0.0062
AL - - - 0.0144 0.0162 0.0064
the model so that the pre-reform steady-state represented the current state of the UK
economy and then simulated di¤erent permanent changes in tax rates.
Our results imply that, relative to the other tax reforms, capital tax reductions lead to
the highest aggregate welfare but are skill-biased and thus increase inequality in the long-
run. Also, including the transition period in the welfare evaluation lowers the inequality
e¤ects of reducing the capital tax since the complementarity between capital and all labour
inputs is higher in the short- than in the long-run. Finally, our results suggest too that a
form of "irrational exuberance" can arise after a tax cut under heterogeneous learning in
the initial conditions after the tax reform
Our ndings further suggest that it may be appropriate to consider redistributive
policies alongside capital tax cuts. While these policies have not been studied here, we
expect them to be more e¤ective if they aim to raise the productivity of factor inputs and,
in particular, enhance social mobility, rather than simply redistribute income towards the
income groups that are not favoured by the reform. A careful evaluation of such policies
would be an obvious extension to this work. We leave these issues for future research.
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Chapter 3
Debt-targeting scal rules and income inequality: the
case of Bolivia
3.1 Introduction
Modern macroeconomic policy making has become increasingly constrained by the con-
cern about the long run e¤ects of misguided monetary and scal policies. A clear example
of this current trend is the result of the high levels of public debt accumulated in most
Latin-American economies from the mid-seventies to early-eighties. These, along with
weak budgetary institutions, led to severe debt crises as well as costly episodes of hyper-
ination and currency depreciation in most of the region between the mid-eighties and
early-nineties.
Such negative past experiences, in turn, have brought sustainability and scal consol-
idation to the forefront of economic authoritiesconcerns in most of these countries. In
e¤ect, since year 2000, countries such as Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Argentina and Mexico
have all been gradually applying a variety of legislated restrictions or rules on scal policy
in order to set specic limits on government expenditure, the debt-to-output ratio or some
other relevant variables describing the performance of public nances.1
Despite the fact that Bolivia was one of the countries that su¤ered the most during the
aforementioned crisis, and while admittedly macroeconomic stability has been reasonably
1Brazil started applying its scal rule since 2000. Peru and Colombia approved their rules in 2003,
while Argentina and Mexico did it in 2004 and 2006, respectively. See Banco de la Republica et al. (2010)
for a review of the main features of each of these rules.
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preserved over the last twenty seven years, the fact that no long-term sustainability issues
have been considered by the scal authorities, leaves little insurance that such negative
events will not take place again in the foreseeable future. Two elements make this concern
all the more relevant.
First, although the government revenues have been increasing consistently over the
last six years and primary surpluses have been announced in the last ve consecutive
years, public debt has also been increasing in the last three years, from 37 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) to almost 45 percent in 2011. While the current level is still close
to the World Banks debt sustainability threshold for Bolivia of 40 percent, the increasing
trend of the debt-to-GDP ratio seems at odds with the current governments strong scal
situation and raises questions about the formers sustainability prospects if the countrys
public nances start to deteriorate in the near future due to an adverse shock.2
Second, since the late 80s to the mid-2000s, almost 60 percent of the Bolivian external
debt stock had some degree of concessionality.3 Moreover, an important share of this debt
was forgiven between the mid-nineties and the start of the new century thanks a series of
multilateral schemes aiming to benet the poorest and most heavily indebted countries
around the world as long as the freed resources are used instead to achieve a number of
poverty-reduction targets in terms of health, education, gender equality and others (see
e.g. Lopez, 2003). Currently, however, only 30 percent of the Bolivian external debt is
concessional while the remaining 70 percent as well as all the domestic debt have been
contracted under market conditions, a trend which naturally implies that ensuring its
sustainability over time will only tend to be more challenging.4
With this in mind, it seems highly relevant to ask whether implementing a scal rule
that imposes restrictions in the evolution of public debt in Bolivia is an advisable mea-
sure or not. Such question is relevant as early research on the impact of scal rules (see
e.g. Andres and Domenech, 2006a and Gordon and Leeper, 2005) warned against poten-
tial welfare costs derived from applying countercyclical scal rules when agents behave
2Despite reporting a scal surplus of around 2% of GDP for 2012 (see e.g. IMF, 2012), the Bolivian
government has announced its intention to issue bonds in the international markets for USD 500 million
(see www.ft.com (18/3/2012): "Bolivia plans rst bond issue since early 1900").
3Dened as loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or more.
4See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bolivia/
99
optimally and have full access to the nancial markets.
However, more recent work concludes otherwise. For instance, Andres and Domenech
(2006b) show in a New-Keynesian framework that if an important percentage of the pop-
ulation have little or no access to the nancial markets, scal rules targeting debt con-
solidation can be highly successful at controlling debt and have little e¤ect on output
and consumption. Particularly, using a similar model as above, Garcia et al. (2011) and
Cordoba and Rojas (2010) nd that rules targeting debt or the scal decit will yield the
most desirable results in terms of welfare for Chile and Peru, respectively.
These results are also consistent with the more general ndings of Kirsanova et al.
(2009), who use a model with homogeneous agents and nominal frictions within a scal and
monetary interaction context, and cannot conclude against the so-called current consensus
assignment in economic policy, which states that to maximise welfare, scal policy should
mainly focus on the control of government debt or decits.
It is worth emphasizing that the study of the Bolivian case allows to investigate and
discuss in more detail the impact of three highly relevant aspects on the performance of
any given scal rule and, consequently, on the criteria that must be considered for the
selection of the most adequate one.
The rst aspect relates to the signicantly high levels of income inequality su¤ered in
Bolivia. In e¤ect, a ranking reported by the World Bank based on periodic calculations
of the Gini coe¢ cient places Bolivia among the most unequal economies in the world.5
While reportedly the Bolivian government has increased its e¤orts over the last few years
in response to this precarious situation (see e.g. Montecino, 2011), more recent gures on
inequality have shown little improvement (see e.g. Gasparini et al., 2009). In this sense,
it is reasonable to think that any scal policy measure or instrument to be considered by
the government will aim to reduce income inequality or, at least, ensure that the latter
will not be exacerbated. In other words, it is important to investigate whether a given
scal rule can generate a trade-o¤ between debt-control and inequality, an issue that has
not received enough attention in the scal policy literature.
5The Gini coe¢ cient for Bolivia for 2008 was calculated at 56.3, placing this country at the bottom of
the world ranking, only ahead of Colombia, Honduras and South Africa (source: data.worldbank.org).
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A second aspect is that Bolivias economic fate depends strongly on the extractive
nature of its productive structure, as is the case of several natural-resource-rich developing
countries around the world. In particular, Bolivia holds the second largest reserves of
natural gas in South-America, with the revenues originated from exports of this resource
representing around 6 percent of GDP and almost 40 percent of the governments total
revenues each year.
On this respect, there is now an important literature on natural resource dependence
(see e.g. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009 and Van der Ploeg, 2011, for a detailed
discussion) which shows that developing economies with debilitated public nances and
less developed nancial markets tend to be more vulnerable to the adverse e¤ects of the
potential volatility associated with these resources.6 Moreover, it is well-documented (see
Pindyck, 2004, for a detailed review) that currently almost all energy markets in the world,
including the di¤erent regional natural gas markets, are su¤ering from very high levels of
price volatility. Therefore, it becomes clear that the role of natural gas revenues as a key
source of exogenous volatility in Bolivia cannot be ignored in this work.
A third aspect is related to how expectations are formed among agents in general
and particularly in less developed economies like Bolivia. A growing literature has been
exploring the notion that in practice agents might not be fully rational and thus must
rely on past data in order to forecast the behavior of the economic variables of interest,
making use of e¢ cient estimation or learning rules which, under certain conditions, ensure
convergence to the fully rational equilibrium.
In particular, a number of authors (see e.g. Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007,
Eusepi and Preston, 2011, and Huang et al., 2009) have suggested that if an adaptive
learning approach is assumed instead of the commonly used rational expectations hypoth-
esis, the overall goodness-of-t of standard general equilibrium models tends to improve.
Although the particular case of developing countries has received little attention in this
eld, results in favour of adaptive learning have been also suggested by, for instance,
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Boz et al. (2008).
6Notably, such vulnerability has been found to be even higher for landlocked countries with ethnic
tensions (see Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009), two features that also characterise the Bolivian economy.
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Accordingly, a related literature has been discussing the consequences of adaptive learn-
ing in a large number of policy-oriented matters (see Evans and Honkhapoja, 2011, for
a recent detailed review). However, most part of this growing research has paid close
attention to monetary policy issues (e.g. determinacy and expectational stability of policy
rules and optimal policy design), leaving the scal policy eld almost unattended.7 In
particular, to the date, the potential impact of adaptive learning on the performance and
income-inequality implications of applying di¤erent scal policy rules in a given economy
has been largely overlooked by the learning literature.
In light of the above, it is the main objective of this work to shed more lights on
the distributional consequences of applying debt-targeting scal rules in Bolivia when
the economy is exposed to di¤erent sources of volatility and considering di¤erent ways of
expectations formation among agents. For this purpose, we calibrate a closed-economy
stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to match Bolivias main
features as described by the data.
The model assumes two types of agents: capitalists, whose main sources of income
are their physical and nancial assets; and workers, whose main source of income is their
labour supply. To capture key features of heterogeneity and wealth and income inequal-
ity observed in this economy, we follow the literature on credit constraints and income
inequality (see e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996, and Aghion and Howitt, 2009)
and include nancial intermediation costs which are signicantly higher for workers than
for capitalists, implying that the formers participation in the nancial markets is very
limited.
As said earlier, besides assessing the performance of the scal rules as Bolivia is ex-
posed to the e¤ects of standard exogenous technology shocks, natural gas-revenue (or
commodity) shocks are also considered as another relevant source of volatility. For this
purpose, following Garcia and Restrepo (2007) and Garcia et al. (2010), these revenues
are modelled exogenously as net revenues, subject to high levels of international price
7Few relevant exceptions are Giannitsarou (2006) who discusses the importance of learning on the
efectiveness of a capital tax reform after a recession, Evans and Honkapohja (2009) who examine the
e¤ects of learning in face of an anticipated scal reform and Evans et al. (2012) who investigate the
e¤ectiveness of scal policy under learning.
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volatility.
Under this particular model setup we investigate how di¤erent ways of forming expec-
tations a¤ect the performance and the distributional impact of each of the proposed scal
rules. Hence, the results of the model solved assuming rational expectations are presented
rst. Then, this assumption is relaxed and it is assumed that both types of agents are
learners instead.
Specically, it is assumed that both types of agents follow identical learning rules over
time but have di¤erent initial beliefs at the start of the learning process - i.e. a type of
heterogeneous learning8. Here, two well-known rules in the learning literature - recursive
least squares and its constant gain variation - are taken into consideration. Also, in order
to characterise these di¤ering initial beliefs, three alternatives are examined. In the rst
one it is assumed that workers do not know the exact impact of the scal rule in place
while capitalists do. In the second alternative it is assumed that workers do not know the
economic implications of the rule and additionally have slightly more pessimistic initial
beliefs than capitalists. Finally, in the third alternative it is assumed that workers do
not know the implications of the rule but have slightly more optimistic initial beliefs than
capitalists.
For every di¤erent assumption regarding how expectations are formed, this work aims
to examine and rank each of the proposed scal rules according to two main criteria: a)
the short and long run performance at stabilising debt after an exogenous shock has hit
the economy, and b) the associated impact on income inequality.9
The main results of this work are as follows. First, under full rationality, the adop-
tion of scal rules aiming to control the evolution of public debt in a context of high
wealth and income inequality can prove ine¤ective in response to productivity and, spe-
cially, commodity shocks. In e¤ect, in most cases these rules generate a trade-o¤ between
debt-stabilisation and higher income-inequality which, as discussed earlier, should not be
8Another, stronger, type of heterogeneity consists in assuming di¤erent learning algorithms between
agents. In this work, however, we want to show that the di¤erences generated by assuming rational expec-
tations or heteregenous learning can be quite signicant even if the simplest form of learning heterogeneity
is considered.
9In addition, and although income inequality is of key interest in this work, the distributional conse-
quences of applying these rules in terms of welfare will also be reported when relevant.
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ignored in economies where such aspects are highly sensible from a sociopolitical point of
view.
However, if heterogenous learning is assumed, then the transition dynamics are such
that in a number of cases the aforementioned trade-o¤ is no longer present and thus some
of the rules - i.e. those instrumented via labour taxes - can perform rather well in both
elds, specially if TFP shocks are considered.
Second, given the particular features of Bolivia, nding a scal rule that shows high
debt-stabilising properties without compromising income distribution in response to all
relevant sources of exogenous volatility is not an easy task. That is, the scal rules
instrumented via labour taxes seem the most reasonable candidates, but only in response
to productivity shocks. When large negative natural gas revenue shocks are considered,
however, the overall performance of the rules is poor, a result that illustrates the high
dependence and vulnerability of Bolivia on this source revenue which is subject to high
levels of volatility due to sharp changes in its international price.
After this introduction, section 2 describes the model setup and section 3 reports
its calibration and steady-state solution. The solution methods of the dynamic model
assuming both RE and AL are briey described in section 4. Then, section 5 presents the
main results predicted by the model under the di¤erent scal rules and alternative ways
of forming expectations. Finally, section 6 presents the main conclusions of this work and
some nal remarks.
3.2 Model setup
In this section we construct a closed-economy DSGE model comprised of two types of
agents: a representative capitalist and a representative worker.10 Both consume output in
the product market and supply labour in the factor market in return for labour income.
Also, subject to intermediation costs, both types of agents allocate savings to physical
capital and government bonds in return for capital income with the main di¤erence that
10The names capitalist and worker were chosen to facilitate their identication along the document.
They try to emphasize the fact that capitalists have the returns from their assets as the main source of
income while workers obtain most of their income from their work.
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intermediation costs for workers are signicantly higher.
The representative rm is owned by the capitalist who hires labour services and leases
physical capital from the factor market for which it pays the competitive wage and in-
terest rate respectively. Finally, the government taxes economic activity, provides public
spending and issues debt to balance its budget. In such context, as discussed earlier, a
set of alternative scal rules which focus on the levels of public debt will be considered so
that their relative performance and distributional consequences can be examined.
3.2.1 Population composition
The population size, N , is exogenous and constant. Among N , N c < N are identical
capitalists andNw = N N c are identical workers. Capitalists are indexed by the subscript
c = 1; 2; :::; N c and workers by w = 1; 2; :::; Nw. There are also N f rms, f = 1; 2; :::; N f .
For simplicity, we assume that the number of rms equals the number of capitalists,
Nk = N f , and that each capitalist owns one rm. It is useful, for what follows, to dene
N c=N = nc, Nw=N = nw = 1   nc and N f=N = nf . The shares of each type of agent in
the population are constant.
3.2.2 Firms
Each rm produces a single output, Y ft , using physical capital, K
f
t , and labour services,
Hft . The production function is given by a well-known Cobb-Douglas specication (see
e.g. Angelopoulos, Jiang and Malley, 2011):
Y ft = At

Kft
 
Hft
1 
(3.1)
where At is exogenous stochastic productivity whose motion is depicted by a rst-order
autoregressive - AR(1) - process
At+1 = A
(1 a)
0 A
a
t e
"t (3.2)
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where A0 > 0 is a constant, 0 < a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter, "t  N(0; 2")
are random shocks to total factor productivity (TFP) and 0 < 1,and (1   1), are the
productivity of capital and labour, respectively.
Each rm acts competitively, taking prices and policy variables as given, and maximises
prots given by:
ft  Y ft   rktKft   wtHft (3.3)
subject to the technology constraint, where wt is the wage rate and rkt is the interest
rate on capital. Note that in equilibrium, prots, ft , are driven to zero due to perfect
competition.
3.2.3 Budget constraints of capitalists
The representative capitalist owns one rm and receives income from providing labour
services, Hc;t, to the labour market and income from interest on his accumulated stock
of nancial assets, in the form of capital, Kc;t, and government bonds, Bc;t. The interest
rate on government bonds is given by rbt . In line with the Bolivian legal framework, all
these sources of income are taxed by the government, with the exception of that coming
from the interest earned on government bonds. Hence, nancial asset income coming from
investing in physical capital is taxed at the rate  k, while labour income is taxed at the
rate h.
In order to hold assets, capitalists need to pay intermediation or transaction premia due
to imperfections in capital markets. For instance, these premia can represent the costs of
gathering extra information relating to legal issues, asset-specic government regulations,
intermediation fees and so on. Following Persson and Tabellini (1992), we assume a
quadratic cost function such that the capitalist incurs a cost of 'kcK
2
c;t for holding physical
capital and of 'bcB
2
c;t for holding government bonds, where '
b
c; '
k
c > 0 measure the size
of the transaction costs. The presence of this capital market imperfection and of the
associated transaction costs, helps the model to capture a feature of realism, but also help
to dene household heterogeneity in the model.
The capitalist uses his income for consumption, Cc;t, for which he pays a consumption
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tax,  c, investment in capital and government bonds. Thus, his budget constraint is:
(1 +  c)Cc;t +Kc;t+1 +Bc;t+1 = (1  )Kc;t +Bc;t +
 
1   k rktKc;t+
+
 
1  hwtHc;t + rbtBc;t + Gtrt   'bcB2c;t   'kcK2c;t (3.4)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate, Gtrt = G
tr
t =N are average net transfers from the
government and Kc;0; Bc;0 > 0 are given.
3.2.4 Budget constraints of workers
The problem of the worker is similar to the problem of the capitalist, in that he provides
labour to the labour market, invests the share of his income he does not consume in capital
and government bonds, earns interest rate income on his nancial stock, receives the same
average transfers and pays the same tax rates for these economic activities.
He di¤ers from the capitalist, however, in that he pays di¤erent transaction costs, so
that the e¤ect of the capital market imperfections a¤ects him to a greater extent.11 In
particular, we assume that rm ownership gives an insider advantage in nancial transac-
tions to the capitalist (due, for instance, to past experience, socioeconomic background,
networks or geographical issues related to living in less connected rural areas) and thus
the size of the transaction costs is lower for the capitalist.
The idea that capital market imperfections can explain heterogeneity has been exam-
ined by, inter alia, Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (2009). In this work, we
examine the case of non-zero, nite intermediation costs for both capitalists and workers
where 'bc < '
b
w, '
k
c < '
k
w. This in turn implies that workers have much lower initial
holdings of capital and government bonds than capitalists, i.e. Kw;0 < Kc;0, Bw;0 < Bc;0.12
Accordingly, the budget constraint of the worker is given by:
(1 +  c)Cw;t +Kw;t+1 +Bw;t+1 = (1  )Kw;t +Bw;t +
 
1   k rktKw;t+
+
 
1  hwtHw;t + rbtBw;t + Gtrt   'bwB2w;t   'kwK2w;t (3.5)
11The worker also di¤ers from the capitalist in that he does not appropriate the prots of the rm.
Given that in this model these prots are zero in equilibrium, this di¤erence is trivial.
12Note that this notion of heterogeneity among agents is somehow related to other line of research in
this eld, which assumes that the economy is populated by Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents in a New
Keynesian framework (see e.g. Garcia et al. 2011 and Garcia and Restrepo, 2006).
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3.2.5 Utility function of agents
Each type of household i = c; w maximises:
E0
1P
t=0
tu
 
Ci;t; Hi;t; Gt

(3.6)
subject to the relevant budget constraints given above; where E0 is the expectations
operator; and Gt = Gt=N is average (per agent) government services or the total amount
of public goods per capita. We use the instantaneous utility function:
ui;t =
 
Ci;t; Hi;t; Gi;t

=
h
(Ci;t)
1 (1 Hi;t)2
 
Gi;t
1 1 2i1 
1   (3.7)
where 1; 2; and 3 are preference parameters while  is the parameter of risk aversion.
It is worth mentioning that, unlike the previous two chapters, government spending is
assumed to enhance utility in this case. This assumption is taken in light of two relevant
features of the Bolivian economy. First, from a demand point of view, Bolivia remains
as the poorest country of South America and around 60% of its population is still below
the national poverty line.13 In this sense, the relative dependence of this large part of the
population on public goods, services and transfers is quite signicant with respect to total
income.
Second, from a supply point of view, the current governments policy in terms of the
outlook of the countrys productive structure is to unambiguously favour state-owned
activities. Examples of this are the on-going process of nationalisation of rms owned by
private foreign investors in so-called strategicsectors (e.g. oil, gas and electricity) which
started in 200614, and the start-up of several state-owned companies which now compete
against domestic private companies in relatively more competitive markets (e.g. grains,
sugar, almonds, diary, paper, cardboard and cement).15
13See http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Bolivia+poverty&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3A581%3BcountryID%3A68.
14See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-29/spain-s-iberdrola-has-4-units-taken-over-by-
bolivian-government.html.
15See page 67 of the World Banks Report No.58674 (Bolivia Public Fi-
nancial Management Review, 2011). Available online at: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/
01/18/000333037_20110118233636/Rendered/PDF/586740ESW0Whit14B01PUBLIC1012120.10.pdf
108
3.2.6 Government
Budget constraint
The government provides the private agents with utility-enhancing services, in the form
of government consumption. In order to nance these expenses, it taxes consumption,
income from labour and physical assets and issues government bonds.
In addition, as is the case in a number of emerging/developing economies, the gov-
ernment obtains signicant revenues, denoted by Rt, from selling a natural resource often
produced within a natural-monopoly structure and thus usually owned entirely (or almost
entirely) by the government. Very well-known cases are the cooper industry in Chile and of
course the oil industry in several Latin-American, African and Middle-Eastern countries.
In turn, due to a signicant increase in exploration activity since the late-90s, Bolivia
became known for holding the second largest reserves of natural gas in South-America
(after Venezuela). Also, after a major investment to build a cross-border pipeline to Brazil
in addition to the existing one to Argentina (built in the early-70s), the revenues originated
from exports of this resource to both countries have represented around 6 percent of the
countrys GDP on average in the last three years.16
Following Garcia and Restrepo (2007) and Garcia et al. (2010), given the nature of this
strategic industry, the additional revenues coming from natural gas exports are modelled
here as net revenues.17 Therefore, the budget constraint of the government is given by:
Gt +G
tr
t +
 
1 + rbt

Bt = Bt+1 +N
c[ cCc;t + 
krktKc;t + 
hwthc;t]+
+Nw[ cCw;t + 
krktKw;t + 
hwthw;t] +Rt (3.8)
where the behavior of Rt will be given by an AR(1) process:
Rt+1 = R
(1 R)
0 R
R
t e
"Rt (3.9)
16The 20-year contract with Brazil was agreed in 1996 and a new contract with Argentina (Bolivia also
sold gas to Argentina between 1972 to 1999) was signed in 2004.
17Note that this a simplifying way of modelling revenues which are net from the operational costs
involved in the production/distribution of this commodity, so that more emphasis can be given to the
volatile nature of the international prices at which it is sold.
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with R0 > 0, 0 < R < 1 and "Rt  N(0; 2R).
Fiscal rules
It has been empirically demonstrated by several authors that scal policy in Latin Amer-
ican countries has been historically pro-cyclical (see e.g. Gavin et al., 1996, Gavin and
Perotti, 1997 and Talvi and Vegh, 2000), a situation that has led to severe losses in terms
of growth and welfare, especially for the poor (see e.g. Perry, 2002).
Bolivia has not been the exception to these empirical ndings and, in fact, its lack of
scal discipline and weak budgetary institutions during the 70s and 80s provoked a severe
public debt crisis, with total debt reaching a staggering 229.3 percent of GDP in 1987,
which eventually had to be defaulted, as well as unprecedented rates of hyperination and
currency depreciation.18
While admittedly macroeconomic stability has been preserved to the date after that
last episode, the fact that no long-term sustainability issues have been considered by the
Bolivian scal authorities over the last 20 years leaves little insurance that such negative
events will not take place again in the foreseeable future. As mentioned earlier, two
important elements give raise to this concern.
First, despite the fact that the government revenues increased remarkably (mainly due
to increasing tax revenues and natural gas exports), leading to ve consecutive years of
primary surpluses, public debt has also been increasing, from around 37 percent of GDP
in 2008 to a little less than 45 percent of GDP in 2011.
While such levels are below the 10-year (67% of GDP) and 20-year (75% of GDP)
averages of this variable and thus are not alarming,19 its trend seems at odds with the
current strong scal situation and raises questions about its sustainability if the govern-
ments nances start to deteriorate in the near future due to an adverse shock such as a
large fall in the price of natural gas or a decrease in tax revenues after an slowdown of
economic activity.
Second, unlike ten years ago when more than 60 percent of the Bolivian public debt had
18Since that episode and to the date, Bolivia has not taken part in international nancial markets again.
19Bolivian public debt data source: Reinhart and Roggof (2010).
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some degree of concessionality, currently more than 70 percent of the debt stock has been
contracted under market conditions, which in turn implies that ensuring its sustainability
over time is only becoming more challenging.
In light of the above, the proposed model includes a legislated restriction on scal
policy in Bolivia that sets specic limits on expenditure and taxation taking the behavior
of public debt as the main indicator of scal prudence (i.e. a debt-targeting scal rule).20
That is, following Andres and Domenech (2006b), the scal rules to be considered are:21
Gt
Yt
= G0

B
Y
=
Bt
Yt
g
(3.10)
 kt = 
k
0

Bt
Yt
=
B
Y
k
(3.11)
ht = 
h
0

Bt
Yt
=
B
Y
h
(3.12)
 ct = 
c
0

Bt
Yt
=
B
Y
c
(3.13)
where Bt=Yt is the actual debt-to-GDP ratio and B=Y is its sustainable steady-state level
or long-run target, G0 represents the G=Y ratio in the steady-state while  k0; 
h
0 and 
c
0
are also equal to their respective steady-state values,  k; h and  c.
20Such rule has been applied in the past by, for example, Canadian provinces in order to contribute to
debt consolidation in Canada (see e.g. Fiess, 2002).
21Two more general and sophisticated scal rules were also tested. First, following Garcia et al. (2011),
a rule of the form
Gt = TR  (rt + x)Bt + g(TRt   TR)
was considered, where TRt represents total revenues at time t, g is a parameter measuring the acyclicality
of the rule, x is an arbitrary parameter which tries to prevent public debt from showing an explosive
behavior, and the variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values.
Under this rule, indeterminacy problems started to arise for most of the feasible range of the scal policy
coe¢ cients, given the calibration to Bolivian data. This indeterminacy issue is in fact not uncommon
under this setup and is discussed by Garcia et al. (2012) and Garcia and Restrepo (2007).
Second, following Malley et. al (2009), a rule of the form
xt = x0

Bt
Yt
=
B
Y
b Yt
Y
y Rt
R
R
was examined, where the s are the coe¢ cients which denote how anticyclical the rule will be, xt =
Gt=Yt; 
k
t ; 
h
t ,
c
t , denotes all the possible scal instruments at hand and x0 denotes the steady-state level
of these instruments.
The results under this type of rule were in general no better than those under the proposed debt-
targeting rules. The inclusion of gas revenues in the rule transmitted the price volatility of this commodity
(as warned by e.g., Garcia et al., 2011, Schaechter et al., 2012, and Berganza, 2012), while including the
output gap generated no meaningful additional gains with respect to the results reported here.
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The reaction parameters i for i = g; k; h; c determine the degree of adjustment implied
by the rule in response to a deviation of the actual debt-to-GDP ratio with respect to its
steady-state level. Given the form of the rules, positive values of the reaction parameters
will ensure that any deviation from the debt target will be gradually corrected. For
instance, consider the case where the actual ratio is above the steady-state level. Here,
positive values for the 0is will ensure that the policy instruments will react in order to
bring Bt=Yt back to its target. That is, government spending as a share of GDP will
remain below G0 while taxes will be set above their steady-state levels until the deviation
is corrected completely. Conversely, if the B=Y ratio is below its target, then the rules
will generate the opposite reaction in these instruments.
Moreover, the larger the parameters, the faster the adjustment towards the B=Y target
will be. Naturally, negative values for these parameters will lead the rules to amplify any
initial deviation from the target, while zero-values will make them completely irresponsive
to any deviation, irrespective of its size. In this sense, this work will only concentrate on
the positive ranges of the reaction parameters to ensure that debt-stabilisation is the main
goal of the proposed rules. Having said this, note that the positive ranges of these reaction
parameters will be further restricted in order to ensure the determinacy and learnability
of the model, and issue that is discussed during the calibration procedure.
The above scal rules are dened as simpler, more transparent and easy to monitor
by agents (see e.g. Berganza, 2012), features that might be perceived as highly valuable
in countries such as Bolivia, where debt-sustainability has been a major concern for many
decades and governments consistently su¤er from low credibility, as discussed by e.g.
Calderon et al., (2004), and thus agents might require easy-to-follow measures in order to
assess the overall performance of the scal sector. On the other hand, it has been shown
too that such simple rules have been more e¤ective in helping to strengthen long-term
sustainability than in responding to shocks. The next step, thus, seems to be the need for
gradual improvement of these rules, such that the sustainability objective can be e¢ ciently
combined with greater exibility to accommodate economic shocks (as suggested by e.g.
Schaechter et al., 2012).22
22This last aspect goes beyond the intended scope of this work.
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It is worth noting too that the adoption of the above scal rules in the model is fairly
consistent with the ndings of Kirsanova et al. (2009), whose detailed analysis of monetary
and scal interactions concludes in favour of the current so-called consensus assignment
in economic policy, which states that to maximise welfare scal policy should focus on the
control of government debt or decits, as its impact on output is very small.. Moreover,
the proposed analysis is also in line with the ndings of Andres and Domenech (2006b),
Cordoba and Rojas (2010) and Garcia et al. (2011), which suggest that, if an important
part of the population in the economy have little or no access to the nancial markets,
then scal policies aiming for debt-consolidation will tend to be quite successful and thus
will also yield the most desirable results in terms of welfare.
3.2.7 Market-clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for the capital, bond, labour and product markets, respec-
tively, are:
N fKft = N
cKc;t +N
wKw;t (3.14)
Bt = N
cBc;t +N
wBw;t (3.15)
N fHft = N
cHc;t +N
wHw;t (3.16)
N fY ft = N
cCc;t +N
wCw;t +N
c [Kc;t+1   (1  )Kc;t] +
+Nw [Kw;t+1   (1  )Kw;t] +Gt +N c
 
'bcB
2
c;t + '
k
cK
2
c;t

+
+Nw
 
'bwB
2
w;t + '
k
wK
2
w;t

+Rngt
(3.17)
3.2.8 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) is dened when (i) households and rms
optimize, taking prices and policy as given; (ii) all constraints are satised; and (iii) all mar-
kets clear. Each representative capitalist chooses fCc;t; Hc;t; Kc;t+1; Bc;t+1g1t=0 to maximise
discounted lifetime utility subject to (3:4) whereas each worker chooses fCw;t; Hw;t; Kw;t+1;
Bw;t+1g1t=0 subject to (3:5). Finally, each representative rm chooses
n
Kft ; H
f
t
o1
t=0
to
maximise prots subject to the technology constraint (3:1) resulting in two optimality
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conditions.
In addition to these, the DCE also includes the production function, one of the two
conditions involving the Lagrangian multipliers from the households problems, the gov-
ernment budget constraint, the aggregate resource constraint, the two AR(1) exogenous
processes and, according to the case under study, one of the scal rules cited above.23
3.3 Calibration and Steady-state
The models structural parameters relating to preferences, production and capital accu-
mulation and the heterogeneity features discussed earlier are next calibrated using annual
data for Bolivia from 1990 to 2010. These are reported in Table 3.1 below.
3.3.1 Population shares
In order to map out agent heterogeneity and dene the shares in the population of the
two types of households described in the model, we consider the Financial Services Access
in Latin-America Survey by the Latin American Development Bank (known as CAF)
presented in April, 2011. According to this survey, currently 35 percent of the Bolivian
population have access to formal (i.e. regulated) nancial services, while the rest have to
rely in other informal and thus more costly sources of funding. Hence, nc or the percentage
of capitalists in the model will be placed at this level, implying that nw = 1  nc = 0:65.
3.3.2 Savings
Heterogeneity in savings and the associated very high levels of concentration observed in
the nancial markets in Bolivia are controlled for, as explained in the previous section, by
the parameters that govern nancial transaction costs (see Benabou, 1996, and Aghion
and Howitt, 2009), taking a number of elements into account. First, for simplicity we will
set this cost in capital asset markets to be the same in the bond market.
Second, although there is no reliable information regarding the size of the informal
23To save space the DCE system is not reported here, but it is provided in Appendix C.
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nancial market Bolivia, some data exists regarding the concentration levels in the gov-
ernment bond market which could be used to characterize both asset markets.
In e¤ect, a new scheme based on retail sales of government bonds was implemented
by the Central Bank of Bolivia in October of 2007 (see CBB, 2007) one of its aims being
to provide a risk-free saving alternative to agents who, for a number of reasons, do not
participate in the formal nancial markets. Since then, the stock of bonds sold through
this scheme has stabilised at around 3.3 percent of the total stock.24 Hence, such level
could be taken as a fair approximation of the actual holdings of both physical capital and
government bonds of those labelled as workers in the model.
Therefore, the transaction costs in the model are set to be fty ve times higher for
the workers compared to those for capitalists, so that it can be replicated that 35 percent
of the population (i.e. the capitalists) hold around 96.7 percent of the total assets of the
economy in the form of both physical capital and securities, while the 65 percent of the
population (i.e. the workers) are only responsible for the remaining 3.3 percent.
3.3.3 Parameters common to all agents
We next approximate the subjective time preference, , so that it is consistent with the
average real interest rate in the Bolivian formal credit market from 2004 to 2010,25 which
we calculated to be around 6.2 percent.26 This gives a parameter value of  = 0:94.
Parameters 1; 2 and 3 = 1   1   2 in the utility function have been set at usual
values in the literature - i.e. leisure is almost twice as important as consumption while
the utility provided by public goods is quite small - in order to match the key aggregate
ratios observed in the data (i.e. C=Y and G=Y ),27 as well as the notion that agents spend
24At the end of 2011, the stock of bonds sold directly to the agents reached Bs310 millions, repre-
senting 3.3% of the total internal public debt, excluding the debt to the pension fund system. See
http://www.bcb.gob.bo/webdocs/2012/01-enero/semanal/entero20-01.pdf
25We do not use previous years in this calculation as the nancial market was highly dollarised during
that period, and thus the interest rates in domestic currency did not fully reect the conditions of the
markets. Since the mid-2000s, however, the dollarisation levels have decreased signicantly (see e.g.
CBB, 2010).
26Data source: http://www.udape.gob.bo (see statistical dossier section)
27National accounts data source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values
parameter value denition
0    1 0.070 depreciation rate of capital
'kc ; '
b
c> 0 0.001 transaction costs, capitalists
'kw; '
b
w> 0 0.055 transaction costs, workers
0 <  < 1 0.940 rate of time preference
0 <  < 1 0.373 capitals share of income
0 < 1< 1 0.350 consumption weight in utility
0 < 2< 1 0.600 leisure weight in utility
0 < nc< 1 0.350 population share of capitalists
0 < G0< 1 0.142 public spending share of output
0 < h0< 1 0.130 e¤ective labour tax rate
0 <  k0< 1 0.230 e¤ective capital tax rate
0 <  c0< 1 0.130 e¤ective consumption tax rate
Gtr> 0 0.066 government transfers
A > 0 1.000 constant parameter productivity
0 < a< 1 0.602 AR(1) parameter productivity
a> 0 0.0208 standard deviation productivity
R0> 0 0.026 const. parameter gas revenues
0 < R< 1 0.720 AR(1) parameter gas revenues
R> 0 0.120 standard deviation gas revenues
between 15 to 35 percent of their available time working, with the workers at the top of
this range. Finally, we also use a common value from the literature for the coe¢ cient of
risk aversion, i.e.,  = 2 (see e.g. Angelopoulos et al., 2011).
The parameter values related to the technology available are somewhat more di¢ cult
to dene due to the lack of reliable and up-to-date data about the structure of the Bolivian
productive sector. To obtain the best possible approximations, rst we make use of an
important nding by Cole et al. (2005), who show that the capital-to-output ratio for a
sample of eleven Latin-American economies (in which Bolivia is included) is in fact quite
similar (i.e. slightly higher) to that of the US, which in turn is known to have stabilised
at around K=Y = 2 since the 50s (see e.g. Evans, 2000).
Then, by applying the perpetual inventory method to compute the capital stock for
Bolivia using data on gross capital formation for the last sixty years, we nd that an
annual depreciation rate, , of 7 percent is consistent with a capital-to-output ratio that
oscillates around a value slightly above 2.28
28This depreciation rate is similar to the rate used by both Feu (2004) and Feu et al. (2007) for the case
of Brazil. Also, Gelos and Isgut (2001) considered depreciation rates between 4% and 7% when studying
the cases of Mexico and Colombia.
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Finally, we turn our attention to the parameter value related to capitals share in
income. It has been argued that the capitals share of income tends to be larger in
developing economies due to a large supply of unskilled labor that has kept wages at very
low levels, thus a¤ecting negatively the share of labor in national income. In fact, very
preliminary e¤orts made by the Bolivian statistics o¢ ce (INE) in order to obtain some
estimates of 1   for the last two decades yielded a value of around 0.48, implying that
 = 0:52.
However, it must be noted that due to lack of data, most labours share measurements
such as the one presented above tend to underestimate the labor income of the self-
employed and family workers who make up a large fraction of the labour force. Moreover,
Gollin (2002) and Bergoeing and Soto (2002) demonstrate that when there is enough
information to adjust for this mismeasurements, the resulting capital shares lie within a
range between 0.2 and 0.37.29 In fact, for the purposes of this work, we will consider
one of Gollins estimates for Bolivia, situated at the top of the aforementioned range, of
 = 0:373.
3.3.4 Parameters related to the action of the government
The steady-state e¤ective average tax rate for capital gain is taken from Chen and Mintz
(2011) who estimate it to be  k = 0:23, quite close to the nominal rate of 25 percent
dened by law (Law No.1606, passed in December, 1994). For the case of the labour
income tax and the consumption tax, due to the lack of up-to-date estimates and reliable
data on their e¤ective counterparts, both are set to the same rate of h =  c = 13% as
established by law (Tax Law No.843, passed in May, 1986).30
Next, the government-to-output ratio at the steady state, G=Y , is set to match the
20-year average ratio according to the data, of 14.2 percent. Likewise, the government
transfers, Gtr, are set to a value of 0.065 so that the Gtr=Y ratio matches its respective
20-year average given by data, of 15 percent of GDP.
29With the adequate adjustments, Bergoeing and Soto (2002) managed to correct an o¢ cial preliminary
measurment of  from around 0.59 to a level of 0.36 for Chile.
30See http://bolivia.infoleyes.com/shownorm.php?id=367
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It is worth noting that these transfers were included in the model only to match the
key aggregates observed in the data and no scal rules related to them will be considered
in this work as these have shown virtually no changes over the last few years, in the form of
permanent and periodical bonuses aimed to very sensible social demands (e.g. elder people
with no pension income, maternity and lactancy allowances, people with disabilities), and
thus are very di¢ cult to modify without either creating a climate of social unrest or risking
its nancial sustainability over time.
On the other hand, despite the fact that its 10-year average is around 67 percent, the
public debt-to-output ratio will be set at the much lower average registered between 2008
to 2010 (with a slight but still worrying increasing trend in the last two years as discussed
earlier), of 43 percent.
Since the World Banks three-year average IDA Resource Allocation Index classies
Bolivia as a medium performer with respect to the overall quality of its macroeconomic
policies, implying that the related risk threshold on debt-to-GDP is 40 percent (IMF,
2009), to remain as close to this target as possible seems a reasonable policy in terms of
macroeconomic prudence and long-term debt sustainability. Therefore, a ratio of B=Y =
0:43 will be taken as the main reference in the scal rules to be examined in the following
sections.
A word must be said about the reaction or feedback parameters of the scal rules
given in equations (3.10) to (3.13). While the values of these parameters have no impact
whatsoever in the steady-state of the economy, they do have major impact in the transition
dynamics as we shall see later. In this sense, recalling that we are interested in the
debt-stabilising properties of these scal rules, the ranges for each of these parameters
which ensure the determinacy and learnability of the model are, respectively, g : [0; 0:19],
k : [0; 0:39], h : [0; 0:39], c : [0; 0:33].
In order to dene the optimal values for the parameters related to each rule within the
above ranges, an optimal simple rule (OSR) procedure is performed according to which,
for each rule, di¤erent values of the feedback parameter are tested. The optimal value of
the parameter in each case will be the one that minimises a quadratic objective (or loss)
function that takes into account both the standard deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio and
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an income inequality ratio, dened as the discounted cumulative total net income earned
by a representative capitalist with respect to the cumulative discounted total net income
earned by a representative worker after each year. This procedure yields the following
optimal parameter values g = 0:19, k = 0:05, h = 0:39 and c = 0:33; which will be
used throughout the rest of this work.31
3.3.5 Sources of volatility
To conclude this parameterisation procedure, we now focus on the parameters of the two
exogenous sources of volatility considered in the model. First, to estimate the AR(1) rela-
tion for the productivity process described by (3.2), TFP data for Bolivia was constructed
as in King and Rebelo (1999)32 using the IFSs National Accounts annual data for Bo-
livia from 1986 to 2010, in order to avoid the adverse e¤ects in the estimations that arise
when earlier periods, characterised by severe episodes of economic crisis (e.g. late-70s and
early-80s), are included in the estimation sample.33 The resulting estimates for a and a
are thus 0.602 and 0.028, respectively; while the constant term A0 has been set equal to
its standard value of one.
Finally, for the process of Rt, we assume that the constant term R0 is equal to 0.0265,
which ensures that at the steady-state the R=Y ratio is equal to 0.06, as observed in the
data between 2008 to 2010 (see CBB, 2010). The parameters R and R are set to 0.72 and
0.12, respectively. These were obtained by estimating an AR(1) process for the evolution
of the quarterly average price per British Termal Unit of gas sales to Brazil between
2007 and 2011,34 because changes in the volumes sold are less likely as these depend on
the pipelines capacity and thus can only be a¤ected by other unexpected events such as
31It is worth noting that the rule on capital tax is the only that is kept at very low levels of reaction,
mainly because of its signicantly high negative impact on income inequality.
32The production function in (3.1) written in per-worker terms (considering the economically active
population data provided by the Bolivian National Statistics O¢ ce - INE) was solved for At. By feeding
the per-worker time series of output and (also newly built) capital stock, an estimated TFP series was
obtained. This was then expressed in logs and detrended, and nally an AR(1) process was tted to it.
33For instance, if the entire sample between 1950 and 2010 is considered, the less realistic resulting
estimates are a = 0:486 and a = 0:118:
34Gas sales to Brazil represent 76 percent of the total. The sale prices to both countries are deter-
mined by formulas which consider the international market prices of a basket of oil-related products. See
http://www.hidrocarburosbolivia.com.
119
Table 3.2: Steady-state
variable value variable value
ncCc
Y
0.288 n
cKc
Y
2.001
nwCw
Y
0.420 n
wKw
Y
0.069
C
Y
0.710 K
Y
2.070
ncIc
Y
0.145 n
cBc
Y
0.416
nwIw
Y
0.005 n
wBw
Y
0.014
I
Y
0.150 B
Y
0.430
G
Y
0.142 Hc 0.168erk = erb 0.064 Hw 0.347
rk 0.180 Uc -30.57
rb 0.065 Uw -38.44
R
Y
0.06 Ua -35.67
geopolitical issues, civil unrest in the producing regions, natural disasters, etc. High and
increasing price volatility in the natural gas and most energy markets has been widely
documented and discussed in the last years, see for instance Pindyck (2004).
3.3.6 Steady-State
The steady-state solution of the model is given in Table 3.2 below in terms of the aggregate
variables.35 First, note that the chosen parametrization allows the model to match the
key aggregate ratios observed in Bolivian data between 1990 and 2010. That is, the C=Y
and I=Y ratios are just below their observed counterparts of 0.72 and 0.16, while for the
remaining aggregate ratios - K=Y; B=Y; G=Y and R=Y - the match is virtually perfect as
intended during the parametrization procedure discussed in the previous section.
In addition, note that due to the di¤erent transaction costs in the nancial markets,
the capitalists hold 96.7 percent of the total assets in the economy. In e¤ect, as said above,
the ratios of savings, Ic=Iw, and assets, Kc=Kw and Bc=Bw, of the representative capitalist
to the representative skilled worker, are equal to fty ve, which gives a clear idea of the
high levels of income and wealth inequality in Bolivia.
Second, note that a representative capitalist consumes relatively more than a worker
35Variables erb = erk denote net rates (i.e. after tax, depreciation and transaction costs when applicable),
which under the given assumptions have to be equal in both asset markets.
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since Cc = 0:3607 and Cw = 0:2834. This implies that in aggregate terms the capitalists -
i.e. representing only 35 percent of the entire population - consume 41 percent of the total
consumption in the economy as shown in the Table. On the other hand, the variables Hc
and Hw show that, as expected, the capitalists work considerably less than the workers.
Thus, in terms of welfare, higher consumption and lower work e¤ort make the capitalists
relatively better o¤ as indicated by Uk which is smaller than Uw in absolute terms. The
weighted average measure of aggregate or Benthamite lifetime utility (computed for 1000
periods), Ua, is also reported in the Table.
3.4 Model Solution
To solve the model, we start by taking the rst-order Taylor series expansion of the DCE
and exogenous process for productivity around their respective steady-states. For any
variable Xt, these values are denoted bXt = logXt   logX. We next re-express the model
in matrix form as second-order di¤erence equation system:
xt=M1Etxt+1 +M2xt 1 +M3zt
yt= N1xt +N2xt 1 +N3zt +N4Etxt+1
zt= zt 1 + ut:
(3.18)
where xt =
h
B^c;t+1; K^c;t+1; B^w;t+1; K^w;t+1
i0
contains the endogenous state variables; yt =h
C^c;t; C^w;t; H^c;t; H^w;t; r^
b
t ; r^
k
t ; w^t; G^t; ^
k
t ; ^
h
t ; ^
c
t
i0
the endogenous control variables; and zt =h
a^t+1; R^t+1
i0
the exogenous state variables.36 The various M and N matrices contain
convolutions of the structural parameters. Finally, since we have two exogenous state
variables,  =
264 a 0
0 R
375 and ut = ["at+1; "Rt+1]0.
In Appendix C it is briey described how (3:18) is used to obtain both the rational
expectations (RE) and adaptive learning (AL) solutions of the log-linearised model. For
the latter, a more detailed description of how the initial conditions for learning have been
36For examples of other work in the literature using this particular reduced form, see Evans and
Hokhaponja (2001), Giannitsarou (2006) and Carceles Poveda and Giannitsarou (2008).
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setup is also provided.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Setup of the experiments
In this section we examine the performance and distributional implications of each of the
scal rules cited earlier when the economy faces di¤erent sources of volatility and assuming
di¤erent ways of forming expectations as discussed above. For this purpose, the transition
dynamics in response to productivity and gas-revenue or commodity shocks are studied
by means of standard impulse-response functions (IRFs).
It is worth noting that, when assessing the impact of productivity shocks, it is common
in the literature to examine the behavior of the relevant variables in response to a one
percent shock. This seems reasonable as long as the estimated standard deviation " of
the errors in the autoregressive process describing the behavior of the variable of interest
is small. For instance, if we consider the well-known standard deviation of 0:00712; esti-
mated for the TFP process in the US (see e.g. Giannitsarou, 2006), shocks in the range
[ 0:01; 0:01] will cover 90 percent of the probability mass.
Following a similar criterion and taking an standard deviation of " = 0:028 - estimated
earlier for TFP in Bolivia - implies that shocks in the range [ 0:045; 0:045] also cover 90
percent of the probability mass. In the same line, an estimated standard deviation of
R = 0:12 for the process of the international gas prices faced by the Bolivian government
implies that shocks in the range [ 0:2; 0:2] are required to cover a similar probability mass.
Consequently, TFP shocks and commodity shocks in the order of +/-4.5 percent and +/-20
percent, respectively, are considered in the experiments of this section. However, since the
results found when negative shocks are assumed are found to be symmetrically opposite
to those found under positive shocks, only the results of the former case will be reported
and discussed in detail.
With respect to the learning setup, it is worth noting that when it is assumed that both
types of agents are learners but their learning processes, including their initial beliefs, are
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homogeneous, no additional distributional implications are identied with respect to the
results under RE. Hence, we focus instead in a situation where the two types of agents do
di¤er in terms of the initial information they have at the start of their learning processes,
which we assume coincides with the date an exogenous shock hits the economy.
To this end, the matrix with the agentsinitial beliefs ~0 is constructed as described
by equation (C:15) in Appendix C, denoting the fact that capitalists always know the
RE equilibrium parameters of their policy functions while workers do not and instead can
have either incomplete initial beliefs (i.e. where the steady-state equilibrium is known but
the e¤ects of the scal rule are not), or, in addition to the previous case, pessimistic or
optimistic initial beliefs associated with o¤-equilibrium perceptions about the state of the
economy.
In e¤ect, the pessimistic beliefs are consistent with an hypothetical lower steady-state
with a 0.4 percent lower consumption, virtually the same working hours and an over-
estimated debt-to-GDP ratio of 0.47; found by assuming that the three e¤ective taxes in
the economy (i.e. capital, labour and consumption) are just one percent higher than under
the base calibration in Table 3.1.
This particular way of dening a lower equilibrium was chosen to denote the fact that
those agents with less information in the economy might underestimate the actual state of
the economy and attribute this misperceived under-performance to the distorting actions of
the government. Note too that the changes in the three tax rates are equally proportional
to ensure that in the lower state there are no additional distributional implications coming
from a di¤erent tax schedule.37
In similar fashion, the optimistic initial beliefs are consistent with an hypothetical
higher steady-state with a 0.4 percent higher consumption, the same number of hours
worked and an under-estimated debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 0.34, found by assuming that
the e¤ective taxes in the economy are one percent lower than in the true equilibrium.38
37When it is assumed that workers do not over- or under-estimate the debt-to-GDP ratio, implying
that Gtr has to be re-calibrated in each of the new steady-states to preserve the above ratio at 43%,
learning generates no signicant di¤erences with respect to the results under RE. For this reason, this
line of research is not taken any further.
38When higher-than-one percent di¤erences in the taxes are considered to nd the hypothetical equi-
libria, the model becomes not learnable (see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) if the economy is subject
to large commodity shocks.
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It is important to note too that for those experiments considering the constant gain
variant of the RLS algorithm, the gain parameter g is set to its most common value in the
literature of 0:03, as conrmed by the survey in Williamson and Orphanides (2005) and
by the estimates of Milani (2007).
The performance of each of the rules in terms of stabilising debt is measured by the
predicted standard deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio in levels computed both in the
short run (i.e. for the rst ve years) and over the lifetime.39
On the other hand, the distributional impact of the rules is examined by means of the
evolution of the ratio between the discounted cumulative total net income (i.e. labour
and capital income net of taxes and transaction costs plus average transfers) earned by
a representative capitalist and the cumulative discounted total net income earned by a
representative worker after each year. Hence, in what follows, a higher income-inequality
ratio denotes a worse income distribution in the economy.
In what follows, we rst examine the performance of the proposed scal rules in terms of
their debt-stabilisation properties. Next, the distributional e¤ects derived from applying
each of these rules are studied. In both parts, the e¤ects of the di¤erent assumptions
regarding how expectations are formed are taken into account.40
3.5.2 Debt-stabilisation properties of the rules
The upper panel of Table 3.3 reports the standard deviations associated with the evolution
of the B=Y ratio under each of the rules after a negative 4.5 percent TFP shock has hit
the economy while the lower panel reports similar information in the case of a negative
20% commodity shock.
Consider the performance of the rules under full rationality rst (columns denoted with
RE in the Table). Recalling that all the rules are parameterised at their optimal values,
note that in the short run the scal rules on  c and  k by far o¤er the best performance
39For the lifetime calculations 1000 periods were used.
40The results obtained considering the RLS learning algorithm and its constant gain variation show
very small di¤erences. For this reason, only the results under the former are reported.
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Table 3.3: Standard deviation of B/Y
Rule type Short Run Lifetime
RE AL-opt AL-pes RE AL-opt AL-pes
After a -4.5% TFP shock
Rule on G=Y 0.0785 0.0788 0.0782 0.0133 0.0137 0.0132
Rule on  k 0.0760 0.0773 0.0749 0.0131 0.0132 0.0130
Rule on h 0.0829 0.0914 0.0747 0.0137 0.0363 0.0114
Rule on  c 0.0691 0.0790 0.0789 0.0137 0.0132 0.0140
After a -20% commodity shock
Rule on G=Y 0.0805 0.0823 0.0757 0.0235 0.0255 0.0205
Rule on  k 0.0781 0.0800 0.0779 0.0223 0.0231 0.0233
Rule on h 0.0889 0.1076 0.0708 0.0255 0.2353 0.0185
Rule on  c 0.0807 0.0819 0.0749 0.0235 0.0255 0.0198
in response to TFP and commodity shocks, respectively. Increasing these two tax rates in
order to rapidly improve the public nances is in fact common practice.41
In the long run, the rule on  k shows the best debt-stabilising properties after either
type of exogenous shock. In the case of TFP shocks, this is expected since the negative
productivity shock tends to reduce the scal revenues and thus leads to a raise of public
debt. Both the increase in debt and the fall of output generate an increase of the B=Y
ratio above its long-run target. Hence, according to the rule, the increase of the B=Y
ratio immediately motivates a raise in  k to increase the government revenues and reduce
debt. In a context of high wealth and income inequality, this tax raise a¤ects mostly to
capitalists who see their disposable income fall. However, since they can gradually increase
their labour supply to compensate for the loss in capital income, aggregate output and
income will tend to increase faster under this particular rule, with respect to the other
rules.
In the case of commodity shocks, similar mechanisms as those described above take
place. However, since shocks of this type are known to be relatively large and since
these have a direct impact on the nancial markets, the overall performance of the rules -
including the rule on  k - in a fully-rational environment is worse, as shown by the larger
standard deviations of B=Y in the lower panel of the Table.
41Examples of this are the increase of the Value Added Tax (VAT) in the UK in 2012, and the gradual
increase of the Capital Gain tax in Iceland since 2008, in order to face the aftermath of the 2007-2009
nancial crisis.
125
These last ndings illustrate the worrying levels of dependence and vulnerability Bolivia
has with respect to its gas exports, which in turn can su¤er of high price volatility. As
mentioned earlier, such features are quite common among a number of developing countries
rich in natural resources and have motivated a more active search of mechanisms aiming to
reduce the sensitivity of their public nances to the dynamics of the international markets
of these resources.42
Next, we turn our attention on how heterogenous learning changes the above re-
sults. First, we simply assume that while capitalists know their equilibrium policy func-
tions,including the e¤ects of the scal rule applied, workers do not know the latter. In
such case, the results are very similar to those found under full rationality above, irrespec-
tive of the type of shock or the chosen learning algorithm. These results suggest that the
di¤erences between the workersestimated policy function according to their initial beliefs
and their true policy functions under RE are rather small in this case. As a result, they
are able to learn the latter very rapidly despite the temporary deviations from equilibrium
generated by the exogenous shock.
In light of the above, we further explore the implications of assuming a higher degree
of heterogeneity between agents in the form of di¤ering initial beliefs. That is, in addition
to the above assumption, we further assume that, while the capitalists initial beliefs
are consistent with the true equilibrium of the economy, o¤-equilibrium optimistic or
pessimistic expectations regarding the situation of the economy govern the initial beliefs
among workers.
From these two cases, reported in Table 3.3 as AL-optand AL-pesrespectively, it is
clear that the type of initial belief the workers are assumed to hold has an important e¤ect
on the evolution of the volatility debt-to-GDP ratio. First, when optimistic initial beliefs
prevail among workers, the rule on  k stands out as the best performing rule irrespective
of the type of exogenous shock. A similar mechanism as under RE above explains this
outcome, with the di¤erence that, due to the initial optimism of workers which leads to
an increase in the returns on capital, capitalists choose to work more and consume less
42Such as stabilisation funds with di¤erent characteristics depending on the type of natural resource
(see e.g. Sturm et al., 2009).
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in order to invest relatively more, thus leading to a faster capital accumulation in the
early periods after the shock than under full-rationality. This behavior is then adjusted
gradually as they observe the adverse e¤ects of the negative shock.
Second, when these beliefs are pessimistic, the rule taking h as an instrument tops the
rank. In this case, workers initially choose to work more to compensate the expected fall
in consumption consistent with a lower steady-state, only to gradually realise the levels of
consumption are in fact higher than expected. This change in the outlook of the economy
leads workers and, later on, capitalists to gradually increase their labour supply in order
to fund higher levels of investment. In this sense, given that the labour income tax base
increased since the early periods after the shock, the scal rule on this tax helps to bring
the B=Y ratio back to its target in a more e¢ cient fashion relative the other rules. Having
said this, something worth of attention is the fact that this rule provides the most extreme
results under adaptive learning, both in the short- and long-run. That is, if the initial
beliefs among workers are pessimistic then the rule shows the best performance of all as
explained above, but if the beliefs are optimistic instead then it yields the worst possible
performance.
3.5.3 Income inequality
The two gures presented in Appendix C show the evolution of the income inequality ratio
over time in response to negative TFP and commodity shocks according to each of the
proposed rules under both RE and heterogeneous learning. In these, it can be seen that a
negative shock of any type generates a sharp temporary fall in the inequality ratio (or a
better income distribution) for all cases considered.43
Then, the adjustment process back to the equilibrium level of almost 1.6 - denoting
that the net income of a representative capitalist is approximately sixty percent higher
that than that of a representative worker44 - can di¤er in terms of the persistence of the
initial deviation from equilibrium, depending on the chosen rule and/or the assumption
43Conversely, a positive shock temporarily increases income inequality in all cases.
44This result is consistent with a survey carried by UPB(2005), which shows that 77% of the population
in Bolivia earn less than 4000 Bolivianos per month, while the remaining 23% earn 7000 Bolivianos per
month or more.
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Table 3.4: Evolution of the income inequality ratio
Rule type Short Run Lifetime
RE AL-opt AL-pes RE AL-opt AL-pes
After a -4.5% TFP shock
Rule on G=Y 1.5771 1.5778 1.5760 1.5976 1.5977 1.5975
Rule on  k 1.5786 1.5798 1.5777 1.5981 1.5983 1.5978
Rule on h 1.5776 1.5827 1.5736 1.5975 1.6047 1.5961
Rule on  c 1.5772 1.5778 1.5762 1.5976 1.5977 1.5977
After a -20% commodity shock
Rule on G=Y 1.5889 1.5876 1.5899 1.5968 1.5959 1.5976
Rule on  k 1.5900 1.5889 1.5908 1.5972 1.5966 1.5974
Rule on h 1.5886 1.5852 1.5918 1.5963 1.5775 1.5982
Rule on  c 1.5890 1.5878 1.5902 1.5968 1.5959 1.5978
regarding expectations. Table 3.4 reports a summary of these results once more focusing
both in the short-(ve years) and long-run.
As previously done, let us examine the results under RE rst. The rule on h appears
to show the best performance overall as it generates the lowest inequality ratios with
respect to the other rules, although in the short-run this is only true in the case of the
commodity shock, given that the rule on G=Y is the best performer if a negative TFP
shock is assumed. The fact that these two rules have a relatively more even impact over
workers and capitalists than the capital tax, which tends to favour the latter, explains this
result.
Precisely, the rule on  k deserves some attention as it generates slightly higher levels of
income inequality when measured over the lifetime, thus making it the worst performing
rule of all. The unequal wealth and income distribution in the economy implies that any
change in  k will mainly a¤ect the capitalists. In the early periods after the shock, the
initial raise of this tax in response to the increasing debt (leading the B=Y ratio above
its long run target) a¤ects negatively their disposable income. However, since they can
compensate part of this loss by increasing their labour supply, the short-run impact of
this scal rule on income inequality is rather small. Then, as the e¤ects of the negative
exogenous shock fade over time, consecutive reductions of this tax must follow in line with
the rule, which in turn leads to a steady increase of the capitalistsdisposable income and,
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consequently, to higher levels of income inequality over time.
We next focus on the impact of heterogenous learning on these results. As when
studying debt-stabilisation, when it is assumed that workers have initial beliefs consistent
with the true equilibrium but do not know the potential impact of the rule applied on the
economy, the results obtained are very similar to those found assuming RE. For this reason,
once again we turn our attention to the cases were optimistic or pessimistic expectations
a¤ect the workersinitial beliefs.
Since the results in this part are found to be qualitatively di¤erent depending on the
type of exogenous shock considered, we rst examine the impact of a negative TFP shock.
In this case, Table 3.4 shows that if optimistic initial beliefs are assumed among workers
then the rules on G=Y and  c show the best performance, irrespective of time horizon
considered. In contrast, if pessimistic beliefs are assumed then, it is the rule on labour
income that one which tend to improve income distribution.
This result is explained by the pessimistic beliefs among workers, which motivate them
to work and invest relatively less than under equilibrium, implying that they are hit
relatively less than the capitalists by the lower factor prices and the higher tax rates or
lower government spending implied by the rules in response to the negative shock, thus
naturally leading to lower levels of income inequality.
Finally, consider a negative commodity shock. In this case, the initial fall in revenues
due to the bad shock forces the government to increase its demand for debt, which leads
to an increase in the returns of public bonds and, given the market clearing conditions, to
an increase in the returns of physical capital too. Within this context, optimistic workers
invest and work more than if their beliefs where consistent with the true equilibrium and
thus benet from the increase in the asset returns during the early periods after the shock
which. These early benets, in turn, in most cases outweight the future losses in disposable
income that follow once taxes (spending) start to increase (decrease) according to the scal
rule applied aiming to stabilise debt. Under these circumstances, the rule on h shows the
best performance.
If, by contrast, pessimistic initial beliefs prevail among workers, they behave in the
opposite way, thus losing the chance to benet from the increasing returns in the nancial
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markets. However, the lower than expected returns on capital generated by this behavior
a¤ects capitalists, who see their capital income decrease in the long run. In this sense, the
rule on G=Y in the short run, given its more even impact on both types of agents, and
the rule  k in the long run exhibit the best performances in this case.
Before concluding this part, it is important to note that a welfare-inequality ratio,
dened as the ratio between the cumulative utility of the representative capitalist and the
cumulative utility of the representative worker, has also been computed for the short run
and over the lifetime (see Table C.1 in Appendix C). The ratio shows that, in fty percent
of the cases, whenever a rule generates the best income distribution (cases marked with
an in the Table), it also leads to the best possible distribution of welfare (cases marked
with an in the Table).45
3.5.4 Income distribution and debt-stabilisation trade-o¤
The above results suggest that the relative performance of each of the rules considered in
this work can be quite di¤erent depending on the criterion chosen to evaluate them but
also on the circumstances assumed to prevail in the economy in terms of the type of shock
that hits the economy or the way agents form expectations.
Given this diverse set of results available, a reasonable way of better ranking these
rules in order to nd the most adequate one given the particular features of Bolivia, should
consider the performance of each rule in terms of both its debt-stabilisation properties as
well as its distributional implications as measured by its impact on the income-inequality
ratio.
In this sense, Table 3.5 below presents a summary of the relative performance of each
rule according to both criteria. Only those cases in which the rule performs better that
the remaining rules in both elds are identied with a Xmark, while the other cases are
assigned an xmark.46
45Note that, in constrast to the income-inequality ratio, in this case a lower welfare-ratio means higher
welfare inequality, because the computed discounted utility values are negative (see Table 3.2).
46Note that in the early periods after a TFP shock, the rule on h generates a better income distribution
as well as a lower volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio under heterogeneous learning with pessimistic beliefs
among workers. However since it also yields a worse welfare distribution as shown in Table C.1 in Appendix
C, it has been marked with an x.
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Table 3.5: Performance of the rules according to both criteria
Rule type Short Run Lifetime
RE AL-opt AL-pes RE AL-opt AL-pes
After a -4.5% TFP shock
Rule on G=Y x x x x x x
Rule on  k x x x x x x
Rule on h x x X x x X
Rule on  c x x x x x x
After a -20% commodity shock
Rule on G=Y x x x x x x
Rule on  k x x x x x x
Rule on h x x x x x x
Rule on  c x x x x x x
Consider the case where the economy is populated by fully-rational agents rst. Irre-
spective of the type of shock or the time horizon under analysis, it is clear no rule can
satisfy both criteria, a result which denotes a type of trade-o¤ between debt-stabilisation
and income inequality for this economy as it faces di¤erent types of exogenous shocks.
Next, consider the impact of heterogenous learning on this analysis. The only rule
deserving some attention is the one on h because, if pessimistic initial beliefs among
workers are assumed47, it actually breaks the trade-o¤ between debt-stabilisation and
income-inequality only if a negative TFP shock is considered.48 However, the trade-o¤
can not be broken whenever the workers hold optimistic beliefs instead or for any case
related to a negative commodity shock.
This last result, as said earlier, can be interpreted as typical symptom su¤ered by
several countries which are rich in a certain commodity and thus become highly dependant
on the revenues coming from its exports (see e.g. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekkey, 2009,
and Van der Ploeg, 2011) . Moreover, if the price of this commodity tends to be highly
volatile - as is the case of natural gas, see e.g. Pyndick (2004) - implies that the countrys
vulnerability to abrupt price changes becomes a major concern.
To further elaborate on this aspect, it seems important to examine how these results
47If positive exogenous shocks are considered instead, then optimistic initial beliefs among workers lead
to this and the next results in this section.
48Note too that a similar trade-o¤ with respect to welfare-inequality still remains even for this case.
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Table 3.6: Performance of the rules after a negative ve percent commodity shock
Rule type Short Run Lifetime
RE AL-opt AL-pes RE AL-opt AL-pes
Standard deviation of B/Y
Rule on G=Y 0.0174 0.0178 0.0167 0.0052 0.0056 0.0048
Rule on  k 0.0169 0.0173 0.0169 0.0049 0.0051 0.0051
Rule on h 0.0191 0.0223 0.0158 0.0056 0.0289 0.0042
Rule on  c 0.0175 0.0177 0.0166 0.0052 0.0056 0.0046
Income inequality ratio
Rule on G=Y 1.5950 1.5947 1.5952 1.5993 1.5990 1.5994
Rule on  k 1.5961 1.5958 1.5963 1.5996 1.5994 1.5996
Rule on h 1.5950 1.5942 1.5952 1.5992 1.5959 1.5994
Rule on  c 1.5950 1.5947 1.5953 1.5993 1.5991 1.5994
Performance of the rules according to both criteria
Rule on G=Y x x x x x x
Rule on  k x x x x x x
Rule on h x x X x x X
Rule on  c x x x x x x
change if some smoothing mechanism - e.g. a stabilisation fund, is designed to isolate the
economy from the high volatility of these resources.49 As an illustration, consider a case
where, thanks to such smoothing mechanism, a commodity shock in this economy is now
quantitatively more similar to a TFP shock, so that, for instance, a +/-5 percent shock
also covers 90 percent of the relevant probability mass.
Table 3.6 summarises the results of assuming this smaller commodity shock. In this
case, the trade-o¤ is preserved under RE as above, but now assuming heterogeneous
learning with pessimistic initial beliefs among workers can help to overcome the debt-
stabilisation versus income inequality trade-o¤, only when the scal rule on h is imple-
mented.
3.6 Conclusions
This document presents an heterogeneous-agent DSGE model with two types of agents
(namely, capitalists and workers) and no social mobility, calibrated to match Bolivias key
aggregate data, particularly its high levels of wealth and income inequality, with the aim
49Funds of this type have been implemented in e.g. Norway, Russia and Botswana (see e.g. Sturm et
al., 2009).
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of examining the short and long-run e¤ectiveness and distributional e¤ects of four scal
rules designed to impose restrictions on the evolution of public debt. A long history of
severe debt-crisis episodes, triggered both by scal and monetary mismanagement and the
resulting need to apply for a number of debt-relief programs over the last twenty ve years
justies this interest.
Taking this economys particular case as a useful illustration, the contribution of this
work is twofold. First, from a theoretical point of view, it shows that the adoption of
scal rules aiming to control the evolution of public debt in a context of full rationality
and high wealth and income inequality can prove challenging in response to productivity
and, specially, large commodity shocks.
The reason for this result is that, in general, the proposed rules generate a trade-o¤
between debt-stabilisation and income inequality which should not be ignored, especially
in countries like Bolivia, currently ranked among the worst in the world in terms of income
distribution, where such aspects clearly stand out as highly sensible from a sociopolitical
point of view.
However, if agents are assumed to behave as learners but with initial beliefs between
capitalists and workers that di¤er at the start of their learning processes - which is assumed
to coincide with the time an exogenous shock hits the economy - the transition dynamics
are such that in a number of cases the aforementioned trade-o¤ is no longer present and
hence some of the rules - i.e. those instrumented via the labour income tax - perform
rather well in both elds.
Second, from a policy-oriented point of view, this work suggests that, given the par-
ticular features of Bolivia, nding a scal rule which can show e¤ective debt-stabilising
properties without compromising income distribution in response to all relevant types of
exogenous shocks is not an easy task. In e¤ect, the scal rule on labour income tax (in
that order) seem the most reasonable candidates, particularly if heterogeneous learning is
assumed to prevail in the economy in terms of how expectations are formed among agents.
When large commodity shocks are considered, however, the overall performance of the
rules is much worse, a result that illustrates the high dependence of this economy on the
revenues coming from natural gas exports and the signicant degree of vulnerability with
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respect to this commoditys international price, known to be highly volatile.
In light of the above, it could be argued that the implementation of a smoothing
mechanism or natural gas stabilisation fund aiming to isolate the economy from this high
volatility identied in commodity revenues, could prove useful at increasing the overall
e¤ectiveness of the chosen scal rule and thus help to preserve a sound scal policy in
Bolivia over time. We leave this issue for future research.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 The stationary version of the model
Recall the denitions ct = Ct=t, ht = Ht, kt = Kt=t, yt = Yt=t, it = It=t, wt = Wt=t,
rt = Rt and zt = Zt. Hence, the transformation for the production function is:
Yt
t
=
ZtK

t 1 (
tHt)
1 
t
;
yt = zt
 kt 1h
1 
t ; (A1)
while the technology process can be written simply as:
lnZt = (1  ) lnZ +  lnZt 1 + "t;
ln zt = (1  ) lnZ +  ln zt 1 + "t: (A2)
Meanwhile, the budget constraint is:
Yt
t
=
Ct + It +  k(Rt   )Kt 1 + hWtHt
t
;
yt = ct + it +  k(rt   ) 1kt 1 + hwtht (A3)
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while the capital accumulation law can be transformed as:
Kt
t
=
(1  )Kt 1 + It
t
;
kt = 
 1(1  )kt 1 + it: (A4)
The Euler equation will be transformed according to:
1 = Et

Ct
Ct+1
t
t


Yt+1
Kt
t
t
  

(1   k) + 1

;
= Et

ct
ct+1


yt+1
kt
  

(1   k) + 1

(A5)
and, nally, the rst order condition related to labour becomes:
CtHt
t
=
(1  h)(1  )Yt
t
;
htct = (1  h)(1  )yt; (A6)
Next, dening rt = Rt and wt = Wt=tas the stationary values of the factor rentals,
the equilibrium conditions in the factor markets become:
Rt+1 = 
Yt+1
Kt
t
t
;
rt+1 = 
Yt+1
t+1
kt
= 
yt+1
kt
; (A7)
and:
Wt
t
Ht = (1  )Yt
t
;
wtht = (1  )yt: (A8)
Finally, the stationary denition of the government expenditure is:
Gt
t
=  k (rt   ) Kt 1
t
+
hWtHt
t
gt =  k (rt   )  1kt 1 + hwtht: (A9)
136
A.2 The steady-state values
Assuming that xt = x with x = fy; c; i; k; z; h; r; w; gg, rst the steady-state value of
capital can be found from the Euler condition as follows:
1 = 

c
c


y
k
  

(1   k) + 1

;


=


y
k
  

(1   k) + 1;

y
k
  

(1   k) = 

  1;

y
k
=
=   1
(1   k) + ;
k =
y
= 1+(1 k)
(1 k)
k =

(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

y; (A10)
while the value for investment can be found by replacing the above result into the law of
capital accumulation and rearranging terms:
k =  1(1  )k + i;
i =

1   1(1  ) k;
=

1   1(1  )  (1 k)

 1+(1 k)

y;
=

( 1+)(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

y: (A11)
Similarly, the steady state value of consumption can be found from the resource con-
straint, by substituting the previous two results for k and i and the equilibrium condition
in the labour market for w:
c = y   i   k 1 (r   ) k   hwh;
= y  

( 1+)(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

y    k 1 (r   )

(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

y
 h(1  )y;
= y
h
1  ( 1+)(1 k)

 1+(1 k)  
k(r )(1 k)


 1+(1 k)   h(1  )
i
; (A12)
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while the value for hours worked comes from the Euler condition for labour and the
previous result for consumption:
h =
(1  h)(1  )

y
c
;
= (1 h)(1 )

y
y

1 

( 1+)(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

 k(r )

(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

 h(1 )
 ;
= (1 h)(1 )


1 

( 1+)(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

 k(r )

(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

 h(1 )
 : (A13)
With the results for capital and labour it is now possible to take the production function
and nd the steady-state value of output (with z = Z as shown later). For convenience,
rst dene  = 

  1 + (1   k) and  = (   1 + )(1   k) to get:
y = Z kh1 ;
= Z 

(1 k)


y




(1 h)(1 )

h
1 




   k (r   )

(1 k)


  h(1  )
i 11 
;
which becomes:
y1  = Z

(1 k)



(1 h)(1 )

h
1 




   k (r   )

(1 k)


  h(1  )
i 11 
;
and raising both sides of the equation to the power of 1=(1  ) nally gives:
y = Z
1
1 

(1 k)

 
1  (1 h)(1 )

h
1 




   k (r   )

(1 k)


  h(1  )
i 1
: (A14)
Note that here the following result obtained for the technology process was also used
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above:
ln z = (1  ) lnZ +  ln z;
ln z    ln z = (1  ) lnZ;
ln z = lnZ;
z = Z: (A15)
In addition, the steady-state values of the factor prices are:
r = 
y
k
;
= 
y
(1 k)


 1+(1 k)

y
;
=

(1 k)


 1+(1 k)
 ;
=


  1 + (1   k)
(1   k) : (A16)
and:
w =
(1  )y
h
;
which, after substituting (A13) and (A14) and simplifying, becomes:
w = (1  )Z 11 

(1 k)


 1+(1 k)
 
1 
; (A17)
Finally, the steady-state value for government spending is given by:
g =  k (r   )  1k + hwh (A18)
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A.3 The log-linear version of the model
The log-linearization has been done dening x^t = lnxt=x with x = fy; c; h; i; k; zg. First,
the log-linear version of the production function is:
yt = zt
 kt 1h
1 
t ;
yey^t = Zez^t

kek^t 1
 
heh^t
1 
;
yey^t = Zez^tkek^t 1h1 e(1 )h^t ;
but since in the steady state y = Zkh1 :
ey^t = ez^tek^t 1e(1 )h^t ;
y^t = z^t + k^t 1 + (1  ) h^t: (A19)
Next, the technology process can be written as:
ln zt = (1  ) lnZ +  ln zt 1 + "t;
lnZez^t = (1  ) lnZ +  lnZez^t 1 + "t;
ln ez^t =  ln ez^t 1 + "t;
z^t = z^t 1 + "t: (A20)
The log-linear version of the resource constraint is:
yt = ct + it +  k (rt   )  1kt 1 + hwtht;
yey^t = cec^t + ie{^t +  k
 
rer^t     1kek^t 1 + hwew^theh^t ;
y(1 + y^t) = c(1 + c^t) + i(1 + {^t) +  k
 1kr

1 + r^t + k^t 1

 
  k 1k

1 + k^t 1

+ hwh

1 + w^t + h^t

;
Recalling that y = c+ i+  k (r   )  1k+ hwh in the steady state and reordering terms
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gives:
yy^t = cc^t + i^{t +  k
 1krr^t +  k 1k (r   ) k^t 1 +
+hwhw^t + hwhh^t;
and by substituting the log-linear versions of the equilibrium conditions in the factor
markets discussed below, this expression can be simplied as follows:
yy^t = cc^t + i^{t +
 
 k
 1kr + hwh

y^t  
 
 k
 1k

k^t 1
y^t =
c
y
c^t +
i
y
{^t +
( k
 1kr + hwh)
y
y^t   ( k
 1k)
y
k^t 1
and reordering terms gives:

1   k
 1kr + hwh
y

y^t =
c
y
c^t +
i
y
{^t  

 k
 1k
y


k^t 1 (A21)
Next, the law of capital accumulation has the following log-linear version:
kt = 
 1(1  )kt 1 + it
kek^t =  1(1  )kek^t 1 + ie{^t
k(1 + k^t) = 
 1(1  )k(1 + k^t 1) + i(1 + {^t)
k + kk^t = 
 1(1  )k +  1(1  )kk^t 1 + i+ i^{t
but since at the steady state k =  1(1  )k + i this equation becomes:
kk^t = 
 1(1  )kk^t 1 + i^{t;
k^t =
(1  )

k^t 1 +
(   1 + )

{^t;
k^t = (1  )k^t 1 + (   1 + )^{t: (A22)
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The FOC for labour has the following log-linear version:
htct = (1  h) (1  )yt;
heh^tcec^t = (1  h) (1  )yey^t ;
but since at the steady state hc = (1  h) (1  )y, the equation becomes:
eh^tec^t = ey^t ;
h^t + c^t = y^t: (A23)
The Euler condition for consumption has the following log-linear version:
1 = Et

ct
ct+1

((rt+1   ) (1   k) + 1)

;
ceEtc^t+1
cect
=
 
rer^t+1    (1   k) + 1;


e(Etc^t+1 c^t) = (1   k)
 
reEtr^t+1   + 1;


(1 + Etc^t+1   c^t) = (1   k)reEtr^t+1   (1   k) + 1;


+


Etc^t+1   

c^t = (1   k) (r   ) + (1   k)rEtr^t+1 + 1;
and according to (A16) 

= (r   ) (1  k)+1 at the steady state and thus the expression
above becomes:


Etc^t+1   

c^t = (1   k)rEtr^t+1:
or, by considering the log-linear version of the equilibrium condition in the capital market
discussed below:


Etc^t+1   

c^t = (1   k)rEty^t+1   (1   k)rk^t; (A24)
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In addition, the log-linear version of the equilibrium condition in the capital market is:
rt+1 = 
yt+1
kt
;
rer^t+1 = 
yey^t+1
kek^t
;
but given that at the steady state r =  y
k
:
er^t+1 = e(y^t+1 k^t);
r^t+1 = y^t+1   k^t: (A25)
And for the equilibrium condition in the labour market is:
wtht = (1  )yt;
wew^theh^t = (1  )yey^t ;
but using the fact that at the steady state wh = (1  )y:
e(w^t+h^t) = ey^t ;
w^t + h^t = y^t: (A26)
Finally, the log-linear version of the government budget constraint is:
geg^t =  k
 
rer^t     1kek^t 1 + hwew^theh^t
=  k
 1kr

1 + r^t + k^t 1

   k 1k

1 + k^t 1

+
+hwh

1 + w^t + h^t

:
Recalling that g =  k (r   )  1k+hwh in the steady state and collecting and reordering
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terms gives:
gg^t =
 
 k
 1kr

r^t +

(r   ) k 1 k

k^t 1 +
+(hwh) w^t + (hwh) h^t;
and substituting (A25) and (A26) into the above expression and cancelling terms yields:
gg^t =
 
 k
 1kr + hwh

y^t  
 
 k
 1k

k^t 1: (A27)
A.4 The reduced form of the RBC model
First, substitute (A23) into (A19) for h^t to get:
y^t = z^t + k^t 1 + (1  ) (y^t   c^t);
y^t = z^t + k^t 1   (1  ) c^t; (A28)
evaluating this at t+ 1 and recalling that Etz^t+1 = z^t gives:
Ety^t+1 =


z^t + k^t   (1  )

Etc^t+1: (A29)
Next, substituting (A29) into (A24) gives:


Etc^t+1   

c^t = (1   k)r



z^t + k^t   (1  )

Etc^t+1

 (1   k)rk^t;


+ (1 k)r(1 )


Etc^t+1 =


ct +
(1   k)r

z^t: (A30)
Meanwhile, to nd consumption in terms of the state variables, take equation (A21)
and dene  =

1  k 1kr+hwh
y
 1
to nd:
y^t =
c
y
c^t +
i
y
{^t  

 k
 1k
y


k^t 1;
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and substitute this expression into (A28) to obtain:


c
y
c^t +
i
y
{^t  

 k
 1k
y

k^t 1

= z^t + k^t 1   (1  ) c^t;

y
cc^t + (1  ) c^t + 
y
i^{t = z^t + k^t 1 +

 k
 1k
y

k^t 1;h
c+(1 )y
y
i
c^t +
i
y
{^t = z^t +

 +

 k
 1k
y



k^t 1:
Dening D = c+(1 )y
y
and substituting (A22) for investment into the equation above
gives:
Dc^t +
i
y

k^t (1 )k^t 1
( 1+)

= z^t +

 +

 k
 1k
y



k^t 1:
Next, collecting terms and dening ' =    1 +  yields:
Dc^t +
i
y'
k^t   i(1 )y' k^t 1  

 +

 k
 1k
y



k^t 1 = z^t;
Dc^t +
i
y'
k^t  
h
i(1 )
y'
+  + k
 1k
y
i
k^t 1 = z^t;
which can be written as:
Dc^t =   iy' k^t +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'
i
k^t 1 + z^t;
c^t =   iy'D k^t +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'D
i
k^t 1 +
1
D
z^t; (A31)
and evaluated at t+ 1 (with Etz^t+1 = z^t) becomes:
Etc^t+1 =   iy'DEtk^t+1 +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'D
i
k^t +

D
z^t: (A32)
Now, these last two equations (A31) and (A32) can be substituted for period t and
period t+1 consumption into the main expectational equation (A30), in which for conve-
nience the denition F =



+ (1 k)r(1 )


was also used. Hence, the resulting equation
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is:
F

  i
y'D
Etk^t+1 +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'D
i
k^t +

D
z^t

=



  i
y'D
k^t +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'D
i
k^t 1 +
1
D
z^t

+ (1 k)r

z^t;
and collecting terms:
 Fi
y'D
Etk^t+1 +

F(i(1 )+y'+k 1'k)
y'D

k^t +
F
D
z^t
=   i
y'D
k^t +

(i(1 )+y'+k 1'k)
y'D

k^t 1 +

D
z^t
+
(1   k)r

z^t;

F(i(1 )+y'+k 1'k)
y'D
+
i
y'D

k^t
=
h
Fi
y'D
i
Etk^t+1 +
h
i(1 )+y'+k'k
y'D
i
k^t 1
+

(1 k)r

+

D
  F
D

z^t;
and, nally the reduced form of the model is:
k^t = G
 1
h
Fi
y'D
i
Etk^t+1 +G
 1
h
i(1 )+y'+k'k
y'D
i
k^t 1
+G 1

(1 k)r

+

D
  F
D

z^t; (A33)
where:
G =

F(i(1 )+y'+k 1'k)
y'D
+ i
y'D

:
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A.5 The reduced form of the jump variables of the
model
Here, the rest of the variables of the model are expressed in terms of the state variables.
First, note that the reduced form for consumption was already found in equation (A31),
but it is written again below for convenience:
c^t =   iy'D k^t +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'D
i
k^t 1 +
1
D
z^t:
Meanwhile, the reduced form for investment can be found directly from the law of
capital accumulation:
{^t =

(   1 + ) k^t  
(1  )
(   1 + ) k^t 1: (A34)
For output, replace consumption from (A31) into (A28) to get:
y^t =
1

z^t   (1  )


  i
y'D
k^t +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'D
i
k^t 1 +
1
D
z^t

+ k^t 1;
=
1

z^t + k^t 1 +
(1 )i
y'D
k^t  

(1 )(i(1 )+y'+k 1'k)
y'D

k^t 1   (1 )D z^t;
= (1 )i
y'D
k^t +

1  (1 )(i(1 )+y'+k
 1'k)
y'D

k^t 1 +

1

  (1 )
D

z^t;
and after rearranging terms this becomes:
y^t =
h
(1 )i
y'D
i
k^t +

y'D (1 )[i(1 )+y'+k 1'k]
y'D

k^t 1 +

D 1+
D

z^t: (A35)
Likewise, for the case of hours worked, replace the above result into the production
function (A19) and then solve for h^t, as follows:
h^t =
1
(1  ) y^t  
1
(1  ) z^t  

(1  ) k^t 1
147
h^t =
h
(1 )i
y'D
i
k^t +

y'D (1 )[i(1 )+y'+k 1'k]
y'D

k^t 1
+

D 1+
D

z^t
 1
(1  )  
1
(1  ) z^t  

(1  ) k^t 1;
and collecting terms gives:
h^t =
h
i
y'D
i
k^t +

y'D (1 )[i(1 )+y'+k 1'k]
y'D(1 )  

(1  )

k^t 1
+

D   1 + 
D (1  )  
1
(1  )

z^t;
and this can be further simplied to:
h^t =
h
i
y'D
i
k^t +

y'D (1 )[i(1 )+y'+k 1'k] y'D
y'D(1 )

k^t 1 +
h
D 1+ D
D(1 )
i
z^t;
and, by further simplifying the last two terms of the r.h.s., the expression nally turns
into:
h^t =
h
i
y'D
i
k^t +

y'D [i(1 )+y'+k 1'k]
y'D

k^t 1 +

D 1
D

z^t: (A36)
The reduced form for the interest rate is found by replacing (A35) into (A25) evaluated
at period t:
r^t = y^t   k^t 1
r^t =
h
(1 )i
y'D
i
k^t +

y'D (1 )[i(1 )+y'+k 1'k]
y'D

k^t 1 +

D 1+
D

z^t   k^t 1;
and collecting terms:
r^t =
h
(1 )i
y'D
i
k^t  

(1 )[i(1 )+y'+k 1'k]
y'D

k^t 1 +

D 1+
D

z^t: (A37)
Next, to nd the reduced form for the competitive wage note that by combining equa-
tions (A23) and (A26), it follows that:
w^t = y^t   h^t = c^t;
and this implies that the reduced form for w^t has exactly the same form as the one for
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consumption. That is:
w^t =
h
  i
y'D
i
k^t +
h
i(1 )+y'+k 1'k
y'D
i
k^t 1 +
1
D
z^t: (A38)
Finally, the reduced form for government spending can be found by substituting (A35)
into (A27), to get:
g^t =
(k 1kr+hwh)
g
y^t   (k
 1k)
g
k^t 1
g^t =
(kr k+hwh)
g

(1 )i
y'D
k^t +
y'D (1 )[i(1 )+y'+k' k ]
y'D
k^t 1 + D 1+D z^t

 
 (k
k
 )
g
k^t 1
and, by collecting terms:
g^t =

(k 1kr+hwh)(1 )i
gy'D

k^t +

(k 1kr+hwh)(D 1+)
gD

z^t +
(k k r+hwh)(y'D (1 )[i(1 )+y'+k k']) (k k )y'D
gy'D

k^t 1 (A39)
A.6 A brief review of di¤erent approaches about the
formation of expectations
A useful way to discuss the di¤erent approaches to modelling expectations is by means of
an example. Consider again the reduced form of a log-linearized (around the steady state)
stochastic model:
k^t = a1Etk^t+1 + a2k^t 1 + b1z^t;
z^t = z^t 1 + "t;
(A40)
where k^ is the endogenous state variable (e.g. capital stock), z^ is the exogenous state
variable (e.g. technology) and "t  iid(0; 2). Also, note that Et represents expecta-
tions, which might not be necessarily rational. This is the same expression as equation
(1:55) in the document. As stressed earlier, many authors (e.g. Evans and Honkapohja,
2001, Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007, 2008, and Giannitsarou, 2006) show that
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a number of economic models - such as the RBC model and many of its extensions - can
be expressed in this convenient form.1
From (A40) it is clear that the solution of the model will depend on the assumption
made about how agents form expectations. This section rst takes a look at the adaptive
expectations hypothesis; then the RE solution is reviewed and nally the AL approach
is considered compared to the rst two. Once the model is solved under these three
approaches, the parameterization of the RBC model presented in the document (for the
US) is borrowed in order to perform some simulations of the evolution of k^t so that the
di¤erent results coming from these formulations can be appreciated.
A.6.1 Adaptive Expectations
Assume that agents form their expectations about the future level of capital according to
the general formulation:
Etk^t+1 = Et 1k^t + #(k^t   Et 1k^t); (A41)
meaning that the previous expectation Et 1k^t is adjusted by a fraction 0 < # < 1 of the
forecast error represented by k^t Et 1k^t. This formulation is usually known as the adaptive
expectations approach to expectations formation. It naturally depends on the value the
correction factor # takes: the higher (smaller) it is the faster (slower) the convergence of
any deviation of k^t to its steady state will be.
To see the impact of this formulation in the model at hand, substitute, (A41) into
(A40) to get:
k^t = a1

Et 1k^t + #(kt   Et 1k^t)

+ a2k^t 1 + b1z^t;
= a1(1  #)Et 1k^t + a1#k^t + a2k^t 1 + b1z^t;
1Also, it was shown earlier that it is always possible to nd the solutions for the jump variables of the
model. For this reason, this section will focus on solving the model and simulating the evolution of the
state variable kt only.
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and rearrange terms to obtain:
k^t   a1#k^t = a1(1  #)Et 1k^t + a2k^t 1 + b1z^t;
k^t =
a1(1  #)
(1  a1#)Et 1k^t +
a2
(1  a1#) k^t 1
b1
(1  a1#) z^t; (A42)
but note that since k^t 1 is the initial capital stock, applying (A41) to nd Et 1k^t yields:
Et 1k^t = k^t 1 + #(k^t 1   k^t 1) = k^t 1;
and thus collecting terms and recalling that zt = zt 1+ "t means that (A42) nally turns
into:
k^t =
a1(1  #) + a2
(1  a1#) k^t 1 +
b1
(1  a1#) z^t 1 +
b1
(1  a1#)"t; (A43)
plus the initial values kt 1 and zt 1.
The adaptive expectations approach played a signicant role in economic modelling in
the 1960s and the 1970s, but became under heavy criticism in the late 1970s and eventually
was replaced by the RE hypothesis as the main paradigm under which economic theory is
constructed. To see why, note that if k^t is increasing, assuming adaptive expectations in
(A43) will systematically underestimate it and if k^t is decreasing then the formulation will
consistently overestimate it. This inherent weakness of the updating rule may provide poor
forecasts and, as a result, it is reasonable to believe that agents will look for better forecast
rules. Having said this, it is worth to note that more insights about this formulation will
be given with the intended simulations.
A.6.2 Rational Expectations
Given the discussion above, assume now that agents form rational expectations (RE) which
implies that there can be no systematic component in the forecast error which agents could
correct. This means that agents will form expectations according to:
Etk^t+1 = E

t k^t+1; (A44)
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where the () superscript denotes rational expectations. Thus the model becomes:
k^t = a1E

t k^t+1 + a2k^t 1 + b1z^t;
z^t = z^t 1 + "t:
(A45)
The method of undetermined coe¢ cients will be used here to nd the solution. First,
it is assumed that rational agents have a (correct) guess about the form of the solution of
the endogenous state variable:
k^t = !kkk^t 1 + !kz z^t: (A46)
Substituting the second equation of (A45) into the expression above gives:
k^t = kk^t 1 + z z^t 1 +
z

"t; (A47)
where k = !kk and z = !kz. These two are the undetermined coe¢ cients of interest.
Leading this expression one period and taking expectations yields:
Et k^t+1 = kE

t k^t + zE

t z^t +
z

Et "t+1;
= kk^t + z z^t; (A48)
because Et "t+1 = 0. Substitute this initial guess into the reduced form model to obtain:
k^t = a1(kk^t + z z^t) + a2k^t 1 + b1z^t;
z^t = z^t 1 + "t;
(A49)
which can be written as a unique equation:
k^t =
a2
(1  a1k)
k^t 1 +
(a1z + b1) 
(1  a1k)
z^t 1 +
(a1z + b1)
(1  a1k)
"t:
Finally, since this last equation must equal the initial guess (A47) formed by agents,
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it follows that:
k =
a2
(1 a1k) ; z =
(a1z+b1)
(1 a1k) ;
and solving the quadratic equation for k yields two results, only one of which (i.e. the
one with negative sign) is consistent with a stable equilibrium (i.e. it has an absolute
value less than one) and is the following:
k  =
1 p1 4a1a2
2a1
and z  =
b1
1 a1(+k2) ;
(A50)
while the other solution (the one with a positive sign in the quadratic equation) is ruled
out as it implies an explosive path for the state variable. Therefore, the solution under
RE is given by:
k^t =
1 p1 4a1a2
2a1
k^t 1 +
b1
1 a1(+k  )
z^t 1 + b11 a1(+k  )
"t: (A51)
plus the initial values k^t 1 and z^t 1.
The example provided above shows clearly that to nd the solution it is necessary
to assume that agents have full knowledge about the model that generates the data as
well as the values of the structural parameters. In that respect, many authors recently
have argued that, while such assumption helps to nd very neat mathematical results for
further analysis and that it might make more sense from a long-run perspective, it is quite
unrealistic when the short and medium-run dynamics observed in practice are considered.
A.6.3 Adaptive Learning
Perhaps a more plausible view of rationality is given by the AL approach, in which agents
are assumed to behave as econometricians when forecasting. As shown in the main docu-
ment, two major points of this approach are: a) it makes the forecast functions and the
estimation of their parameters fully explicit, and b) expectations and forecast functions
inuence future data realizations.
Considering the model given in (A40) again, under AL it is assumed that agents believe
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that the process for k^t is of the form (i.e. the perceived law of motion):
Etk^t+1 = ~k;t 1k^t + ~z;t 1z^t; (A52)
where ~t 1 denotes estimate of  (i.e. the true coe¢ cient under RE) with information up
to t  1. Since this equation represents the behavior of the agents, it can be replaced into
the reduced form model (A41) to get:
k^t = a1(~k;t 1k^t + ~z;t 1z^t) + a2k^t 1 + b1z^t;
z^t = z^t 1 + "t;
which can be written as a unique equation:
k^t =
a2
(1  a1~k;t 1)
k^t 1 +

a1~z;t 1 + b1


(1  a1~k;t 1)
z^t 1 +

a1~z;t 1 + b1

(1  a1~k;t 1)
"t: (A53)
Next, it is further assumed that every period agents run an OLS regression to estimate
the vector of coe¢ cients ~ = [~k; ~z]
0. It was shown in the document that the OLS
formulation can be expressed recursively as:
~t = ~t 1 + t
 1R 1t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

;
Rt = Rt 1 +
1
t

xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

;
where xt = [k^t; z^t]0 and Rt is the 2  2 second moment matrix of xt. Therefore, the
complete model under AL in the form of RLS is given by the system:
k^t =
a2
(1 a1k;t 1) k^t 1 +
(a1z;t 1+b1)
(1 a1k;t 1) z^t 1 +
(a1z;t 1+b1)
(1 a1k;t 1) "t;
~t = ~t 1 + t
 1R 1t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

;
Rt = Rt 1 + 1t
 
xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

;
(A54)
plus the initial values k^t 1 and z^t 1 as well as the initial conditions ~t 1 and Rt 1.
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A.6.4 A simulation of the results
In order to see the di¤erent results obtained for a model solved under these three assump-
tions, the RBC model considered in this document is taken again and calibrated for US
post-war quarterly data as in Ireland (2004). Hence the parameter values are  = 0:99,
 = 0:36,  = 1:0039,  = 0:025,  = 2:59,  = 0:95, " = 0:00712, Z = 2, and nally
 k = h = 0. Accordingly, the coe¢ cients of the rst equation of the reduced-form model
in (A40) are a1 = 0:4962, a2 = 0:5012 and b1 = 0:0107, while the second equation has
coe¢ cients  = 0:95 and " = 0:00712.
Before going any further, two major points must be stressed in this exercise. First,
to isolate the e¤ects of the di¤erent assumptions about the agents expectations, it is
assumed that z^t 1 = 0 (i.e. the exogenous state variable is at its steady state value) and
that "t = 0 so that the environment in this particular exercise is deterministic. Second,
to see how di¤erent the speeds of convergence towards the steady state are under each
expectations formulation, two cases for the initial value of the endogenous state variable
are considered: a) when k^t 1 =  0:1 or 10% below the steady state value - represented by
the x-axis as it is equivalent to k = 0 - and b) when k^t 1 = 0:1 or 10% above the steady
state value k = 0.
Figure A1 plots the di¤erent trajectories of k^t under each case of interest. For the model
under adaptive expectations it is assumed that the correction factor is very high, equal
to 0:9 implying a relatively fast return to equilibrium under this process. This parameter
plus the values of the coe¢ cients a1, a2 and b1imply that (A43) becomes k^t = 0:9953k^t 1.
This law of motion is plotted in the Figure using dashed curves: one for the case when
k^t 1 =  0:1 (i.e. below the 0 straight line) and another one for the case when k^t 1 = 0:1.
When RE is assumed, equation (A51) becomes relevant and, after replacing the para-
meter values, the resulting law of motion is k^t = 0:9349k^t 1. The two dotted curves in the
Figure exhibit the predicted trajectory of k^t under this assumption for the two alternative
levels of k^t 1. Finally, when AL is assumed, the solution is given by the system (A54),
which implies that only the RLS algorithm has been considered for this exercise as an
illustration of the main properties of this approach. In order to nd ~t 1 and Rt 1, the
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RGD initializing method - described in detail in the document - was assumed with t0 = 20
the number of preliminary observations. Given the rst estimates ~t, the law of motion in
the rst period is k^t = 0:9507k^t 1 but, as more information becomes available over time,
it converges towards the one associated to RE.
In the three cases at hand the results are found to be symmetric with respect to the two
di¤erent initial values for k^. However, from the Figure it is clear that the RE hypothesis
generates the fastest convergence trajectory to the steady state level of zero. In fact, after
80 periods approximately k^t virtually returns to its steady state level.
On the other hand, even with a high correction factor (i.e. 0:9), the adaptive expec-
tations formulation shows a much slower convergence towards equilibrium, a result that
reinforces the notion that (A41) systematically underestimates k^t if it is increasing (as
shown by the the low convergence of the dotted curve below the x-axis when compared to
the dashed curve) and that systematically overestimates k^t if it is decreasing. Moreover,
the return to equilibrium under this assumption only occurs after several periods (in this
exercise, this is reasonably achieved after 1500 periods, not shown in the Figure), a strong
degree of inherent inertia that seems di¢ cult to reconcile with what is seen in practice.
The simulation of the path of k^t under AL provides a good illustration of the versatility
of this approach. As discussed in the main document, the initial values taken by the RLS
learning algorithm to estimate the coe¢ cient t become quite critical as these dene how
close to the RE solution the law of motion under learning will be in the short and medium
run (i.e. in the long run convergence is ensured). In this example, given the initial values
~t 1 and Rt 1 (found using 20 preliminary observations), AL generated a slower return
to equilibrium compared to RE. However, if more preliminary periods are allowed so that
the initial values are closer to the coe¢ cients coming from the RE solution, one should
expect the predicted path of k^t to be much closer to the one under RE.
In the same line, if the initial values are far away from the RE solution - showing a
poor initial ability to learn - then the predicted path will probably start closer to the one
under adaptive expectations but then the estimates will unambiguously improve in the
following periods and hence these will eventually get much closer to the RE path thus
exhibiting a much faster return to equilibrium. These properties show why AL is usually
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dened as a small deviation from RE which tries to depict a learning process by the agents
when these are equipped with adequate techniques that help them to do so as more data
become available.
A.7 Ordinary Least Squares in recursive form
As explained in the document, it is assumed that every period agents run an OLS regres-
sion:
k^t = x
0
t 1~t + t;
with t the forecast error, in order to obtain estimates ~t, but using data up to t 1. The
OLS formula in this case is:
~t =
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1 tX
i=1
xi 1k^i: (A55)
The recursive representation of (A48) is found as follows. First, note that it can also
be written as:
~t =
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1 t 1X
i=1
xi 1k^i + xt 1k^t
!
: (A56)
Moreover, note that at the beginning of the recursion, k^t 1 in the second term of the r.h.s.
can be expressed as:
k^t 1 = x0t 2~t 1;
where ~t 1 is the rst estimate found one period before (following a specic procedure
such as RGD or AHC, which are described in the document) and thus it is given for the
current period t. Therefore, replacing this into the main equation (A55) gives:
~t =
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1 t 1X
i=1
xi 1x0i 1~t 1 + xt 1k^t
!
;
but expanding the rst term in the second parenthesis of the r.h.s gives the equivalent
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expression:
~t =
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1 " tX
i=1
xi 1x0i 1 xt 1x0t 1
#
~t 1 + xt 1k^t
!
;
which can be written as:
~t =
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1 " tX
i=1
xi 1x0i 1
#
~t 1   xt 1x0t 1~t 1 + xt 1k^t
!
;
or, by expanding the whole expression:
~t =
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1 tX
i=1
xi 1x0i 1
!
~t 1  
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1
xt 1x0t 1~t 1
+
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1
xt 1k^t;
and this can simplied to:
t = ~t 1  
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1
xt 1x0t 1~t 1 +
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1
xt 1k^t
= ~t 1 +
 
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1
! 1
xt 1
h
k^t   x0t 1~t 1
i
:
Next, dene:
St =
tX
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1;
so that the above equation becomes:
~t = ~t 1 + S
 1
t xt 1
h
k^t   x0t 1~t 1
i
; (A57)
while the behavior of S can be described by:
St =
t 1X
i=1
xi 1x
0
i 1 + xt 1x
0
t 1;
= St 1 + xt 1x
0
t 1: (A58)
159
Therefore, the entire recursive representation of OLS is given by the system:
~t = ~t 1 + S
 1
t xt 1
h
k^t   x0t 1~t 1
i
;
St = St 1 + xt 1x
0
t 1:
However, note that this recursion can also be written in a di¤erent (but perhaps more
well-known) way by dening Rt = St=t. In such case, the second part of the recursion as
in (A57) is:
St
t
=
1
t
St 1 +
1
t
xt 1x
0
t 1;
Rt =
1
t
St 1 +
1
t
xt 1x
0
t 1;
but multiplying the rst term of the r.h.s. side by (t  1)=(t  1) gives:
Rt =
1
t
(t  1)
(t  1)St 1 +
1
t
xt 1x
0
t 1;
=

1
t  1  
1
t(t  1)

St 1 +
1
t
xt 1x
0
t 1;
= Rt 1 +
1
t

xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

: (A59)
Meanwhile, the rst part of the recursion is:
~t = ~t 1 +
t 1
t 1
S 1t xt 1
h
k^t   x0t 1~t 1
i
;
= ~t 1 +
1
t
R 1t xt 1
h
k^t   x0t 1~t 1
i
: (A60)
So, nally, the recursion is given by the system:
Rt = Rt 1 + 1t
 
xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1

:
~t = ~t 1 + t
 1R 1t xt 1

k^t   x0t 1~t 1

;
(A61)
and these are the two expressions described and used when applying the RLS learning
algorithm in the document.
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A.8 Compensating consumption supplement
Following Lucas (1990) and Giannitsarou (2006), the welfare measure considered is the
percentage amount, , by which consumption should change in all periods in the pre-reform
economy so that agents are equally well o¤ as in the post-reform economy (including the
transition periods), but conditional on the initial random shock to technology. Therefore,
considering the aggregate version of (1:1), this means:
E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCpostt   Hpostt

=
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln

Cpret

1 +

100

  Hpret

j "0 = "; (A62)
which can be written as:
UpostT =
1X
t=0
t ln

1 +

100

+ E0
1X
t=0
t [lnCpret   Hpret ] j "0 = ";
for T = 1; 2; :::;1, or:
UpostT =
1X
t=0
t ln

1 +

100

+ UpreT j "0 = ":
Since  is less than unity it follows that
P1
t=0 
t ! 1=(1  ). Hence, solving for  gives:
ln

1 +

100

= (1  ) UpostT   UpreT  j "0 = "
or, nally:
 =
h
ef(1 )[UpostT  UpreT ]g   1
i
 100 j "0 = ": (A63)
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 The descentralised competitive equilibrium ver-
sion of the model
c;t =   Cc;t
 1(1  hc;t)1 
(Cc;t 1(1  hc;t)1 ) (B.1)
ctwt(
h   1) =   C

c;t(   1)
(Cc;t(1  hc;t)1 )(1  hc;t)
(B.2)
ct =  ct+1( + 2Kc;t+1kc + rk;t+1( k   1)  1) (B.3)
ct =  ct+1(2Bc;t+1bc + rb;t+1( k   1)  1) (B.4)
Bc;t+1  Bc;t  Gt +Kc;t+1 =  Kc;t(   1) B2c;tbc (B.5)
 Cc;t  K2c;tkc   hcw(h   1)
 (Bc;trb;t +Kc;trk;t)( k   1)
st =  
Cs;t
 1(1  hs;t)1 
(Cs;t 1(1  hs;t)1 ) (B.6)
stwt(
h   1) =   C

s;t(   1)
(Cs;t(1  hs;t)1 )(1  hs;t)
(B.7)
st =  st+1( + 2Ks;t+1ks + rk;t+1( k   1)  1) (B.8)
st =  st+1(2Bs;t+1bs + rb;t+1( k   1)  1) (B.9)
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ut =  
Cu;t
 1(1  hu;t)1 
(Cu;t 1(1  hu;t)1 ) (B.10)
utwu;t(
u   1) =   C

u;t(   1)
(Cu;t(1  hu;t)1 )(1  hu;t)
(B.11)
Cu;t = hu;twu;t(1  u) +Gt (B.12)
rk;t =
1

A( (nuhu;t)
 + (1  ) ( (ncKc;t + nsKs;t) + (B.13)
(1  ) (nchc;t + nshs;t)) ) 1 1 
(1  ) 

( (ncKc;t + n
sKs;t)
 +
(1  ) (nchc;t + nshs;t)) 1 
 (ncKc;t + n
sKs)
 1
wt =
1

A( (nuhu;t)
 + (1  ) ( (ncKc;t + nsKs;t) + (B.14)
(1  ) (nchc;t + nshs;t)) ) 1 1 
(1  ) 

( (ncKc;t + n
sKs;t)
 +
(1  ) (nchc;t + nshs;t)) 1 
(1  p) (nchc;t + nshs;t) 1
wu;t =
1

A( (nuhu;t)
 + (1  ) ( (ncKc;t + nsKs;t) + (B.15)
(1  ) (nchc;t + nshs;t)) ) 1 1 (nuhu;t) 1
Gt + (1 + rb;t)(n
cBc;t + n
sBs;t) = n
cBc;t+1 + n
sBs;t+1 + 
krk;tn
cKc;t (B.16)
+ krb;tn
cBc;t + 
hwtn
chc;t
+ krk;tn
sKs;t + 
krb;tn
sBs;t
+hwtn
shs;t + 
uwu;tn
uhu;t
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Yt = n
cCc;t + n
sCs;t + n
uCu;t + n
cKc;t+1   (1  )ncKc;t (B.17)
+nsKs;t+1   (1  )nsKs;t+1 + bcncB2c;t
+kcn
cK2c;t + 
b
sn
sB2s;t + 
k
sn
sK2s;t
where:
Yt = A
n
 (nuhu;t)
 + (1  ) [ (ncKc;t + nsKs;t) + (1  ) (nchc;t + nshs;t) ]


o 1

Note too that ct , 
s
t and 
u
t are the Lagrangian multipliers associated to the bud-
get constraints of the three types of agents considered in the model. The descentralised
competitive equilibrium is completed with the AR(1) process describing the exogenous
behavior of productivity.
B.2 Model solution under rational expectations
Consider the system of equations given in (2:20). Employing the undetermined coe¢ cients
method, agents rst guess that the equilibrium laws of motion for the state variables under
RE have the following linear form:
xt = xxt 1 + zzt (B.18)
where x and z are coe¢ cient matrices. Substituting for zt using the last equation in
(2:20) gives:
xt = xxt 1 + zzt 1 + z
 1ut (B.19)
where x = x and z = z. Leading (B:19) by one-period and taking expectations of
both sides yields:
Etxt+1 = xxt + zzt (B.20)
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since z
 1Et [ut+1] = 0. Substituting (B:20) and (B:19) into the rst equation of (2:20)
gives:
xt =

(I M1x) 1M2

xt 1 +
+

(I M1x) 1 (M1z +M3)
  
zt 1 + ut

: (B.21)
Comparing (B:21) with (B:19) implies that the unique RE solution of the reduced-form
model is given by the two parameter matrices, hereafter denoted by x and z, that satisfy
the following two equations:
x = (I M1x) 1M2
z = (I M1x) 1 (M1z +M3):
(B.22)
Assuming x and z exist, the solution for the models state variables under RE is:
1
xt = xxt 1 + 
 1zzt: (B.23)
Substituting (B:23) and the expected value of its lead into the second equation of (2:20)
gives the RE solution for the models control variables:
yt =
h
N1x +N2 +N4
2
x
i
xt 1 +
+

N1
 1z +N3 +N4
 
z + x
 1z

zt: (B.24)
B.3 Model solution under adaptive learning
Under the AL hypothesis, it is also assumed that private agents can correctly guess the
form of the equilibrium policy functions of the state variables given by (B:18). However, in
contrast to the RE solution, it is assumed that they do not know the time-invariant para-
meter values given by x and z, which ultimately govern the dynamics of the economy.
2
Therefore, they must rely on past data and a recursive learning algorithm to estimate these
1The two solution matrices x and z, were obtained applying the method proposed by Klein (2000).
2See Evans and Honkapohja (2001), for further details.
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parameters to produce forecasts of the endogenous state variables for the next period. As
new data become available in each period, they revise their parameter estimates so that
their forecasting errors are corrected gradually.
More formally, agentsexpectations are assumed to follow a so-called perceived law of
motion (PLM) of the form:
Etxt+1= ~x;t 1xt + ~z;t 1zt (B.25)
where parameters ~x and ~z are the estimates of x and z coming from a recursive least-
squares regression and E denotes that expectations do not follow the RE hypothesis.3
Following a similar procedure as under RE, we substitute (B:25) into the rst equation
of (2:20) to obtain:
xt= P1xt 1 +  1P2zt (B.26)
where
P1= (I M1~x;t 1) 1M2
P2= (I M1~x;t 1) 1

M1~z;t 1 +M3

:
(B.27)
Equation (B:26) is referred to as the actual law of motion (ALM) since every new observed
value of xt depends on the deep parameters of the model economy but also on the agents
forecasts given by the PLM (B:25).
The actual laws of motion for the control variables under learning are found by sub-
stituting (B:26) for xt and (B:25) for Etxt+1 in the second equation of (2:20) giving:
yt =
h
N1P1 +N2 +N4~x;t 1P1
i
xt 1 +
+
h
N1
 1P2 +N3 +N4

~x;t 1
 1P2+~z;t 1
i
zt: (B.28)
To estimate ~x and ~z in (B:25) we rst dene the matrix wt = [Bc;t; Kc;t; Bs;t; Ks;t;
at]
0 and then use the recursive least-squares (RLS) learning algorithm which can be written
3Note, we follow the common assumption (see, e.g. Evans and Honkaphoja, 2001, and Carceles-Poveda
and Giannitsarou, 2007) that at period t agents form expectations for xt+1 using their estimates from the
previous period, ~x;t 1 and ~z;t 1, which allows us to avoid a problem of simultaneity in the learning
process.
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for t = 1; 2; 3:::; as follows:
~t= ~t 1+gtR
 1
t wt 1(xt   ~
0
t 1wt 1)
0
Rt= Rt 1+gt
 
wt 1w
0
t 1  Rt 1
 (B.29)
whereRt is a matrix with the second moments of the regressors included inwt; (xt   ~0t 1wt 1)
is the latest forecast error that will be used to correct the current estimates; and gt = 1=t
is a decreasing gain sequence implying that, as t increases, every new forecast error will
have a lower relative importance in the updating process.4
B.3.1 Initial conditions for learning
To represent the importance of initial beliefs for the solution of the model under learning,
dene pre =

x;pre; z;pre
0
and post =

x;post; z;post
0
as the RE solution matrices
for the pre-reform and post-reform economies, respectively, and ~0 =
h
~x;0; ~z;0
i0
as the
matrix containing the starting values of the learning algorithm. To obtain the rational
expectations solution, we assume that:
~0 =

x;post; z;post
0
(B.30)
where R0 is the covariance matrix associated with the values of the endogenous state
variables as predicted by their corresponding policy functions under the post-reform RE
solution post.
5
For the case of homogeneous learning, we assume, as in Giannitsarou (2006), that:
~0 =

x;pre; z;pre
0
(B.31)
4See, e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and Honkapohja and Mitra (2006), for more details on
stability conditions under learning. We make use of Matlab functions made available by Carceles-Poveda
and Giannitsarou (2007), to solve the model under learning.
5To obtain R0 we make use of a numerical approximation involving the following steps: (i) simulate
a series of N(0; a) random shocks for the exogenous state variable at, for Tnum = 100; 000 periods; (ii)
using (i), simulate the values for the endogenous state variables as predicted by their corresponding policy
functions under the post reform RE solution (post) for Tnum; (iii) construct w(5Tnum) including the
time series of the simulated values for the ve states (Bc;t; Kc;t; Bs;t; Ks;t; at); and (iv) compute the
covariance matrix in a recursive fashion according to the second equation of (B:29), where the starting
values R0 and w0 are given by two zero matrices.
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where the covariance matrix R0 is computed as described above, using (B:31) instead of
(B:30).
For the case of heterogeneous learning, we assume that the skilled workers "guess"
that the coe¢ cients remain the same and thus use the coe¢ cients that correspond to the
pre-reform economy in their policy functions for the initial period. In contrast, we assume
that the capitalists are able to predict the post-reform RE steady-state and their optimal
reduced form coe¢ cients for their policy functions in this equilibrium, so that their "guess"
for their initial coe¢ cients correspond to the post-reform RE solution.
This heterogeneity in beliefs implies that the initial guesses for both agents are e¤ec-
tively incorrect, as the actual economy, as determined by the interaction of their choices,
is neither in the pre- nor in the post-reform RE equilibrium. Given the gap between the
expected and actual outcomes, both agents use thereafter recursive least-squares to learn
the coe¢ cients.
Formally, let 
c
x;post and 
c
z;post be a (4  2) and (1  2) sub-matrices of x;post and
z;post, respectively, containing the two columns of x;post and z;post that correspond to
the policy functions of the capitalists. Similarly, let 
s
x;pre and 
s
z;pre be a (4  2) and
(12) sub-matrices of x;pre and z;pre, respectively, containing the two columns of x;pre
and z;pre that correspond to the policy functions of the skilled workers. Hence, ~0 is
constructed as:
~0 =
264 cx;post42 sx;pre42

c
z;post

12


s
z;pre

12
375 (B.32)
while, for consistency, R0 is now computed as above but using (B:32) instead.
Note that for all the post-reform scenarios considered, ~0 always satises the station-
arity condition that the real parts of all the eigenvalues of ~x;0 must lie inside the unit
circle, while R0 is always an invertible matrix. These two conditions ensure the algorithm
is adequately initialised, see, e.g. Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007.
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B.3.2 E-stability and convergence
An important issue is whether the RLS learning algorithm chosen in this work will converge
to the RE solution. To verify this, we rst consider the so-called expectational stability
or E-stability of the model under learning. E-stability determines the stability of the RE
solution under a learning rule such as RLS, in which the estimates ~x and ~z used in the
PLM (B:25) are adjusted slowly in the direction of the implied ALM parameters shown
in (B:27).
In fact, if this adjustment process is completed, feeding the latest estimates ~x and ~z
in the two ALM parameters in (B:27) should yield exactly the same two estimates for ~x
and ~z. In such a case, these estimates must be equal to the RE solution parameters x
and z, since the model at hand has a unique equilibrium. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
demonstrate that such condition can be veried by computing the following two matrices
(associated to x and z, respectively):
Qx =

(I M1x) 1M2
0 
 (I M1x) 1M1 ;
Qz = 
0 
 (I M1x) 1M1 (B.33)
and then testing if all their corresponding eigenvalues have real parts less than one. For
our model, the E-stability condition is met for the base calibration of the model as well
as for all the tax reforms considered. This is also true for the additional calibration
included when discussing the importance of the degree of substitutability between capital
and unskilled labour.
A second condition for convergence is the stationarity of the RE solution. This requires
that the eigenvalues of x have real parts less than one, ensuring that the part of the RE
solution associated with the lags of the state variables do not have an explosive path.
The stationarity condition is also met for the all the experiments considered in this work.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that if the E-stability and stationarity conditions are
satised, then the RLS algorithm converges locally to x and z and thus the model at
hand is learnable.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Descentralised competitive equilibrium
(C
1
c;t (1  hc;t)2G1 1 2c;t )1 1
Ck;t
=  c;t(1 +  c;t) (C.1)
 (C1c;t (1  hc;t)2G1 1 2c;t )1 2
1  hk;t = c;t(1  h;t)wt (C.2)
 c;t = c;t+1( 1 +    (1  h;t+1)rk;t+1 + 2kcKc;t+1) (C.3)
 c;t = c;t+1( 1  rb;t+1 + 2bcBc;t+1) (C.4)
(1 +  c;t)Cc;t +Kc;t+1   (1  )Kc;t =  Bc;t+1 + (1 + rb;t)Bc;t (C.5)
+(1   k;t)rk;tKc;t +Gtr
+(1  h;t)wthc;t + bcB2c;t + kcK2c;t
(C
1
w;t(1  hw;t)2G1 1 2c;t )1 1
Cw;t
=  w;t(1 +  c;t) (C.6)
 (C1w;t(1  hw;t)2G1 1 2c;t )1 2
1  hw;t = w;t(1  h;t)wt (C.7)
 w;t = w;t+1( 1 +    (1  h;t+1)rk;t+1 + 2kwKw;t+1) (C.8)
 w;t = w;t+1( 1  rb;t+1 + 2bwBw;t+1) (C.9)
rk;t = At(ncKc;t + nwKw;t)
 1(nchc;t + nwhw;t)1  (C.10)
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wt = (1  )At(ncKc;t + nwKw;t)(nchc;t + nwhw;t)  (C.11)
Gc;t +G
tr =  (1 + rb;t)(ncBc;t + nwBw;t) + ncBc;t+1 (C.12)
+nwBw;t+1 +  c;tncCc;t +  k;trk;tncKc;t
+h;twtnchc;t +  c;tnwCw;t +  k;trk;tnwKw;t
+h;twtnwhw;t +R
ng
t
Yt = ncCc;t + nwCw;t + ncKc;t+1 (C.13)
 (1  )ncKc;t + nwKw;t+1
 (1  )nwKw;t +Gc;t + bcncB2c;t
+kcncK
2
c;t + 
b
wnwB
2
w;t + 
k
wnwK
2
w;t +R
ng
t
where:
Yt = At(ncKc;t + nwKw;t)
(nchc;t + nwhw;t)
1 
Note that c and w are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget constraints
of the two types of agents in the model. The descentralised competitive equilibrium is
completed with the two AR(1) processes that describe the behavior of productivity and
gas revenues, plus one of the debt-targeting rules proposed in the main text.
C.2 Model solution
The solution of the model assuming both RE and AL is qualitatively similar to the de-
scription given in parts B.1 and B.2 of Appendix B. In the case of learning, however, the
initial conditions are di¤erent in this chapter and thus are described next.
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C.2.1 Initial conditions for learning
When considering the case of homogeneous learning, we should assume that:
~0 =
264 cx;i42 sx;i42

c
z;i

12


s
z;i

12
375 (C.14)
where i represents any possible set of initial beliefs (e.g. pessimistic or optimistic) which
are common to both types of agents but that are away from those consistent with the RE
equilibrium.1 However, as expected, since in this case both capitalists and workers will
learn in exactly the same fashion (i.e. due to the same initial beliefs and same learning
algorithm), no additional relevant distributional e¤ects coming from this assumption can
be found and thus we do not pursue this approach any further.
Hence, for the case of heterogeneous learning, we explore the possibility that the cap-
italists have already learned the parameters of their policy functions and are aware of the
implications of the scal rule applied by the authorities as ifthey were fully rational.
In contrast, the workers nd themselves with limited information and, as a result, their
initial beliefs are slightly o¤ their true parameters according to the RE equilibrium.
Here, we consider three possibilities: a) they do not know the impact the scal rules
applied might have on the economy, b) they do not know the impact of the rule but
also have pessimistic initial beliefs (i.e. consistent with a worse-o¤ equilibrium) regarding
the situation of the economy and c) they do not know the impact of the rule and have
optimistic initial beliefs instead.
Therefore, if an exogenous shock hits the economy, this heterogeneity in beliefs implies
that the initial guesses for both agents in their attempt to return to the steady-state will be
e¤ectively incorrect. This is the case because the capitalists do not know that the workers
are not fully rational and their initial beliefs are in fact incorrect. On the other hand, the
1To obtain R0 we make use of a numerical approximation involving the following steps: (i) simulate
a series of N(0; a) random shocks for the exogenous state variables a^t or R^t, depending on the shock
under analysis, for Tnum = 100; 000 periods; (ii) using (i), simulate the values for the endogenous state
variables as predicted by their corresponding policy functions under 0 for Tnum; (iii) construct w(6Tnum)
including the time series of the simulated values for the six states (B^c;t; K^c;t; B^w;t; K^w;t; a^t; R^t); and (iv)
compute the covariance matrix in a recursive fashion according to the second equation of (B:29), where
the starting values R0 and w0 are given by two zero matrices.
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workers are not aware of the original error in their initial estimates and also do not know
that the capitalistsbeliefs are much closer to the RE equilibrium. The interaction between
both types of agents will take place in these circumstances, thus a¤ecting their choices
over time as unexpected larger forecast errors might take place during their estimation
procedures.
More formally, the learning process after any exogenous shock has taken place will
start with an heterogeneity in beliefs described by:
~0 =
264 cx;re42 sx;j42

c
z;re

12


s
z;j

12
375 (C.15)
where j represents the three alternative initial beliefs of the workers.2 From then on,
capitalists and workers will interact using the same learning algorithm as they try to
eventually learn their true coe¢ cients, associated to the unique RE equilibrium. Finally,
note that for all the scenarios considered, ~0 always satises the stationarity condition
that the real parts of all the eigenvalues of ~x;0 must lie inside the unit circle, while R0
is always an invertible matrix, two conditions that will ensure the learning algorithm is
adequately initialised.
C.2.2 E-stability and convergence
Following a similar discussion to that presented in section B.2.2 of Appendix B, the rst
condition for convergence of the learning process towards the RE solution, i.e. the E-
stability condition, is met for the base calibration of the model under all the alternative
scal rules considered. This is also true for the additional calibrations included in order
to obtain the hypothetical lower and higher steady-states used to characterise di¤erent
initial beliefs of the workers. The second condition for convergence, which consists in
the stationarity of the RE solution is also met for all the experiments considered in this
Chapter.
2For consistency, R0 is now computed as above (see previous footnote) but using (C:15) instead
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Table C.1: Evolution of the welfare inequality ratio
Rule type Short Run Lifetime
RE AL-opt AL-pes RE AL-opt AL-pes
After a -4.5% TFP shock
Rule on G=Y 0.7935 0.7936 0.7934 0.7947 0.7946 0.7945
Rule on  k 0.7932 0.7934 0.7930 0.7944 0.7946 0.7945
Rule on h 0.7936 0.7954 0.7926 0.7948 0.7947 0.7946
Rule on  c 0.7935 0.7936 0.7935 0.7947 0.7946 0.7945
After a -20% commodity shock
Rule on G=Y 0.8008 0.8005 0.8011 0.7985 0.7985 0.7985
Rule on  k 0.8003 0.8000 0.8004 0.7982 0.7981 0.7982
Rule on h 0.8011 0.7997 0.8020 0.7987 0.7986 0.7987
Rule on  c 0.8008 0.8005 0.8011 0.7985 0.7985 0.7985
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